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The Life Cycle Model of the Fertility Choice in 
Hungary
Petra Németh  
In this paper, we model the Hungarian fertility choice at the micro level. We outline 
a life cycle model in which a representative family makes decisions on its number of 
children, the timing of having children and the mother’s return to work after having 
children over the course of its life cycle. In constructing the model, we incorporate 
the factors influencing the decision to have children (with a particular emphasis on 
the family benefits scheme between 2006–2014) and how the behaviours of various 
household types (in terms of qualifications) differ from each other. According to 
the simulation results, among the family support tools presented, the family tax 
allowance scheme introduced in 2011 has a significant impact on the final number 
of children, maternal age and the timing of childbearing among low and medium 
education families. The measures introduced in 2014 provide incentive to have 
three children in all educational groups and foster the early labour market return 
of mothers. To our knowledge, no similar modelling attempts have been made so 
far in the Hungarian literature. 
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: C61, D91, H31, J13, J18 
Keywords: childbearing, family support, life cycle model
1. Introduction
The objective of this paper is to model the decision to have children in Hungary 
at the micro level, in order to expand the current body of material on this topic. 
In constructing the model, we incorporated the domestic factors influencing the 
decision to have children (with a particular emphasis on the family benefits scheme) 
and how the behaviours of various household types (in terms of qualification) differ 
from each other. To our knowledge, there have been no similar attempts to date in 
the Hungarian literature to create a model for the optimal timing of having children.
A substantial body of literature exists on the modelling of women’s fertility 
and labour decisions, but the modelling technique vary widely. The foremost 
Petra Németh is assistant professor at the Department of Macroeconomics of Corvinus University of Budapest.
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representatives of one of the main directions describe women’s fertility and 
sequential labour supply decisions in a dynamic model, also known as the life cycle 
model under specific circumstances and conditions. The common feature of these 
models is that they assume optimising economic agents and factor in all direct and 
indirect costs and benefits associated with having children. Solving or structurally 
estimating these types of dynamic models gives us answers to several key questions 
such as family policy allowances and the role of childcare institutions in life cycle 
decisions, as well as explanations for decreasing fertility, changes in female labour 
supply and the differences in the fertility and labour supply decisions between 
countries (Arroyo – Zhang 1997, Hotz et al. 1997, Francesconi 2002, Del Boca – 
Sauer 2009, Bick 2010, Keane – Wolpin 2010). In this model framework, we can 
also investigate not only the optimal number of children, but also the optimal time 
interval between births.
Hotz, Klerman and Willis (1997) and Arroyo and Zhang (1997) provide a broad 
overview of the structure, characteristics and solvability of the dynamic or life cycle 
model investigating the fertility decision, while the work of Gábos (2005) provides 
a summary in Hungarian. Francesconi (2002) estimated a dynamic structural model 
in which married women make labour supply and fertility decisions. Women 
differ according to their full-time or part-time work status. The model yielded an 
important result in several regards, of which the most relevant one for our topic 
is: if the mother works full time and has a child, she will achieve a significantly 
lower lifetime utility if she stays off the labour market for an extended period after 
childbirth compared to staying off the labour market for a short period. However, 
this difference is negligible among women with part-time work. Keane and Wolpin 
(2010) also used a structurally estimated life cycle model to quantify the extent to 
which the difference in preference, the available welfare services and differences in 
labour market opportunities determined the life cycle decisions of Spanish women 
with various characteristics. Del Boca and Sauer (2009) estimated a decision rule 
derived from the life cycle model using data from Italy, France and Spain and 
drew conclusions from this on the link between the institutional environment, 
labour market flexibility, childcare institutions and activity and fertility decisions. 
Bick (2010) investigated two reforms recently introduced in Germany using a life 
cycle model calibrated to German data. His main line of investigation is the role 
of subsidised early childhood childcare in the life cycle labour supply of married 
women and their willingness to have children. Based on the results of the model, 
Bick (2010) concludes that the labour market activity and fertility of women with 
children under three years of age is positively influenced by the availability of 
subsidised crèches.
Mainly tied to Bick’s (2010) paper, we build a microeconomics-based dynamic or 
life cycle model to determine the optimal childbearing strategy for Hungary that 
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factors in the fertility choice, resuming work after having children and the temporal 
links between the factors shaping the decision to have children and the mechanism 
of action between them. Accordingly, we would like to lay the foundations of a life 
cycle model that takes into account and factors in to such extent as is practicable 
the domestic economic and institutional factors and environment that influence/
determine a family’s fertility decisions and the subsequent return to work. These 
factors are: daytime childcare options for young children; the mother and father’s 
education, labour market status and labour income; family allowances and tax rules. 
Among these, we focus particularly on investigating the role of family policy tools 
on fertility decisions. We would like to especially emphasise that – for modelling 
purposes – we ignored every other factor that we knew has or may have a significant 
impact on fertility choice, including changes in values, the spread of new types of 
relationships, cultural and biological factors or the family’s housing conditions. In 
summary, we outline the life cycle decisions of women having completed their 
studies, but still of childbearing potential given the specific support and paid leave 
system, while the model’s resolution is based on comparing the direct and indirect 
costs and benefits of having children.
The model ultimately shows that given a specific support environment, when to 
have children and how many children are optimal with how much labour market 
absence for families is characterised by different parameters (different education). 
In other words, the model gives us an answer as to how the many transformations 
of the family benefits scheme influence families’ optimal childbearing and in what 
direction, all other things being equal. Based on the model, we also attempt to 
offer an explanation to in-depth questions such as which benefits affect the timing 
of childbearing and which benefits foster a quick return to the labour market; 
which benefits best contribute to childbearing by families with various degrees of 
education; how does the optimal childbearing strategy of families with different 
degrees of education differ under a specific benefits system. We look at three 
various family support regimes: the regime prevailing in 2006–2010, the one in 
2011–2013 and the new legislative package on support and paid leave for mothers 
with small children adopted in 2014 (referred to as GYED-extra).
In the following, this paper is structured as follows: After the introduction, we 
outline the life cycle model and its resolution in Chapter 2 and provide and calibrate 
the model’s parameters. In Chapter 3, based on the model’s simulation results we 
present how a specific support and tax scheme influences the life cycle decisions 
on childbearing and female employment of families with different degrees of 
education, while Chapter 4 summarises the results of the model and presents the 
final conclusions.
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2. The life cycle model of fertility choices under various family 
benefits schemes
In accordance with the literature, the model features the following general 
characteristics: It is first made up of a man and a woman who make a decision on 
their number of children and the timing of childbearing, on the utilisation of their 
time and incomes during their life cycle. The couple maximises its lifetime utility 
characterised by constant preference ordering1 given specific time and budgetary 
constraints, and given the factors shaping the number of children and the raising 
of children and the technological constraints shaping the woman’s productivity. 
The man and the woman’s human capital increases with age/experience (and, as 
a result, their labour income), but at a decreasing rate, and the mother’s human 
capital amortises during the time spent at home on maternity leave, in other words 
if she leaves the labour market (Bartus et al. 2013). In terms of the general structure, 
we supplemented or simplified the known modelling framework in several regards 
(adjusted to the Hungarian environment) and thus work based on the following 
specific life cycle model.
A typical family’s joint life cycle decision on having children and working is 
considered realistic at different ages depending on its level of education, but the 
model investigates a 20-year period uniformly for every level of education. We 
also assume that the start of work is also the potential start of the option of having 
children irrespective of the degree of education. We determined the age for starting 
work based on the age published in the 2012 Hungarian Labour Market Yearbook 
and corresponding to the starting age for earning included in the 2011 age-income 
profiles: the examined career begins at age 18 for the unskilled and those with low 
qualification, at age 20 for those with medium qualification and at age 25 for those 
with high educational qualification (Fazekas – Benczúr – Telegdy (edit.) 2012:372, 
Figure 6.3.4). In addition, in line with the data, we can also assume that most 
women in Hungary currently have a child before the age of 45 and most women 
have their first child before the age of 30 on average (KSH 2015:53, Table 4.1.3).
We know, however, that having a child is a lifelong commitment and can be a 
significant cost/benefit for the family until the child turns 25. It would therefore be 
warranted for the couple to consider its decision to have children in light of their 
entire lifetime. However, we rejected this option for two reasons. For one, in line 
with the literature, we also use the simplifying assumption that borrowing or saving 
is not possible in either period (Arroyo – Zhang 1997; Hotz et. al 1997; Francesconi 
2002; Del Boca – Sauer 2009; Bick 2010; Keane – Wolpin 2010). For this reason, 
we are unable to model either the flow of wealth between nations or long-term 
1  This assumption is important because we are currently not looking at the effect of changes in preference, 
that is, of changes in value on fertility.
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care for the child in this framework. The other reason is that we do not think that 
someone who is planning to have a child in the near future is able to calculate or 
thoroughly consider the associated costs over the long term, i.e. over the next 
20–25 years. Even if they could, it is improbable that this would substantially change 
their current decision.
The woman is the household’s actual decision-maker, meaning it is she who decides 
during every period on consumption, childbearing and, if she has a young child, on 
labour, while the man has a passive role and works during every period (with the 
exception of families with education of less than eight years of elementary school) 
(Hotz et al. 1997; Keane – Wolpin 2010; Fehr – Ujhelyiova 2011). We assume that 
in periods when the family has no young children or does not yet have any young 
children, the woman works full time (except if the mother has education of less than 
eight years of elementary school, in which case she remains inactive throughout 
her entire lifetime). However, if there is a small child under the age of three in the 
family, the woman can decide about returning to work. Furthermore, each family 
can have three children at most in the model, only one child can be born per period2 
and the woman dedicates all of the time to child-raising in the years when a child 
is born. After they are born, the children consume similarly to their parents, and if 
the mother works, the children require childcare during early childhood (e.g. public 
crèche, family day-care, private crèche). We do not differentiate between the raising 
of children in the model,3 which may be a function of how much different parents 
spend on their child’s education and training. For the sake of simplicity, we assume 
that free pre-school and school is available for every child at the same standard, and 
therefore we regard the cost of caring for children over the age of three as zero. We 
do not incorporate it into the model that the costs of raising children may change 
as a function of the child’s age and the parents’ education (Bartus et al. 2013).
In the model, we distinguish between families based on the parents’ highest 
level of completed education. Investigating based on education is warranted for 
several reasons. For one, the productivity of an unskilled couple, a couple with low 
qualification, medium qualification or high qualification and thus their income profile 
differs over the course of their lifetime (Bartus et al. 2013). In addition, several family 
benefits in Hungary depend on income or are at least tied to employment therefore 
in conjunction with the different educational levels these benefits offer quite 
different economic incentives for having children. Accordingly, we view the model 
separately for decision-makers representing an unskilled group (up to eight grades 
of elementary school), a group with low qualification (vocational training, vocational 
school), medium qualification (high school) and high qualification (higher education), 
2  We assume that the probability of infant mortality is zero.
3  The trade-off between the number of children and the quality of children is addressed in the work of Becker 
(1993) and Bick (2010).
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and symbolise the highest completed level of education with the starting gross 
salary and productivity parameters. For men, we assume an exogenous productivity 
profile depending on age and qualification level. By contrast, the productivity profile 
for women is endogenous, because we factor in that she does not work during the 
period when she is raising a child and her human capital accumulated up to that 
point amortises (Bartus et al. 2013). For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the 
individuals making up a household have the same level of education.4 We estimated 
the productivity trajectory parameters in the 2010 and 2011 environment based on 
2011 real gross wages and in the 2014 environment based on 2013 real gross wages 
for men and women and for every educational level.
We solved the basic model for three different support environments for each 
educational level under the family support regime prevailing in 2010, in 2011 
and the new regime introduced in 2014. The eligibility criteria for family benefits 
have changed substantially since 1 January 2014, and a new system that is more 
flexible in several points was adopted. In summary, all of the state tools that provide 
additional (disposable) income for families after they have children fall under the 
umbrella of family support; this concept therefore includes cash and family benefits5 
and the family tax incentive system (according to the definition given by Ignits – 
Kapitány 2006).
To the extent allowed by an abstract model, we attempted to realistically incorporate 
the eligibility rules for benefits under the old and new regimes, the amount of 
benefits, the prevailing taxation rules and the income trajectories by educational 
level. However, we ignored other transfers as they are not closely tied to our main 
topic. In summary, we made the following assumptions in our model:
•  We distinguish for educational levels: unskilled (up to eight grades of elementary 
school), low qualification (vocational training, vocational school), medium 
qualification (high school) and high qualification (higher education).
•  The father works during every period and throughout his time if he has at least 
a low level of education. Unqualified fathers only spend a portion of their time 
working.
•  The mother does not work until the child is one year old, can decide on working 
when the child is between one and three years old and works full time once the 
child is older than three. Unqualified women are an exception to this and spend 
all of their time at home irrespective of age or number of children.
4  There is empirical evidence that women with higher qualification typically choose a partner with higher 
qualification (Becker 1981; Bartus et al. 2013).
5  Cash benefits include the prenatal allowance and the childcare allowance, while family benefits include the 
maternity allowance, the family allowance, childcare benefits and the child-raising allowance.
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•  Daytime childcare for young children costs money.
•  We consider the period between 18 and 37 years of age as the childbearing period 
for unskilled women and women with low education, between 20 and 39 years 
for women with medium education and between 25 and 44 years for women 
with high education.
In addition, we consider the following “fertility and labour life cycles” as the baseline 
and feel that these are an accurate reflection of reality for an average family with 
high, medium, low or no education:6
•  A typical unskilled woman will have her first child at the age of 20, and we assume 
that she will remain inactive for the rest of her life.
•  A typical woman with low education will have her first child at the age of 27, have 
two children consecutively and spend five years on average off the labour market.
•  A typical woman with medium education will have one child at the age of 29 and 
spend three years off the labour market.
•  A typical woman with high qualification (higher education) will have one child at 
the age of 31 and spend three years off the labour market.
In the following subchapters, we outline the costs and benefits of a family after they 
have children; we present the theoretical model that we built and its resolution, 
and finally we provide and calibrate the model’s parameters.
2.1. Costs and benefits of raising children
Having and raising children is associated with the following direct and indirect costs 
for families in the model:7
•  the consumption of children (direct)
•  costs for daytime childcare for young children if the mother works (direct)
•  the mother’s lost current income during her years spent at home (indirect)
•  the mother’s human capital loss reflected in lower lifetime income (indirect)
•  the one-off fixed cost of the mother’s return to the labour market which increases 
with the number of children (representing the utility of household work) (indirect)
6  We must emphasise that when interpreting the results, these assumptions will serve as a baseline but will 
not influence the results.
7  András Gábos and Iván Gál Róbert factor similar components into the cost of raising children (Gábos – Gál 
– Keller 2007).
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From another perspective, having children is beneficial for families for the following 
reasons:
•  The child is a source of joy. The instantaneous utility function is therefore positively 
dependent on the number of children.
•  Families are eligible for numerous transfers if they have children (family support 
and social security cash benefits).
•  Parents are also eligible for the family tax incentive if they have children.
2.2. The household’s decision-making problem
2.2.1. Lifetime utility
The maximisable lifetime utility function takes on the following form in the model:




where 0 < β < 1 is the impatience parameter, u(.,.) is the instantaneous utility 
function8 which is the unit of consumption expressed in money (cit ) and the 
additively separable function of the current number of children (nit):
 u cit ,nit( )=






where σ is the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (σ > 0, σ ≠ 1), Ω 
shows the weight of the number of children within decision-making preferences and ε 
measures how the utility function value reacts to changes in the number of children. 
In the lower index, i refers to the type of household based on educational level while 
T is the length of the examined life cycle, and t pertains to the period under review. 
We assume that the man and the woman have the same level of completed education 
which may be one of the following four: unskilled, low, medium or high education, 
respectively shown as i=0,1,2,3. Irrespective of educational level, the life cycle decision 
to have children is investigated over a 20-year period, although this applies to the 
period between 18 and 37 years of age for unskilled individuals and those with low 
qualification, between 20 and 39 years of age for individuals with medium education 
and between 25 and 44 years of age for individuals with high education.
2.2.2. Changes in the number of children over time
mit ϵ {0,1} is the number of children to be born during the period under review, 
which is equal to 0 if no children are born at the time t and 1 if a child is born. If 
8  Bick (2010) and Jones (2010) used a form of function similar to ours. Bick and others included women’s 
leisure time in the momentary utility function, but in our case, it is equal to zero.
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mit = 1, then the number of children, nit increases by one. Only one child can be 
born per year, that is
 nit = nit−1 +mit , (3)
assuming that the children outlive their parents.
2.2.3. The budget constraint
We assume that neither saving nor borrowing is possible and so the family spends 
all of the income after tax from the man’s work (indicated in the upper index as m) 
and the woman’s work (indicated in the upper index as f) and the transfers granted 
based on their children on consumption and if necessary for the children’s daytime 
care and the other costs of starting work. Accordingly, the budgetary constraints 
for a family of type i in the year t under the 2010 regime will be:
 weitmLim +weitfLitf −TAXt +TRt = cit 1.7+0.5nit( )+ pLitf mit−1 +mit−2( )+k 1− Lit−1f( )Litf  (4)
where the man and the woman’s gross wage is the real wage per efficiency unit w( ) 
obtained as a multiple of productivity eitm ,eitf( )  and hours worked Lim ,Litf( ) . The family 
pays tax during every period, the sum of which following deduction of the family tax 
allowance is TAXt. All tax burdens are incurred differently under the various regimes 
due to changes in the family tax incentive and tax rules (see below). The benefits 
granted based on children further boost revenues, marked as TRt during the period 
t (see below). The family must use its sources of income to cover all of its outlays, 
including its total consumption expressed as a multiple of a unit of consumption 
(cit) and the OECD scale.9 Another expense is incurred if the mother returns to 
work when her child is between one and three years of age (mit-1 = 1 or mit-2 = 1), 
in which case daytime childcare must be arranged; the unit cost of this expressed 
in hours worked is p. The mother’s time spent at home is not only useful in terms 
of childcare, but also for performing household chores. This is symbolised by the 
cost k, which is the one-off cost of the mother returning to the labour market. The 
value of the parameter k increases in parallel to the number of children.
Productivity profile. The man’s productivity during his lifetime follows an exogenous 
trajectory depending on his age and education (Hotz et al. 1997; Attanasio et al. 
2008; Keane – Wolpin 2010; Fehr – Ujhelyiova 2011). We describe developments 
in productivity as a function of the highest completed education (symbolised by 
the parameters aim ,γ im ) , the amount of work experience (t) and the productivity 
level of the previous period eit−1m( ), similarly to the 2008 paper of Attanasio et. al.:
 eitm = eit−1m eα i
m+γ imt , where α im > 0, γ im < 0 , (5)
9  The OECD equivalence scale is the most prevalent in the literature, which assumes the consumption of the 
first adult among those sharing a household as one unit, the consumption of every additional adult as 0.7 
units and the consumption of every child as 0.5 units (OECD 1982).
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where the function’s parameters differ by educational level (i). We also assume that 
the age of the man and the woman and their highest level of completed education 
are the same. The woman’s productivity profile is defined endogenously because it 
depends on the labour supply decision also besides the qualification and the work 
experience (Attanasio et al. 2008). If the woman works during the period under 
review Litf =1( ) , then her knowledge acquired until then will increase relative to the 
previous period at the same rate as the man’s, while if she does not work Litf = 0( ), 
then her productivity up to that point amortises at a rate of δ, that is:
 eitf = eit−1f e
α if +γ ift( )Litf −δ 1−Litf( )( ) , where α if > 0, γ if < 0 . (6)
Amount of taxes under the 2010, 2011 and 2014 regimes. In 2010, personal income 
tax (τ1) was due based on the consolidated tax base (gross wage plus 27 per cent, 
also referred to as super gross) while social contributions (pension contribution (τ2), 
health insurance contribution (τ3), labour market contribution (τ4)) were charged 
to the gross wage (NAV 2016). There was also an opportunity for tax credits which 
we factored into the model. We specify the accurate parameters in Subchapter 2.4. 
The family tax incentive (indicated as tax1 per child) was granted as a tax rebate if 
a family had three or more children (Blaskó 2009). The total tax burden decreased 
by the family tax incentive can be calculated for 2010 as follows:
 TAXit2010 = τ 1 ⋅1.27+τ 2 +τ 3 +τ 4( ) weitmLim +weitfLitf( )−nit ⋅tax1 . (7)
By 2011 the tax regime had become a single-rate regime, but super grossing and tax 
crediting were still employed. Contributions were still due based on the gross wage 
(NAV 2016). Starting from 2011, the family tax incentive for families with children – 
the rate per child of which depends on the number of children and is represented 
by tax2(nit) – is an item which reduces the tax base and is deducted from the super 
gross wage (NEFMI 2011). Accordingly, the total tax burden decreased by the family 
tax incentive can be calculated for 2011 as follows:
TAXit2011 = τ 1 ⋅ 1.27 weitmLim +weitfLitf( )−nit ⋅tax2 nit( )( )+ τ 2 +τ 3 +τ 4( ) weitmLim +weitfLitf( )  (8)
By 2014, super grossing was abolished, and thus personal income tax and 
contributions were also due based on the gross wage (NAV 2016). The family tax 
incentive remained as an item which reduced the tax base, but the tax incentive 
was expanded to encompass a family contribution incentive from 1 January 
2014. Accordingly, if the family is unable to apply the full family incentive due 
to insufficient taxable income, it had the option to decrease its health insurance 
contribution, and later its pension contribution, by 16 per cent of the unapplied 
sum (or a portion thereof); we factored in the specific conditions of this regulation 
in solving the model (EMMI 2014). Total tax payable can thus be expressed based 
on TAXit2014 as follows:
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TAXit2014 = τ 1 ⋅ weitmLim +weitfLitf −nit ⋅tax2 nit( )( )+ τ 2 +τ 3 +τ 4( ) weitmLim +weitfLitf( )−
−0.16 ⋅ nit ⋅tax2 nit( )−weitmLim +weitfLitf( )
 (9)
Size of transfers under the 2010 and 2011 regimes. If a child is born in a family 
(mit=1), the mother first becomes entitled to a maternity allowance (TR0) as a 
guaranteed right (MÁK 2014). Until the child turns one, the mother receives a 
prenatal allowance10 (tgyás, represented by TRt1 ), which amounts to 70 per cent 
of the mother’s real income earned in the year preceding the birth of the child and 
is only subject to the deduction of advance personal income tax (τ1):
 TRt1 = 1−τ 1( )⋅0.7wieit−1f Lit−1f  (10)
(OEP 2014). However, if the mother has another child and does not return to the 
labour market between the two births, the most she can received after the second 
child is a prenatal allowance of TR 1 . Afterwards, the mother is eligible for the 
childcare benefit (gyed, represented by TRt2 ) until the child turns two, which also 
rises to 70 per cent of the mother’s real income earned in the year preceding the 
birth of the child, which is also subject to a pension contribution payment obligation 
(τ2) besides the advance personal income tax and its amount is maximised TR 2( ) , 
that is:
 TRt2 =min 1−τ 1 −τ 2( )⋅0.7wieit−2f Lit−2f ;TR 2{ }  (11)
(OEP 2014). During parental leave, the mother is eligible for childcare benefits (gyes) 
as a guaranteed right, which is a fixed sum and is only subject to the deduction of 
a pension contribution (represented, after the deduction of contributions, by TR3). 
If the mother returns to work after the child turns one, she loses eligibility for the 
childcare allowance, but will become eligible for childcare benefits alongside her 
earned income11 (MÁK 2014). Families with three children receive childcare benefits 
during their entire life cycle, not only until the children turn three,12 which we took 
into consideration in our programming. The family receives a family allowance for 
every child from the time of their birth (TR4(nit)), which is a fixed sum and its amount 
depends on the number of children (MÁK 2014).
The amount of transfers under the 2010 and 2011 regimes (TRt2010/2011 ) are 
determined as:
10  In reality, the prenatal allowance is only granted in the first 24 weeks and from then on, the mother can 
apply for childcare allowance until the child turns one. For the sake of simplicity, we nevertheless assume in 
the model that the mother receives a prenatal allowance until the child turns one and childcare allowance 
when the child is between one and two years old.
11  Here, we diverged from the actual policy, because under the 2011 regime, mothers could work up to 30 
hours per week while receiving childcare benefits instead of full time.
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TRt2010/2011 =TR0mit +TRt1mit +TRt2mit−1 1− Litf( ) 1−mit( )+TR3mit−2 1−mit−1( ) 1−mit( )+
+TR4 nit( )nit  (12)
In solving the model, we also factored in that the childcare allowance is only granted 
to the mother if she was insured before giving birth ( Lit−2f =1 , or TRt−21 =1, or TRt2 =1) 
and does not work when the child is between one and two years old. If the mother 
did not have valid insurance, she will still receive childcare benefits until her child 
turns two as follows:
TRt2010/2011 =TR0mit +TR3mit +TR3mit−1 1−mit( )+TR3mit−2 1−mit−1( ) 1−mit( )+
+TR4 nit( )nit  
(13)
If there are several children under the age of three, the mother is only entitled 
to one benefit among the prenatal allowance, the childcare allowance and the 
childcare benefit under this regime.
Size of transfers under the 2014 regime. In the context of the extra childcare 
allowance (GYED-extra), the same benefits are available from 2014 and the amount 
of support (with the exception of the gyed maximum) and calculation method are 
the same. However, eligibility for these benefits changed significantly in two regards: 
one is that mothers can work full time while receiving the childcare allowance and 
the other is that the mother is eligible for several benefits if she had multiple young 
children. Accordingly, we calculate the amount of benefits under this family benefits 
scheme (TRt2004 ) differently than earlier:
 TRt2014 =TR0mit +TRt1mit +TRt2mit−1 +TR3mit−2 +TR4 nit( )nit . (14)
If the mother does not gain eligibility for the prenatal allowance and the childcare 
allowance, she can only receive childcare benefits during the first two years:
 TRt2014 =TR0mit +TR3mit +TR3mit−1 +TR3mit−2 +TR4 nit( )nit . (15)
2.2.4. Time constraint
One usual assumption in the literature is that the man works full time during every 
period, that is Lim =1  (working time is normalised to one) (Hotz et al. 1997). We, 
however, only deem this assumption acceptable taking account of the stylised facts 
for a representative family of low, medium or high educational level (i = 1,2,3). By 
contrast, an unskilled breadwinner only spends 15 per cent of his time working 
during every period, that is, L0m = 0.15 . Among women, we distinguish between 
unskilled and qualified women.13
13  See footnote 17 for an explanation of the choice of parameters.
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In the model, we assume that the unskilled woman does not work irrespective of 
whether or not she has a child, that is, L0tf = 0  during every period. If, however, 
the woman has at least a low educational level (i = 1,2,3), we use several limiting 
assumptions in her case. The woman’s labour supply Litf  can take on two discrete 
values, zero and one. If the family does not yet have or no longer has any young 
children, the woman works full time, that is:
 Litf =1, if mit ,mit−1 ,mit−2 = 0 and  if i =1,2, 3  (16)
We also assume that the woman does not work in the year of having the child, 
that is
 Litf = 0, if mit =1 and  if i =1,2, 3 . (17)
However, if the mother’s child is between one and three years old, she must make 
a decision on working (or having more children), considering the associated costs 
and benefits. In this case, the woman has two options: either working full time or 
raising the child full time:
 Litf = 0,1{ }, if mit−1 =1 or mit−2 =1 and  if i =1,2, 3 . (18)
Although the change is radical between the two options,14 this assumption is not far 
removed from reality, as the part-time employment of women in Hungary is still low.
2.3. Resolving the household’s decision-making problem
Resolving the household’s dynamic problem can be expressed in the following 
manner. The household maximises its lifetime utility with the constraints presented 
in the previous chapter. The woman’s decision-making problem to be represented 
using the following Belman equation:
 Vit
Lfm =max u cit ,nit( )+βVit+1Lfm , ∀t <Ti
VitL
fm =max u cit ,nit( ), t =Ti
 (19)
where VL
fm  is the value function. We resolve the model recursively, progressing 
backwards from the last period according to the dynamic programming model 
with the help of a MATLAB software package. In the model, the woman must make 
decisions throughout the life cycle on consumption (cit), childbearing (mit) and 
labour ( Litf ) in possession of the parameters and exogenous status variables  Lim ,eitm( ). 
We also assume that the couple’s decision is characterised by perfect foresight and 
that the family benefits scheme and tax rules under review (2006–2010, 2011–2013 
or 2014) will remain in place throughout their lifetime. It is based on this that we 
are seeking the “best mit − Litf  series of combinations” throughout the life cycle that 
14  While the mother receives childcare benefits, the employer has an obligation to take her back on the 
workforce with weekly working time of 30 hours at the mother’s request.
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maximises the lifetime utility of the household of type i under the specific family 
benefits scheme. When expressing a series of combinations, we factor in that one 
family can have up to three children. We then calculate the optimal fertility and 
labour strategy separately for 12 different scenarios – four educational levels and 
three family benefits schemes – that yields the highest lifetime utility.
2.4. Selecting parameter values
We set the model’s parameters in terms of tax and social contribution rates and 
family benefits and the family tax incentive based on their actual value for all three 
periods and regimes. In the model, we regard one as HUF 100,000 and compare 
the other parameters expressed in money to this. The Appendix summarises the 
parameter values.
Under the 2010 regime, in the two-rate tax system, the personal income tax rate 
levied on labour income was 17 per cent for annual income of up to HUF 5 million 
(τ1=0.17) alongside a certain tax credit15 and for income of over HUF 5 million, 17 
per cent for the portion of up to HUF 5 million and 32 per cent for the portion over 
HUF 5 million (in this case, τ1=0.32). The contributions were: 9.5 per cent pension 
contribution (τ2=0.095), 6 per cent health insurance contribution (τ3=0.06) and 1.5 
per cent labour market contribution (τ4=0.015) (NAV 2016). The family tax incentive 
was HUF 4,000 per child (tax1=0.04) in 2010 (SZMM 2010).
In 2011, the tax regime was a single-rate regime with a 16 per cent personal 
income tax rate (that is,(τ1=0.16), but super grossing and tax crediting16 were still 
employed. Among contributions, only the pension contribution changed to 10 per 
cent (τ2=0.1), while the value of τ3, τ4 remained unchanged (NAV 2016). From 2011, 
the family tax incentive granted if a family had children was HUF 62,500 if there 
were one or two children, and HUF 205,000 if there were three or more children 
(tax2(nit)=0.625/2.05) (NEFMI 2011). 
In 2011, the personal income tax rate levied on gross wages was also 16 per cent 
(τ1=0.16). Another change was the increase in the health insurance contribution 
to 7 per cent (τ3=0.07), while all other contributions remain at their 2011 level. 
The family tax incentive remained unchanged between 2011 and 2014, but the 
tax incentive was expanded to encompass a family contribution incentive from 1 
January 2014 (NAV 2016; EMMI 2014).
15  The tax credit was 17 per cent of the wage (but capped at HUF 15,100) and can be fully used if annual 
income is HUF 3,188,000; the tax credit then decreases for higher incomes. Annual incomes in excess of 
HUF 4,698,000 are not eligible for the tax credit (NAV 2016). We took into account the relevant threshold 
value for the tax credit.
16  The monthly amount of the tax credit in 2011 was 12,100 at most, which can be used if annual income 
was 2,750,000, while the rate of the tax credit decreased for higher incomes. Annual incomes in excess of 
HUF 3,960,000 are not eligible for the tax credit (NAV 2016).
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Because the man works all the time if his educational level is i = 1,2,3 and working 
time is normalised to one, Lim =1  if i = 1,2,3. For the unskilled, this is L0
m = 0.15.17 
For the sake of simplicity and easier comparison, we assume that real wage 
applied to the efficiency unit w =1. In the model, we assume that daytime care 
for young children (in a public crèche, family day-care, private crèche or a babysitter) 
represents a cost of p per unit of time for parents irrespective of their educational 
level if the mother returns to the labour market. We compare this value to the 
monthly cost of day-care for an average family,18 so we estimated a cost of HUF 
50,000 in 2011 and a cost of HUF 60,000 in 2014 (p = 0.5/0.6). There is a shortage 
of capacity in public crèches and the existing crèches are overcrowded. If we take a 
closer look at the statistical data, it can be seen that in recent years 33–35 per cent 
of children in crèches were over three years old,19 which means that the children of 
mothers who would like to return to the labour market while receiving the childcare 
allowance or childcare benefits are partially crowded out. In addition, the family 
also faces a cost of k that increases with the number of children if the mother 
resumes work: this cost reflects the utility of the household work performed during 
the mother’s time spent at home. We do not differentiate this cost by educational 
level because we feel that it is not a function of education, but instead it differs 
individually based on how much and what level of household work is deemed 
useful for whom.20
We derived the baseline values of productivity and the parameter values based on 
actual cross-sectional data for 2011 for the 2010 and 2011 versions of the model and 
based on data for 2013 for the 2014 model in the following manner: In the model, 
the temporal productivity profile coincides with the developments in the gross wage 
over time, thanks to the w =1  and Lim =1  assumptions, which allows us to estimate 
productivity parameters based on actual real earnings data. For every gender and 
for all four levels of education, the baseline productivity level at the beginning of 
the life cycle ei ,1f ,ei ,1m( )  is based on the average starting gross real wage in 2011 
and in 2013 for the 2014 version.21 For men, productivity follows an exogenous 
17  In the reference year 2011 the employment rate of males with education of less than eight years of 
elementary school was 9.7 per cent, while for those with education at most eight years of elementary 
school 28.7 per cent, for females the values were 4.7 and 17.8 per cent (KSH 2016). Based on this, we set 
the employment of males with education at most eight years of elementary school as 15 per cent, while 
for females it was 0.
18  We must dispel the myth that public crèche places can be accessed free of charge. Prior to 2011, payment 
could be requested for covering the raw material costs of meals and after 2011, a certain portion of 
overheads can be claimed from parents. Since 1 January 2012, the public operator can collect payment from 
parents for the daytime care of children. These fees apply over and above meal fees (Makay – Blaskó 2012).
19  Calculated based on KSH 2014.
20  For instance, the importance or conversely, the substitutability of homemade meals for a family does not 
depend on educational level. For more on the calculation of the cost of household work, see Gábos et al. 
2007.
21  Fazekas – Benczúr – Telegdy (edit.) 2012:372, Figure 6.3.4. and Fazekas – Varga (edit.) 2015:238, Figure 
6.3.4.
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trajectory. We determined the value of productivity parameters α im ,γ im( )   in such 
a manner that the exogenous trajectory of productivity most closely follows men’s 
age-income profile by educational level in 2011 and in 2013 for the 2014 version.22
Women’s productivity trajectory, which plays a role for women with low, medium 
and high qualification, is determined endogenously, because if the woman has 
a child and remains off the labour market, then her knowledge acquired until 
then amortises (δ) and depreciates. We use the values of Fehr and Ujhelyiova 
(2011) for the amortisation rate (δ), i.e. we assume 1 per cent for women with 
low qualification and 2 per cent for women with medium and high qualification. 
We first took into account when and how many children a typical woman of a 
given level of education has and how long she remains off the labour market. The 
estimation procedure is then identical to the procedure used for men. For women, 
we determined the value of productivity parameters α im ,γ im( )  in a manner that 
the “typical woman’s”23 productivity trajectory most closely follows the age-income 
profile by educational level in 2011 and in 2013 given the baseline productivity 
values and the amortisation rate.24
The sum of family benefits for one month provides the monthly amounts used in 
the model. Accordingly, the value of the maternity allowance is TR0=0.053, as we 
distributed HUF 64,125 proportionately over 12 months. The amount of the other 
benefits – the maximum prenatal allowance (TR 1) and childcare allowance (TR 2), 
childcare benefits (TR3), child-raising allowance (TR3), family allowance (TR4) – is 
defined by law; we used the relevant annual amounts for these items. For instance, 
if the net monthly child care benefit is HUF 25,600, we used TR3=0.265 in the model. 
The values of the benefits provided under the family policy regimes under review 
are constant between 2008 and 2014.
The value of the impatience parameter is normally set between 0.9 and 1 for life 
cycle models (Attanasio et al. 2008; Bick 2010; Fehr – Ujhelyiova 2011). Similarly 
to the model of Attanasio et. al. (2008), we used 0.98 as the value of β. For 
the parameters of the utility function, we also used the standard values found 
in the literature when possible. The reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution of consumption, σ, ranges between 1.5 and 2, while ε, which measures 
how much the utility function reacts to changes in the number of children, is around 
1.5. We used the values of Bick (2010): therefore we fixed σ at 1.98 and ε at 1.39. 
Finally, in knowledge of the foregoing, we calibrated Ω, the weight of the number of 
children within instantaneous utility so that – in line with the stylised facts – highly 
qualified families optimally had one child at the age of 31 in the 2010 environment, 
22  See: Fazekas – Benczúr – Telegdy (edit.) 2012:372/Figure 6.3.4. and Fazekas – Varga (edit.) 2015:238, 
Figure 6.3.4.
23  See the list in Chapter 2.
24  See: Fazekas – Benczúr – Telegdy (edit.) 2012:372/Figure 6.3.4. and Fazekas – Varga (edit.) 2015:238, 
Figure 6.3.4.
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while those with low qualification optimally had their child as young as possible. We 
uniformly use these values for the parameters associated with utility for all three 
household types/educational levels and all support environments. The Appendix 
provides a tabulated summary of the specific parameter values.
The majority of the taxation/labour market/productivity/family support parameters are 
estimated based on actual data, and therefore we did not subject them to robustness 
testing. An exception to this is the parameter representing daytime care for small 
children (p), in which a ±20 per cent divergence did not change our conclusions; in 
other words, our results can be regarded as robust for these parameter values. This is 
mainly due to the fact that for families of low and medium educational level, this cost 
is not incurred,25 while for highly qualified families, this expenditure item is so small 
compared to income that a ±20 per cent divergence in the cost does not impact their 
decision. We also performed a sensitivity test for ±5, 10 and 20 per cent divergences 
in the parameter Ω (the weight of the number of children in instantaneous utility). We 
address our results and interpret the tables in the following chapter.
3. Simulation results
Solving the model gives us an answer to the optimal number of children that a 
couple with a specific level of education should have during their lifetime and when 
they should optimally have them under the current benefits system, and when the 
mother should return to the labour market in order to maximise her lifetime utility. 
It should be noted once again that in the model we make the optimal strategy 
of having children conditional exclusively on the family support and taxation 
environment and the level of education, that is, we ignore all other parameters 
(such as changes in values or standards, the spread of new forms of relationships, 
cultural and biological factors and housing status) which, in reality, also shape the 
number of children and the timing of childbearing. Because other influencing factors 
are ignored, the model is only partially able to reflect the observable differences in 
the fertility patterns of families with differing characteristics. In summary, the results 
show the optimal number of children that a given family type should have and 
when they should optimally have them when considering the financial aspects only.
The decision on the right strategy is made by comparing the various temporal costs 
and benefits of having children. Childbirth in a family is, on the one hand, a value 
in and of itself, i.e. it represents a positive benefit throughout the family’s lifetime. 
On the other hand, the parents become entitled to various benefits and allowances 
for many years (income effect), and therefore family benefits positively impact 
consumption and life cycle utility by increasing lifetime income. If the amount 
of benefits increases in parallel with the number of children, or if they become 
25  For families of low and medium educational level, we assume that the mother spends three years at home 
with her children and therefore, there is no need for daytime childcare.
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available only subject to a certain number of children, then the income effect is 
stronger (e.g. the system of tax allowances). But if the amount of benefit per child 
does not increase or increases only marginally in parallel with the total number of 
children, then the correlation is weaker (e.g. family allowance) (Gál 2011).
From another perspective, having children represents substantial expenses for 
the family. These expenses grow as the number of children increases. One of the 
parents – in reality most frequently, and also in the model, the mother – temporarily 
leaves the labour market after the child is born, meaning that she does not receive 
any income and the mother’s expertise acquired until then is eroded during parental 
leave which will, in turn, setback her entire future life cycle earnings (substitution 
effect) (Jones et al. 2010; Gál 2011; Bartus et al. 2013), negatively impacting the 
family’s life cycle consumption and thereby also its life cycle utility. As the number 
of children increases, the value of lost income from work and the mother’s human 
capital amortises to a greater extent (Bartus et al. 2013). Moreover, with age and 
experience, the wage of those with a higher level of education increases much 
more dynamically than that of their peers with a lower level of education, and for 
this reason, they are likely to delay their intention to have children (postponement) 
in order to minimise the impact of the alternative cost of having children on their 
life cycle income26 (Bartus et al. 2013). Therefore, the substitution effect is greater 
overall in families with a higher level of education. However, this is compensated 
by the fact that the earning party in the family will have a higher lifetime income 
throughout his lifetime than a father with a lower educational level. The fact that 
the children also consume, just as the parents, and during early childhood they need 
day-care (direct cost) if the mother returns to the labour market, also represent 
additional costs. However, the model fails to consider that fact that the cost of 
child-rearing increases in parallel with the age of the children.
Overall, the optimal number of children and the optimal time of having them is 
obtained so that the family reaches the maximum lifetime utility resulting from 
the above-mentioned costs and benefits arising during the life cycle. It is of crucial 
importance as to what extent the amount of benefits and tax allowances received 
for the children can compensate the family’s lost lifetime income and the direct 
costs associated with child-rearing. The costs and the benefits associated with 
having children differ for decision-makers with different educational levels and in 
the different family support and taxation environments, and for this reason, the 
optimal outcome will be different for each of them. In our analysis, we compare the 
values of the calculated life cycle utility in the different scenarios. We always take 
as a starting point the “typical fertility- employment life cycles”27 which we deem 
to best reflect reality in the case of an average family with high, medium and low 
educational level. We always compare the values of lifetime utility with the initial 
26  Aspects of economies of scale.
27  We presented the typical fertility-employment life cycles in Chapter 2.
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case in such a way that, ceteris paribus, we modify some of our initial conditions. In 
the simulation, the final number of children, the mother’s optimal age, the timing of 
having children and the length of parental leave are examined. First, we collectively 
examine the fertility strategy of individuals with low, medium and high educational 
level; we then separately analyse the change in the willingness to have children of 
unskilled couples.
When resolving the model, we took into consideration the current support and 
taxation environment for every regime, while we estimated the gross earnings 
based on the gross income paths based on education in 2011 and 2013 in the case 
of the support system in force in 2010/2011 and in 2014, respectively. However, 
in its current form, the model is unable to reflect the changes in real values (not 
adjusted by inflation), and therefore we should not draw conclusions in the case of 
the different regimes from the comparison of the absolute values of obtained life 
cycle utility. The model can, however, provide answers as to which family support 
environment incentivises more children, earlier employment or, in the case of more 
children, a faster timing to have children. In the following subchapter, we present 
the simulation results and the conclusions we can draw from them in the different 
cases.
3.1. Optimal number of children
Firstly, the main focus of the analysis is to find out how many actual children is 
optimal for the different family types during their lifetime in the different support 
and taxation environment in 2010, 2011 and 2014. For the purposes of the analysis, 
we considered the mother’s time spent with her child/children as constant. The 
preconditions and the results of the simulation are presented in Table 1.
Table 1
Value of lifetime utility of the various types of families in the examined three 












































2010 11.841 11.921 11.74 11.634 9.662 9.573 9.484 9.499 8.767 8.722 8.222 8.62
2011 12.021 12.154 12.02 12.148 9.589 9.591 9.568 9.703 8.675 8.747 8.68 8.769
2014 12.337 12.462 12.321 12.474 9.678 9.668 9.659 10.051 8.714 8.755 8.684 8.947
Note: The educational level variable denotes the mother’s and the father’s highest completed 
educational qualification, while the number of children designates the final number of children in the 
family, the age indicates the mother’s age at the time her child/children were born, and the years of 
leave variable denotes the number of years the mother spends at home with her children on maternity 
leave (gyes/gyed).
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Interpretation of the results can be facilitated if we first think over the underlying 
effect mechanisms. As the parameters of the utility function evolve independently 
from both the educational level and the family benefits system, having one child 
for any family type in any environment represents the same additional benefit. 
However, the financial costs of having children depends on the level of education 
and the support and taxation environment. Therefore, it is of key importance what 
percentage of the costs can be compensated by benefits and tax allowances after 
the birth of a child during the life cycle, and as such, what will be the consumption 
per unit in a family, as this is the other factor that influences utility. Compared to 
not having any children, upon having the first, the second and often the third child 
consumption per unit will be increasingly lower during the life cycle which means 
that the benefits and allowances only partially cover the costs. However, the joy 
associated with having children intensifies as the number of children increases. 
Lifecycle utility measures the total value of the current utility taken at present value, 
which stems from whether the damage caused by a decline in consumption due to 
having children or the joy takes precedence.
Accordingly, we can draw the following conclusions from the results of Table 1. The 
utility of families with one child is higher in every case than that of families with 
two children, but it is not always higher than that of families without children. The 
tax allowance system in force between 2006 and 2010 available only for families 
with three or more children was so beneficial for families with low and medium 
educational level that it also encouraged families with only two children to have a 
third child. However, this was not the case for families with higher education having 
only two children. This was attributable to the fact that by having the third child, 
the life cycle consumption decreased only marginally or might have even increased 
compared to having only two children, although its rate still fell short of the life 
standard of families without children or only with one child. Overall, however, the 
joy associated with having children was able to compensate the negative effect of 
the lower consumption cycle for families with a lower level of education. Only in the 
case of families with higher education can we observe that families with one child 
were better off than those without children; in their case, this was attributable to 
the high value of the prenatal allowance and childcare allowance (tgyás and gyed) 
they received.
Thanks to the tax allowances which were extended in 2011 to families with one 
or two children, the situation improved in the sense that having the first child 
put these families in a better position than families without a child. Moreover, 
the tax allowance, which was substantially augmented for three children, reduced 
the cost of child-rearing for families of every educational level to such an extent 
that they could overall achieve higher lifetime utility with three children than with 
only two children, because by having the third child, their life cycle consumption 
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did not decline, but on the contrary actually increased compared to having only 
two children. Although its value still lagged behind the living standard of families 
without children or only with one child, the joy associated with having children 
was able to compensate the reduced utility stemming from a lower consumption 
cycle. This is why we obtained the results according to which families with low and 
medium educational level with three children were even better off than having 
only one child. Our results also proved to be robust when the Ω parameter was 
changed as well.
The child benefit extra (GYED-extra) introduced in 2014 brought about additional 
improvement, as the benefits available at the expense of contributions further 
reduced the cost of having children, and so the system encouraged couples of every 
educational level to have three children. However, not even the measures of GYED-
extra could improve the fact that “it is not worthwhile” to have a second child after 
the first one, as the position of families with two children, no matter what level of 
education, was worse than that of families with one child or without children. This 
is related to the fact that the birth of the second child represents a bigger burden 
for families (reduction of utility during the life cycle), even taking account of the 
supports and allowances, than the amount of joy they gain (increase in utility during 
the life cycle). This may mainly restrain the willingness to have children of those 
earning lower wages.
The described results can be regarded as robust within the ±20 per cent interval 
of the value of parameter Ω in the case of families with low educational level, 
and only within the ±10 per cent interval in the case of families with medium 
educational level. That is, in their case, a greater increase in the weight of the 
number of children tilts the scale in favour of families with two children compared 
to single-child families, but only in 2011 and 2014. We must handle the results for 
2014 with caution for the group with higher education as they react sensitively to 
the change in Ω: if this is reduced by only 5 per cent, we can observe that three 
children do not provide a higher lifetime utility than a single child; there is only an 
improvement in comparison with childlessness and the two-children family model.
3.2. Increasing age of mothers
In the following, we analyse for families with one and two children whether the 
change in the support and taxation environment influences the optimal age of the 
mother in the case of couples with different educational levels. For the purposes 
of the analysis, we considered the mother’s time spent with her child/children as 
constant, in the case of both one child and two children.
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Table 2
Value of lifetime utility of the various types of one-child families in the examined 



































2010 11.899 11.921 11.907 9.547 9.573 9.571 8.736 8.722 8.703
2011 12.148 12.154 12.128 9.609 9.591 9.543 8.799 8.747 8.713
2014 12.455 12.462 12.436 9.685 9.668 9.628 8.774 8.755 8.726
Note: See Table 1.
According to Tables 2 and 3, under the family policy regime in 2011 and 2014, those 
who became parents at a younger age could achieve a higher lifetime utility (or the 
improvement was greater) than those having children at a later age, as in 2006, but only 
in the case of couples with low and medium educational levels. This stems from the fact 
that starting from 2011 in the case of those with lower education/wages, the family 
tax allowance also extended to families with one and two children, and the support 
available from 2014 in the form of contribution allowances was able compensate for 
the lost income at a younger age still. The described results are also considered robust 
when the value of parameter Ω changes by ±10 per cent. However, the value differences 
are not significant among the groups with either educational level.
Table 3
Value of lifetime utility of the various types of two-child families in the examined 
three benefits systems considered with advancing maternal age






















2010 11.659 11.74 9.409 9.484 8.211 8.222
2011 11.971 12.02 9.574 9.568 8.754 8.68
2014 12.27 12.321 9.671 9.659 8.696 8.684
Note: See Table 1.
The legislative changes in 2011 and 2014 did not trigger a turning point for families 
with higher education. They can obtain higher lifetime utility in all three examined 
support environments if they have children above the age of 30 and not below.
A 5 per cent decrease in the parameter Ω shifts the optimal timing for having 
children in families with low and medium educational levels to an older age, but 
in their case, the results are also not sensitive to a 20 per cent increase in the 
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parameter Ω. By contrast, those who are highly qualified would have been better 
off having children at an increasingly younger age in 2011 and 2014 if parameter 
Ω increased by 5 per cent, but if the parameter decreases by 20 per cent, then the 
presented correlations do not change.
3.3. Scheduling the time of having children
In this sub-section, we compare the different scheduling of having children of families 
with three children. For the sake of the analysis, we fixed the mother’s age in the case of 
the first child and only changed it for the second and third child, and we also considered 
the mother’s time spent with her children at home as constant in every case.
Table 4
Value of lifetime utility of the various types of three children families in the 



































2010 11.63 11.613 11.624 9.50 9.35 9.28 8.62 8.46 8.48
2011 12.15 12.08 12.05 9.70 9.54 9.40 8.77 8.62 8.60
2014 12.47 12.41 12.39 10.05 9.73 9.52 9.95 9.48 9.46
Note: See Table 1.
Based on economic rationality, when having several children, families are better off 
financially if the children are born with the least age difference possible since this 
enables the mother to potentially stay away from work for a shorter period of time 
(less loss of human capital and also loss of life cycle income), and the family is able 
to use the tax allowance available for the three children sooner, or at least part of it.
The family policy regime between 2006 and 2010 did not significantly influence the 
timing of having children for highly qualified couples, but in certain cases a greater 
age difference may have been more beneficial: it is true that the tax allowance for 
families with three children became available only from a later period, but this 
was compensated by the fact that the mother could re-enter the labour market 
between children, and thanks to this, she received more pregnancy and maternity 
aid (tgyás) after the second and the third child (see first line of Table 4). But in the 
case of families with lower education, a smaller age difference between children 
clearly increases lifetime utility.
Highly educated couples who therefore earned high wages were incentivised for 
fast scheduling mainly by the tax allowance regime introduced in 2011, as they were 
already able to access a large part or the entire amount of the tax allowance under 
the 2011 regime. But the value of life cycle utility does not significantly change 
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under either regime when modifying the timing of having children. By contrast, 
the measures of GYED-extra clearly incentivised couples with lower earnings (those 
with low and medium educational level) for faster timing of children bearing. This is 
explained by the fact that the family tax allowance, also extended as a contribution 
allowance, and the rule that the family could be entitled in parallel to family benefits 
for several young children could compensate the costs associated with having 
children to a greater extent. The described results are robust for the ±20 per cent 
change of the value of the parameter Ω for couples of every educational level. In 
this case, the optimal outcomes were not influenced by the pillar of the measures 
introduced in 2014 based on which the mother would be entitled to receive child 
benefit (gyed/gyes) even if she returned early to the labour market, because we 
assume in their case that the mother stays home for three years after the birth of 
every child. This enables us to separately analyse the components of GYED-extra.
3.4. Increasing parental leave
In the following, we compare the fertility strategies prevailing in the case when the 
mother’s parental leave is increasingly long (one or three years). We present the 
analysis only for highly qualified couples with one, two or three children. The results 
obtained for couples with low and medium educational level are presented only 
in the essay part. In the simulation, we left the mother’s age constant throughout 
the period examined.
Table 5
Value of lifetime utility of highly qualified families in the three examined benefits 
systems, assuming increasing parental leave
Educational level High


































Note: See Table 1.
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For highly educated families, we obtained the rationally expected result that the 
less time the mother spent at home with her child/children, the better (in financial 
terms) for the family under all support schemes, provided that the mother had 
a job. In other words, higher lifetime utility can be achieved if the mother only 
spends one year at home with each of her children after they are born instead of 
two or three years. 
Based on the table’s results, it is also apparent that there is a stronger incentive 
for the mother’s early return to the labour market in 2014 compared to 2010 and 
2011 thanks to the fact that the mother does not lose the childcare allowance if she 
resumes work after her child turns one. The improvement between 2011 and 2014 
is significant for both one, two and three children if measured by the percentage 
change in lifetime utility. In other words the childcare allowance extra (GYED-extra) 
measures foster a faster labour market return of mothers, which claim holds true for 
families with low and medium qualification. The described conclusions are robust 
for changes in parameter Ω, as here, we assumed that the number of children and 
the constraints on childbearing are fixed.
3.5. Childbearing among unskilled families
According to the stylised data and thus also in the model, unskilled families behave 
differently, so we investigate them separately. We symbolise the unskilled couple 
using the following conditions: the mother remains an active throughout her 
lifetime irrespective of the number of children and the father also only works a 
part of the time. The following table summarises the value of lifetime utility if the 
family has one, two or three children paced differently. 
Table 6
The value of lifetime utility of unskilled families under the examined three benefits 
























2010 5.065 4.558 4.248 5.446 5.325 5.248 6.302 6.232 6.155
2011 5.156 4.525 4.064 5.717 5.705 5.633 7.958 7.907 7.889
2014 5.067 4.374 3.886 7.812 7.671 7.588 8.059 8.014 7.996
Note: See Table 1.
Changes in family benefits schemes did not affect the optimal number of children 
in their case, nor did it significantly impact the timing of childbearing. By and large, 
the optimal strategy for them is to have as many children as possible (three children 
is better than one or two), as this entitles the mother to more benefits. In addition, 
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it is best to have the children as young as possible and spaced close together, as 
this allows the family to take advantage of the benefits derived from the tax and 
contribution allowances applied to the father’s income earned during his part-time 
work and to extend the eligibility period of the family allowance.
The results also show that the rise in the value of lifetime utility is more significant 
in 2011 compared to 2010, thanks to the tax incentive by having a second child after 
the first and a third child after the second. The measure, extended as a contribution 
incentive in 2014, yields a greater improvement than earlier by having a second 
child after the first, measured at a change in the value of lifetime utility. By contrast, 
families are unable to benefit from the high tax and contribution incentive granted 
for the third child to a greater extent, at which point “only” the childcare benefits 
and the family allowance provide an additional incentive.
4. Results and conclusions
In light of the results from the life cycle model, we are able to determine when and 
how many children different types of families, i.e. families of different educational 
levels should have, and when the mother should return to the labour market 
to achieve the maximum lifetime utility given the specific family support and 
tax regime. In other words, the model gives us an answer to how the multiple 
transformations of the family benefits scheme influences families’ optimal 
childbearing and in what direction, with all other things being equal. Due to the 
differences in employment, we analysed the behaviour of families with low, medium 
and high qualification separately from the behaviour of qualified families. As a 
result, the first four points pertain to the first three family types while the last point 
addresses the fertility strategy of unskilled families.
1.  The tax allowance system in force between 2006 and 2010 available only for 
families with three or more children was so beneficial for families with low 
and medium educational level that it also encouraged families with only two 
children to have a third child. However, this was not the case for families with 
higher education with only two children. From 2011, having the first child put 
these families in a better position than being childless. Furthermore, due to 
the significantly increased tax incentive for families granted for three children, 
all couples of every educational level could achieve higher lifetime utility than 
with two children. However, from 2014, we observed that having three children 
is clearly the most beneficial for families compared to having one child/being 
childless. However, a major impeding factor is that it is not “worthwhile” to have 
a second child after the first one in either support and taxation environment.
2.  Among the family support tools introduced, the family tax incentive scheme 
introduced in 2011 has the greatest impact on optimal maternal age, as it makes 
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it worthwhile to have children at a younger age for those with low and medium 
education.
3.  Those with high qualification and thus high income were most incentivised to 
have children at a young age by the tax incentive adopted in 2011 while among 
lower-income families (medium and low qualification), the greatest incentive to 
having children early) were certain elements of the childcare allowance extra.
4.  There was growing incentive for the mother’s early return to the labour market 
after having a child from 2010 to 2011, and then to 2014 for all three educational 
levels.
5.  For unskilled families, the optimal strategy under all three support regimes is 
to have as many children as possible spaced closely together and at the earliest 
possible age. The measures of the childcare allowance extra shaped the optimal 
outcome in that having a second child after the first one resulted in a greater 
improvement in lifetime utility than earlier.
Although we laid the foundations of the model, we do not feel that in its current 
state it is able to fully factor in and assess the impact of all economic and 
institutional factors shaping fertility choices. But building and stimulating the model 
brings us closer to understanding which support elements foster and contribute to 
childbearing from a financial perspective.
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Appendix: Summary table of parameter values
Description of parameter Parameter value
Taxation parameters
Total taxes and contributions on gross wage-
related income τ=0.345
Personal income tax rate τ1=0.17/0.32/0.16
Pension contribution τ2=0.095/0.1
Health insurance contribution τ3=0.06/0.07
Labour market contribution τ4=0.015
Rate of family tax allowance per child in 2010 (only 
in case of three children) tax
1=0.04
Rate of family tax allowance per child in case of 
one, two or three children after 2011 tax
1(nit)=0.625/2.05 
Labour market parameters
Time spent working by an unskilled man L0m = 0.15
Time spent working by a man (i=1,2,3) Lim =1
Time spent working by an unskilled woman L0f = 0
Time spent working by a woman (i=1,2,3) Lif = 0/1
Real wage for efficiency unit w =1
Cost of day-care of young children p = 0.5/0.6
Fixed cost of re-entering the labour market in case 
of one, two and three children k = 0.5/0.7/0.8
Productivity parameters
Productivity of a highly qualified man during the 
first period (2011/2013)
e3,1m = 2.172 /2.498
Productivity of a medium skilled man during the 
first period (2011/2013)
e2,1m =1.207 /1.374
Productivity of a low skilled man during the first 
period (2011/2013)
e1,1m =1.009 /1.004
Productivity of an unskilled man during the first 
period (2011/2013)
e0,1m =1.013/9.45
Productivity of a highly qualified woman during 
the first period (2011/2013)
e3,1f =1.869 /1.933
Productivity of a medium skilled woman during the 
first period (2011/2013)
e2,1f =1.078 /1.205
Productivity of a low skilled woman during the first 
period (2011/2013)
e1,1f = 0.927 /0.901
Productivity parameters of a highly qualified man 
(2011/2013)
α3m = 0.1226 /0.097
γ 3m = −0.00693/−0.0052
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Description of parameter Parameter value
Productivity parameters of a medium skilled man 
(2011/2013)
α2m = 0.0636 /0.058
γ 2m = −0.00301/−0.003
Productivity parameters of a low skilled man 
(2011/2013)
α1m = 0.052 /0.0766
γ 1m = −0.0027 /−0.00454
Productivity parameters of an unskilled man 
(2011/2013)
α0m = 0.01855/0.037
γ 0m = −0.00097/−0.00185
Productivity parameters of a highly qualified 
woman (2011/2013)
α3f = 0.1/0.104
γ 3f = −0.0062 /−0.0062
Productivity parameters of a medium skilled 
woman (2011/2013)
α2f = 0.072 /0.0705
γ 2f = −0.00375/−0.00375
Productivity parameters of a low skilled woman 
(2011/2013)
α1f = 0.048 /0.084
γ 1f = −0.0021/−0.0046
Amortization rate of low and medium skilled and 
highly qualified persons δ = 0.01/0.02/0.02
Family support allowances
Maternity support TR0 = 0.053 
Maximum net value of the prenatal allowance 
(tgyás) TR
1 =1.3
Maximum net value of the childcare allowance 
(gyed) TR
2 = 0.808
Childcare benefit/child-raising allowance amount 
(gyes/gyet) TR
3 = 0.256
Amount of family allowance per child in case of 
one, two and three children TR
4 = 0.122/0.133/0.16 
Parameters related to utility
Impatience parameter β = 0.98
The weight of the number of children within 
current utility Ω = 0.123
Reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution of consumption σ = 1.98
To what extent does the utility function react to 
the change in the number of children ε = 1.39
36 Studies
Possible Paths for GDP Per Capita – Simulation 
with a Demographic Growth Model
Éva Berde – Izabella Kuncz
To begin our paper, we point out the importance of demographic growth models by 
highlighting the conceptual framework of overlapping generations. We define the 
formulas in our own model based on Lee – Mason (2010), modifying the original 
framework in several respects. We present the exogenous fertility and survival rates 
in different demographic scenarios, and then we derive the simulation paths for 
GDP per capita from these. A word of caution regarding our results: the simple 
structure of our model disregards several factors potentially influencing growth. 
When concentrating solely on the impact of changes in fertility and mortality rates, 
our simulation results suggest that a drop in the total fertility rate, even to slightly 
below the replacement level, and even in the context of a relatively high survival 
rate, may increase GDP per capita. However, in the case of an extremely low total 
fertility rate and a high survival rate, an economic downturn can be expected.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: E23, J11, O40
Keywords: overlapping generations model, total fertility rate, survival rate, 
simulation path, GDP per capita
1. Introduction
The exploration of the regularities in economic growth and the projection of 
potential future paths has excited economists since the emergence of economic 
thinking.1 Nevertheless, the significance of population numbers and structures 
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1  The first such efforts that can be cited appeared with the representatives of the classical school of 
economics. Smith (1776) not only presented the benefits of the division of labour, but also mentioned that 
the productivity growth that can be achieved through the division of labour increases economic prosperity, 
and facilitates the future development of the economy.
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only started to be taken into account in growth models much later.2 From the 
second half of the 1980s, as humanity entered the fourth stage of demographic 
transition, demographics determined economic developments to such an extent 
that demographic variables could no longer be left out of growth models.
In the fourth stage of demographic transition,3 the mortality rate steadily declines 
in almost all developed countries of the world, and in parallel with this, the total 
fertility rate (TFR) is even lower than earlier. The total fertility rate has dropped 
to below the replacement level several times, which portends serious problems 
for the future. Fulfilling the needs of the ageing population, and, more generally, 
maintaining the operation of the economy may prove to be highly difficult under 
such circumstances. While the total fertility rate of more developed regions drops, 
huge net population growth characterises certain less developed areas, due to a 
diminishing mortality rate combined with a high fertility rate, which, however, is 
still lower than earlier. In these countries, the future decrease in the total fertility 
rate and the further drop in the mortality rate are expected, and therefore it is likely 
that the share of the working-age population will soar temporarily. These trends 
may provide an economic stimulus to the countries concerned, and the beneficial 
effect of the so-called first demographic dividend4 can take hold (see, for example, 
Bloom et al. 2003, Mason 2005). Ultimately, even the ranking in the economic clout 
of the countries may change.
Out of the growth models, the changing demographic trends can be best captured 
by the so-called overlapping generations (OLG) model. In the study by Diamond 
(1965), which laid the foundations of OLG models, changes in the birth rate were 
still exogenous, however, it already differentiated between two age groups of 
the population. This framework was expanded by Auerbach – Kotlikoff (1987) to 
include further cohorts, and then the modelling tools were enhanced by Barro – 
Becker (1989). The article by Barro–Becker also treats the birth rate endogenously: 
therefore, the total fertility rate is quantified as a result of the processes in the 
model, and it has an impact on the development of the model’s variables.
Our paper draws conclusions with respect to the potential paths of economic 
growth using one of the overlapping generations models. The basic model we 
used, Lee – Mason (2010), uses a special approach as compared to the usual OLG 
models. Still, it is based on Diamond’s idea, i.e. the overlapping generations, and 
2  Malthus (1798) concentrated specifically on the negative impact of excessive population growth, but did not 
link this issue to the potential growth in productivity. Demographic factors were first taken into account in 
growth models by Solow (1956). The historical sequence of the demographic approaches to growth models 
is summarised in Table A1 in the Appendix.
3  For more on the demographic transition, see, for example, Van de Kaa (2010), Frejka (2016).
4  The first demographic dividend shows the difference between the growth rate of the weighted number of 
workers and the growth rate of a similarly weighted number of consumers. If the number of the so-called 
effective workers increases more (or falls less) than the number of effective consumers, that contributes 
to economic growth.
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the neoclassical growth model framework, in which economic growth is simulated 
as a function of the total fertility rate and the mortality rate. One simplification as 
compared to Diamond’s model is that this does not contain consumer optimisation, 
and one added, novel feature is that the expansion of human capital is among 
the explanatory variables of the model. Its core concept is the trade-off between 
quantity and quality as formulated by Becker (Becker 1960, Becker – Lewis 1973, 
Willis 1973, Barro – Becker 1989, Becker et al. 1990, Galor – Weil 1999), according 
to which adults spend more on their offspring when they have less children, i.e. 
they provide them with more human capital. As a result, when children grow up, 
their productivity increases, and therefore the impact of the lower total fertility rate 
can be offset. Our paper shows that the total fertility rate can drop to a critical level 
where the opportunity for growth is threatened, and society is unable to maintain 
the earlier level of GDP per capita. The study is structured as follows: after the 
introduction, in the second part, we describe Becker’s quantity–quality trade-off, 
and the corresponding theories. In Part 3, we will present our own model, and show 
in which aspects the framework developed by us differs, and to what extent, from 
Lee – Mason (2010). In Part 4, we use artificially constructed exogenous fertility and 
mortality rates, and simulate paths for GDP per capita based on the model of the 
previous part. We detail the demographic trends that the exogenous total fertility 
and mortality rates express, and why it is important to be aware of the impact these 
trends may have on economic growth. Part 5 comprises the summary of our study. 
Then in the Appendix we provide an overview of the historical development of 
growth models using demographics in a tabular form, and we also employ a table 
to show the values of the parameters in our model.
2. Beckerian quantity–quality trade-off
The basic idea behind the Beckerian quantity–quality trade-off is attributed to 
Becker (1960) in the literature. In short, the quantity–quality trade-off means that if 
there are many offspring in a family, less time and money are devoted to one, while 
in the case of fewer offspring, the expenses per child increase drastically. Similar 
approaches to the quantity–quality trade-off are discussed in Becker – Lewis (1973), 
Willis (1973) and Galor – Weil (1999). This issue, especially the global contraction 
of the total fertility rate, is very topical now. For example, Lee – Mason (2010) use 
statistical analysis to prove that in the countries in the NTA5 database, children 
with fewer siblings receive more human capital investments from their parents; 
therefore, they can work more efficiently as adults than their peers growing up 
in larger families. The link between the reduction in the total fertility rate and the 
increase in human capital investments may explain why production values increase 
5  NTA: National Transfer Accounts. The data can be found at http://www.ntaccounts.org/ (last accessed on 
20 September 2017).
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even if the share of the working-age population diminishes. Roudi-Fahimi – Kent 
(2007) provide an outstanding summary of the studies in connection with this idea.
Even the so-called synthesis theory, which treats the causal relationships in a 
complex manner, and which does not support the concept of the Beckerian 
quantity–quality trade-off (e.g. Adelman 1963, Freedman 1963, Silver 1965, 
Freedman – Coombs 1966a, Freedman – Coombs 1966b and Easterlin 1973) 
concedes that the decrease in the total fertility rate and the growing human 
capital investments occurred at roughly the same time in history. Further schools 
of thought other than the synthesis theory that distance themselves from Becker’s 
ideas explain the reduction in the fertility rate with several factors. These include the 
increase in female employment, economic crises, people’s love of comfort and the 
opinion of contemporaries (see, for example, Kaplan 1994, Black et al. 2005, Ellis 
2008, Luci – Thevenon 2010, Sobotka et al. 2011, Colleran et al. 2015, Dang – Rogers 
2016). And despite the apparent facts, the hotly debated Lawson – Borgerhoff 
Mulder (2016) study flatly rejects that there is any causality between human capital 
investments and the development of the total fertility rate. Nonetheless, these two 
authors admit that fertility has declined and the human capital invested in children 
has increased since the mid-19th century. Guo – Zhang (2017), partly in response 
to the paper by Lawson – Borgerhoff Mulder (2016), show that the reason why 
certain authors doubt the theory of the quantity–quality trade-off is a misguided 
interpretation of the facts.
One exception to Becker’s ideas could be that in the countries with an advanced 
public sector, all children have access to basic schooling and healthcare, regardless 
of the number of siblings. Yet Vargha – Donehower (2016) estimated the value 
of the so-called invisible transfers,6 i.e. the care and attention directly devoted 
to children by their parents. The two authors have confirmed that the children 
growing up among fewer siblings receive much more care in the countries with 
advanced public benefits than their peers living in large families, mainly because 
of the invisible transfers.
In our article, we base our model on the negative relationship between the number 
of children and human capital investments, i.e. we accept the causality derived 
from Becker’s ideas. We examine what would happen if this correlation determined 
the productivity of an economy, ceteris paribus. The impact of material capital 
and all the other factors is quantified only indirectly, through human capital, but 
it is indicated that sometimes material capital can be the driver of development. 
The approach examining the role of human capital ceteris paribus is increasingly 
common in the literature, in view of the drying-up of the first demographic dividend 
6  For more on the invisible transfers themselves, see Gál et al. (2016).
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and the increasingly dominant role of the second demographic dividend7 (e.g. Bloom 
et al. 2003, Mason 2005, Mason et al. 2016).
3. Our model
3.1. Differences between Lee – Mason (2010) and our model
Just as in the case of Lee – Mason (2010), our overlapping generations model is 
highly stylised. Our basic aim is to determine the impact of the population’s age 
distribution (and indirectly population numbers) on output per capita. Despite its 
stylised nature, it is important that the model be as realistic as possible.
From this perspective, taking into account four overlapping generations instead of 
the three, as in Lee – Mason (2010), provides enormous help in achieving better 
alignment with the facts. With three overlapping generations, those living until the 
end of the third period spend merely one-third of their life working, and live from 
the transfers provided by the others for two-thirds of their life. In the case of three 
generations, there is an unreasonably high number of children in any period in the 
context of the actual TFR. If we assume that Ntworking  is the number of workers and 
Ft is the fertility rate (for one person rather than one woman, which is usually the 
case in such models), then FtNtworking  children will be born altogether, and the share 
of the first generation will be disproportionately large, even when Ft is barely over 
1 (and the TFR is over 2). In the case of four generations, the people living until the 
end of the fourth period spend half of their lives working, and if the total number 
of workers in the two working generations is Ntworking , while the total fertility rate is 
Ft, then, assuming that the two working generations are roughly of the same size,8 
only Ft0.5Ntworking  children will be born. The share of children within society is much 
more realistic this way, just like the fact that people spend at least half, rather than 
a third, of their lives on the labour market. Those who die after the third period, 
work for two-thirds of their lives.
Accordingly, our model assumes two, rather than one, working generations 
living at the same time: they are the second and third generations in the model. 
These two generations resemble each other, but only the second generation can 
produce children. In addition, the income of the third generation is somewhat 
higher than that of the second. Our model does not differentiate between 
whether the transfers or the in-kind goods are provided to children (Generation 1) 
and the old (or pensioners, i.e. Generation 4 in our model) within the family or 
7  For a short description of the first demographic dividend, see Footnote 4. The second demographic dividend 
refers to the economic growth fuelled by the stronger human capital investments and the related physical 
capital investments.
8  The roughly same size of the two working generations is merely a stylised and momentary simplification, 
with the sole of aim of highlighting the magnitude.
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through redistribution. The overall benefits cover the consumption of children 
and pensioners, and guarantee the human capital investments in children. These 
benefits together are referred to as transfers.
Somewhat simplifying the complex correlations in reality, we assume in our model 
that both working generations divide their income based on the same principles 
between children’s transfer, their own consumption and the elderly’s consumption. 
Therefore, both working generations take part in caring for children,9 and the 
elderly have no savings at all, i.e. their livelihood depends completely on the 
transfers provided by the second and third generations.
The generations that do not work, i.e. children and the elderly, may receive transfers 
from the workers, with variable lower and upper limits, depending on certain factors 
in our model. Thanks to the limits, those who do not work receive at least minimal 
benefits, even in hard times. Furthermore, the limits also ensure that the workers 
do not have to spend on those who do not work beyond their means, even if the 
number of those who do not work is relatively high. The rules in the model that 
determine the way the income of the two working generations is spent also ensure 
that the simulation results are determined not only by the proportion of the size 
of the individual generations in the population, but also indirectly by the total 
population. Meanwhile, the amount spent on human capital investments from the 
transfers influences the productivity of the young workers in the next period, and 
of the older workers in the era coming after that.
Although in their model Lee and Mason quantify the fertility elasticity of human 
capital, as the embodiment of Beckerian quantity–quality trade-off, using actual 
statistical data and an econometric equation, the value of elasticity is a constant 
negative number. We did not regard the value of elasticity to be constant, but to be 
dependent on the total fertility rate. The details of the calculations are presented 
in Chapter 3.3.
3.2. Equations in the model
As described in the previous part, the economy in the model contains four 
overlapping generations:10 children (Nt1 ), young workers (Nt2 ), older workers (Nt3 ) 
and pensioners (Nt4 ). On average, the members of the young working generation 
produce Ft children in Period t. In the next period, children become economically 
active as young workers, and young workers become older workers. Finally, the 
latter’s st share will reach retired age, and the others die at the end of the third 
9  According to the model, both working generations finance children’s consumption and human capital, but 
they do not necessarily provide the transfers directly. The distribution in the model is similar to a system in 
which children receive the amount through central redistribution.
10  The population number of the generation where i = 1, 2, 3, 4 in Period t is denoted with Nit.
42 Studies
Éva Berde – Izabella Kuncz
period. The demographic transitions in the model are described in the following 
equations:
 Nt1 = Ft ⋅Nt2  (1a)
 Nt2 =Nt−11  (1b)
 Nt3 =Nt−12  (1c)
 Nt4 = st ⋅Nt−13 .   (1d)
Total population size in Period t.: Nt =Nt1 +Nt2 +Nt3 +Nt4 .
As indicated earlier, in our model Ft denotes the fertility rate for one person rather 
than one woman in Period t. Therefore, assuming an equal number of men and 
women in a stylised approach, our simulation used half of the TFR value actually 
possible. In our model, no one dies until the end of the third period, and those 
surviving the third period die only at the end of the fourth period, but then they do 
so for sure. Therefore, in our model, st is half of the statistically measurable survival 
rate in the third period. The development of Ft and st is also key in the model. The 
two exogenous ratios together determine the size and structure of the population 
in each period.
Only two working generations perform income-generating activities, and they 
receive wages for their work. The wage of young workers (Wt2 ) depends on the 
amount of human capital they possess (Ht), which was accumulated in the previous 
period:
 Wt2 = g Ht( ) ,  (2a)
where g’(Ht) > 0 and g’’(Ht) < 0. The wages of older workers are proportionately 
higher than that of younger ones, which is indicated by the parameter φ, the value 
of which used in our calculations can be seen in Table A2 of the Appendix.
 Wt3 = f Wt2( )=ϕ ⋅Wt2 , (2b)
where φ > 1. 
Human capital is invested in children by the two working generations, spending ht 
of their income for this purpose. Equation (3) shows the amount of human capital 
of the young workers entering working age in Period t. In line with the assumptions 
in Lee – Mason (2010), Equation (3) presumes that everyone receives the human 
capital investments in childhood, and that this will determine their productivity 
when they become workers: 
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 Ht = h Ft−1( )⋅ Wt−12 +Wt−13( ) . (3)
Since only the two working generations have income, they finance their own 
consumption as well as that of the two dependant generations, and the human 
capital investments in children. Accordingly, the budget constraint is as follows:
 Wt2 ⋅Nt2 +Wt3 ⋅Nt3 ≥Ct1 ⋅Nt1 +Ct2 ⋅Nt2 +Ct3 ⋅Nt3 +Ct4 ⋅Nt4 +Ht+1 ⋅Nt1 . (4)
In line with the above, the amount of human capital investments financed from 
income depends on the total fertility rate, based on the following correlation:
 Ht =α ⋅Ft−1βt−1 ⋅ Wt−12 +Wt−13( ) ,  (5)
where α > 0 is the human capital investment ratio with one unit of F (replacement 
level). βt–1 is the elasticity of human capital investments as a function of Ft–1, which 
will be later referred to as fertility elasticity. This was fixed by Lee – Mason (2010) 
at an average value, but we made it dependent on the total fertility rate. The 
estimation of βt–1 is presented in Chapter 3.3.
The wage of the two working generations is
 Wt2 = γ ⋅Η !tδ = γ ⋅ α ⋅Ft−1βt−1 ⋅ Wt−12 +Wt−13( )( )δ , (6a)
where 0 < δ < 1, γ > 0 and substituting Equation (6a) in Equation (2b):
 Wt3 =ϕ ⋅γ ⋅ α ⋅Ft−1βt−1 ⋅ Wt−12 +Wt−13( )( )δ . (6b)
We would like to point out parameter γ in Equation (6b), the value of which was 
fixed at 1 in our model calculations, similar to Lee – Mason (2010) (see Table A2 
in the Appendix). If γ is greater than 1, this represents a sort of growth factor 
in the model. This growth factor can express the expansion in the efficiency of 
either human capital or physical capital. Since we currently aim to monitor the 
potential changes in fertility and mortality rates ceteris paribus, we utilised only 
one direct efficiency-increasing option in the model, the impact of human capital 
investments on the efficiency in production. Nonetheless, we allow for the option of 
the parameter γ being greater than 1 when our simulation is rerun. In this manner, 
the growth in the efficiency of physical capital can be modelled discretely.
Correlation (4) regarding the budget shows that the different generations can spend 
more money only at each other’s expense. Therefore, we had to incorporate limits 
in our model that prevent the potentially large first or fourth generations from 
burning through the income generated by the workers, leaving nothing to those who 
produced it. In addition, a similar limit had to be applied to prevent the opposite, 
i.e. we had to ensure that the two working generations provide at least minimal 
transfers to the first and fourth generations, even if there are many people in the 
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latter groups in a given period. Equations (7a) and (8a) below place caps and floors 
on the consumption of the elderly and children, respectively, using Ψt defined in 
Equation (7b), μt determined in Equation (8b) and νt established in Equation (8c).11 
The consumption of the fourth generation is: 


























The consumption of the first generation is:








































The income left over after the payment of the transfers to the first and fourth 
generations is spent by younger and older workers on their own consumption:
















The formula of GDP per capita, which in our model means income per person, 
should be expressed separately. This can be seen in Equation (10). This is because 




2 ⋅Nt2 +Wt3 ⋅Nt3
Nt
 . (10)
11  The above-mentioned payment limits were incorporated in the model using the ratios Ψt, μt and νt. If the 
four generations are of the same size, and the available income (remaining after the payment of human 
capital) is distributed evenly among them, all generations receive 25 per cent of the income. Otherwise, 
in the case of generations of a relatively smaller size, the proportion of spending on their consumption 
changes in line with their share within the population, but it may rise by 10 per cent at most in a period 
to avoid extreme growth.
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Using the previous equations of the model, wage dynamics, i.e. the ratio of future 
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while, when substituting Equation (12a) in (2b), the wage of older workers is 
 Wt3



















3.3. Estimating the fertility elasticity of human capital investments
In Chapter 3.1, we already indicated that Lee – Mason (2010) determined the value 
of the elasticity of human capital investments as a function of the total fertility rate 
to be negative but constant. The two authors used NTA (2009) data and found a 
significant negative correlation between the total fertility rate and human capital 
investments. However, they relied on this relationship as a generally occurring link, 
quantifying the elasticity of human capital investments as a function of the total 
fertility rate based on the average value.
By contrast, we employed elasticity that depends on the value of the total fertility 
rate. We used the average number of years spent in school (ISCED 1 or higher 
level studies) as a variable accurately representing the amount of human capital 
investments from the UNESCO (2016) database. The value of the total fertility rate 
was compiled from UN (2015), and in the end we had data for 98 countries.12 The 
countries were divided into two groups, one for the countries with a TFR of over 
2.1 (the replacement level), and the other for the countries below that. Using the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method, we prepared regression estimates for the 
two country groups separately. In the case of high-fertility countries, the absolute 
value of the regression coefficient was significantly higher: βt = –0.8348, while it 
12  We were able to use data from far more countries than Lee – Mason (2010), who relied solely on NTA (2009).
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was βt = –0.273 in the low-fertility country group. After that, assuming a linear 
relationship13 between βt and the Ft fertility rate, βt was determined as follows:
 βt = – 0.4072 – 0.761 · InFt  . (13)
The values determined by Equation (13) fit well on the points represented by the 
total fertility rate and human capital investments of the 98 countries, and that 
is why this correlation was chosen in our model for estimating the elasticity of 
human capital investments as a function of the total fertility rate. If Ft < 0.588, βt 
would be positive, therefore in this range, Equation (13) conflicts with the theory 
based on which we quantified it. However, there was no such low total fertility 
rate in the statistical data, and we did not use such low Ft values in our simulation. 
Further research is necessary to confirm or reject the relevance of the Beckerian 
quantity–quality trade-off with respect to TFR values below 1.176. Yet during our 
model calculations, we never used such a low total fertility rate.
4. The relationship between the total fertility rate, the survival rate 
and growth based on our model’s correlations
The simple structure of our model facilitates simulation testing that examines the 
impact of changes in only the total fertility rate and the survival rate on economic 
growth, independent of other factors. These simulation calculations show the 
impact of the two aforementioned demographic indicators on the development 
of GDP per capita, all other factors being fixed. In other words, only the categories 
determining the size of the population14 change in our model, while everything 
else is constant.
Assuming simple correlations has both benefits and drawbacks. The most important 
benefits in this case are:
•  We can see the effects exerted by the simultaneous change in the total fertility 
rate and the mortality rate ceteris paribus.
•  We can analyse how the different paths of the total fertility rate and the mortality 
rate as compared to each other change per capita output.
•  We can highlight the cases when the expected demographic developments lead 
to a dangerous economic situation.
13  It was assumed that the points determined by the average total fertility rate and human capital investments 
(or, more precisely, its logarithm), can be connected with a straight line. The mathematical statement of 
this line can be seen in Equation (13).
14  There is no migration in our model.
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•  If demographic developments influence economic growth favourably, even 
temporarily, the projection helps the economy in utilising the positive trends as 
long as possible.
The drawbacks of the simple approach are the following:
•  Several factors can influence GDP per capita that cannot be derived from the 
development of the total fertility rate and the survival rate.
•  Our forecasts can stoke unreasonable fears if the negative impact of demographic 
factors can be offset.
•  Positive predictions can falsely suggest that nothing has to be done for economic 
growth, as the demographic drivers take care of that “on their own”.
Now we will present the GDP per capita values on the various simulated paths. 
During our simulations, both the total fertility rate (F) and the survival rate (s) were 
provided exogenously.15
The exogenous time series for F and s were determined in a way so that there would 
be cases when a high fertility rate nosedives, when the moderately high fertility 
rate stay roughly the same, and when the low fertility rate continues to decline. In 
parallel with this, the survival rate stagnates or grows in all cases. Therefore, we 
sought to find out how the various possible paths of the total fertility rate influence 
GDP per capita ceteris paribus, while survival rates do not drop. Of course, our 
model can be used to conduct simulations using several other fertility and mortality 
time series, although we mainly focused on the various, hypothetical and opposite 
paths of the total fertility rate, while assuming that the mortality rate values do 
not deteriorate at all.
We started our simulation from a steady state, from which the economy shifts 
due to the change in the total fertility rate and the survival rate. The values of the 
parameters used during the simulation can be seen in Table A2 of the Appendix. 
Similar to Lee – Mason (2010), the initial wage in the steady state is the wage value 
in the context of the given parameters and exogenous variables. After the total 
fertility rate and the survival rate start changing in each period, the economy shifts 
from this steady state, and later, when F and s do not change anymore, it converges 
towards a new steady state. Similar to Lee – Mason (2010), our study focused on 
the path towards the new steady state, i.e. the time of transition.
15  As a reminder: F is the fertility rate per person, and half of the expected TFR, while s is the survival rate, 
and half of the survival rate for 60 years of age supported statistically, since in the model those living to 
be 60 die at the age of 80.
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Several other authors have used a modelling technique in which the stationary 
condition of the economy was upset, and it was examined how the path leading to 
the new steady state developed. For example, Cipriani (2014) used a steady state 
of an OLG model to demonstrate the expected impact of rising life expectancy 
in the context of first an exogenous, then an endogenous total fertility rate. He 
wanted to find out how much pension will be paid to the members of the older 
generation. Becker et al. (1990) also examined the steady state and its stability 
using endogenous fertility and human capital. The model by Barro – Becker (1989) 
administered hypothetical shocks to the steady state, and monitored the values of 
the variables in the model. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000) analysed the impact of the 
change in the mortality rate in the context of variable and constant educational 
attainment, and this model also started out from a steady state. To mention some 
Hungarian examples, Simonovits (2009) and Varga (2014) upset the steady state of 
their models, which were very similar to each other in many respects, and examined 
how the parametric pension reforms affected the sustainability of the pension 
system.
We also assumed in our model that the economy was in a stationary state in the 
0th period before modelling. Then the total fertility rates and mortality rates 
changed from period to period. We sought to find out how the changes shape 
GDP per capita. Table 1 contains the values of s and F used in the first and second 
simulation calculations in the 16 periods under review, while Figure 1 presents the 
development of GDP per capita corresponding to these (s,F) pairs.
The growth in GDP per capita along the first path clearly shows that if the initially 
very high total fertility rate continuously declines, even sinking well below the 
replacement level by the end of the period under review, GDP per capita may 
increase even in the context of a high survival rate. The survival rate increases 
steadily and at a relatively fast pace for 13 periods along the first path, and then 
during the final three periods, it stabilises at the high level achieved until then. 
GDP per capita grows even in these final three periods, although more moderately 
than before.
Table 1
Total fertility and survival rates along the first and second simulation paths
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Path 
1
F 3.50 3.15 2.84 2.56 2.31 2.08 1.87 1.69 1.52 1.37 1.23 1.11 1.00 0.90 0.81 0.73
s 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.34 0.37 0.40 0.43 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
Path  
2
F 3.50 3.15 2.84 2.56 2.31 2.08 1.87 1.69 1.52 1.37 1.23 1.11 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.16
s 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.34 0.37 0.40 0.43 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
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The simulation was performed on Path 2 using the same survival rates as in Path 1, 
and the total fertility rates were also almost the same (Figure 1). The total fertility 
rate starts out from the same high level in the first period and then falls to the 
replacement level, just like along Path 1. However, upon reaching the replacement 
level, it starts increasing slightly instead of continuing on its downward path. In 
parallel with the hike in the total fertility rate, GDP per capita drops instead of 
growing as before. Therefore, our model suggests that if we use only the total 
fertility rate and the mortality (survival) rates as exogenous variables, the continuous 
contraction of the total fertility rate to any low level is favourable from an economic 
growth perspective under all conditions. Yet the simulation results along Paths 3 
and 4 (Table 2) highlight the fact that the drop in the total fertility rate can reach a 
drastic level in our model where it entails a decrease in GDP per capita.
Table 2
Total fertility and survival rates along the third and fourth simulation paths
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Path  
3
F 1.20 1.14 1.09 1.04 0.99 0.94 0.90 0.85 0.81 0.77 0.74 0.70 0.67 0.64 0.61 0.59
s 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.49
Path  
4
F 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20
s 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.49
If the already high survival rate steadily increases, in an extreme case assuming for 
the last period that almost all 60-year-olds will live until retirement age, and thus 
Figure 1
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also live to be 80 in our model, GDP per capita falls in the context of an excessively 
contracting total fertility rate. Using the same hypothetical survival rate for our 
simulation calculations, but employing constant total fertility rates slightly above 
the replacement level, GDP per capita exhibits only a minimal decline. Nevertheless 
it seems that the development of GDP per capita is most affected in our model 
by the growth or decrease in the total fertility rate. This is also suggested by the 
simulation along Paths 5 and 6 (Figure 3).
The exogenous total fertility rates and survival rates of Paths 5 and 6 were provided 
based on a special consideration. The survival rates are the same in both versions, 
starting out from a moderately high level, and growing relatively slowly but steadily, 
and only the total fertility rates are different. Along Path 5, the total fertility rates 
that start out from below the replacement level increase continuously, right until 
the last period, where they are slightly over the replacement level. However, along 
Path 6, the total fertility rates that start out from a level more than twice the 
replacement level drop continuously. As a result of the above, the GDP per capita 
values along Paths 5 and 6 are quite different from each other. They continuously 
decline along Path 5, while they steadily grow along Path 6. The initial value is 
very low on Path 6, but after a consistent rise, it is only infinitesimally lower in 
the last period than the corresponding value on Path 5. The levels achieved on 
the paths should be compared to the values along the same path – one only need 
to think of the hurdles described at the beginning of the chapter – however, the 
contrasting development of the GDP values in the first and last periods clearly shows 
the opposing dynamics of the two paths.
Figure 2
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Table 3
Total fertility and survival rates along the fifth and sixth simulation paths
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Path  
5
F 0.65 0.67 0.69 0.72 0.74 0.77 0.79 0.82 0.85 0.88 0.91 0.94 0.97 1.00 1.04 1.05
s 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.44
Path  
6
F 2.10 2.00 1.90 1.81 1.73 1.65 1.57 1.49 1.42 1.35 1.29 1.23 1.17 1.11 1.06 1.05
s 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.44
5. Summary
Our study summarised how, after the initially simple approaches, the various types 
of models analysing economic growth took into account the changes in the size 
and composition of the population. From the perspective of our present article, 
the simple OLG model presented in Lee – Mason (2010) is key. We performed our 
simulation calculations with a model that can be considered an enhanced version 
of Lee – Mason (2010).
Our simulation results clearly prove that we can draw many valuable conclusions 
even if, similar to the model by Lee and Mason, we assume that the only factors 
that determine the path of the OLG model are the total fertility rate and the survival 
rate. In such cases, the implicit level of physical capital is fixed, and the increasing 
efficiency of physical capital materialises in the expansion of the efficiency of 
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human capital investments. Therefore, output per capita in itself does not provide 
meaningful information, however, the comparison of the levels by periods taught 
us many lessons.
The general trends observed in the model included the following:
•  The change in fertility influenced GDP per capita much more than the shifts in 
the survival rate.
•  The survival rate had a substantial impact when the total fertility rate was well 
below the replacement level. When the total fertility rate per person (for both 
men and women) was slightly below 0.6 after declining steadily from period to 
period, while the survival rate continuously increased, GDP per capita started to 
dip. In such cases, the survival rate, which increased and approximated 1 (meaning 
an s value converging towards 0.5 in our model at 60–80 years of age), prevented 
the growth of GDP per capita.
•  When comparing two simulation calculations in which the survival rates were 
the same in each period, we mostly saw that the increasing and more steeply 
increasing GDP per capita values were on the path along which the total fertility 
rates declined or declined more, even to below the replacement level. However, 
it was important not to let the total fertility rates fall as low as we described in 
the previous paragraph.
•  When on one of two model paths containing the same survival rates the total 
fertility rate increased from period to period from a low initial value, and it 
declined from an initial high level on the other path, the first path indicated a 
steadily decreasing output per capita, while the other exhibited a consistently 
expanding value, even if the total fertility rates were the same in the last period. 
These two simulations showed the most clearly that such models “reward” the 
reduction in population and “punish” population growth.
No hasty conclusions should be drawn from the above. For example we cannot 
say that a drop in fertility benefits economic growth, since the combined effect of 
several other factors also needs to be taken into account in connection with this 
issue. We should also not forget that if the Beckerian quantity–quality trade-off 
does not take hold, for example the parents do not provide substantial human 
capital investments to a low number of children, all the conclusions of our model 
instantly become unrealistic. Nonetheless, based on the simulation calculations of 
our model, in most cases it can be assumed that the gradual decrease of the total 
fertility rate to slightly below the replacement level has a beneficial effect on the 
development of GDP per capita.
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Appendix
A.1. Demographics in growth models
Since ours is a demographic growth model, the role of demographic variables in the 
development of growth models should be summarised. This can be seen Table A1.
Table A1
The role of population in the various growth models
Type of 
model
Creators of the 
model
The way population is taken into 
account
Size of the population, and its 
role in growth
Classical Thomas Robert 
Malthus
Population grows more rapidly 
than the amount of food.
Excessive population growth leads 
to lower prosperity.
Keynesian Roy F. Harrod, 
Evsey Domar
Exogenous savings ratio, no 
consumer optimisation.
Economic growth does not 
depend on it.
Neoclassical Robert M. Solow, 
Trevor W. Swan
There is no consumer 
optimisation, the labour force and 
productivity of the population 
influences economic output.
The change in exogenous 
population growth influences the 
development of income per capita 
only in the period of convergence 
towards the equilibrium growth 
path, and does not do so in the 
long term.




Households decide on their 
consumption and savings path, 
maximising their own utility.
Short-term dynamics diverge from 
the Solow–Swan model, but the 
increase in income per capita 
does not depend on exogenous 




Kenneth J. Arrow, 
Paul M. Romer, 
Robert E. Lucas, 
Sergio Rebelo
The development of workers’ 
productivity is endogenous.
Using certain parametrisation, the 
externality and R&D based 
models exhibit a positive 
relationship between the 
exogenous population growth rate 







Alan J. Auerbach, 
Laurence 
J. Kotlikoff
There are several overlapping 
generations, maximising their 
lifetime utility.
Population growth is exogenous, 
but the composition of the 
population may vary, and there 




Gary S. Becker, 
Robert J. Barro
Utility-maximising households 
also decide about the number of 
offspring.










Consumption and income 
indicators by age.
The impact of the first and second 
demographic dividend on growth 
depends on the composition of 
the population. 
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A.2. Parameter values used during the simulation
Table A2
Parameters of the model
Value Source
α = 0.075 Authors’ calculation based on the NTA (2016) 
database1
γ = 1 Lee – Mason (2010)
δ = 0.33 Mankiw et al. (1992), Lee – Mason (2010)
φ = 1.128 Authors’ calculation based on the NTA (2016) 
database2
1  The values of all the countries, 19 in all, for which the NTA (2016) contained complete data were taken 
into account (Austria, Brazil, Costa Rica, Finland, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Philippines, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, United States). We found 
that the human capital investment rate (the share of education spending per child within the income 
of a 21–40-year old and that of a 41–60-year-old) was 0.075 on average.
2  The information from the 19 countries with complete data were taken into account (NTA 2016) here as 
well. We saw that the earned income of the workers in the age group of 41–60 was higher by 12.8 per 
cent on average than that of their peers in the age group of 21–40.
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Fiscal Policy and the Business Cycle
György Molnár – Gábor Dániel Soós – Balázs Világi
After the 2007–2008 financial crisis and the subsequent prolonged, deep recession, 
the question of whether fiscal policy can be applied to stimulate the economy came 
into focus, as conventional tools of monetary policy became ineffective. Accordingly, 
the related research also received a new boost. The purpose of our paper is to 
present the new research results, which mainly focus on whether fiscal policy can 
be applied to influence business cycles. Although there is still much debate, the 
claim that the effects of fiscal policy are not constant, but rather depend on the 
state of the business cycle, has been supported by numerous theoretical models 
and empirical results: in prolonged, deep recessions, and especially in the case of a 
liquidity trap, the multiplier of government expenditures is high, while in the case 
of booms it is relatively low.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: E62, E52, E21, E12
Keywords: fiscal policy, expenditure multiplier, business cycles, liquidity trap, debt-
constrained households
1. Introduction
Over the last eighty years the position of economics on the applicability of fiscal 
policy has changed significantly. Owing to the works of Keynes, it became the 
prevailing opinion in the 1930s that fiscal policy is suitable to boost the economy 
during times of recession, and from a more general approach, to influence business 
cycles. In the 1970s new classical economics formulated the exact opposite of this 
view, and the doubts about the fiscal policy gradually reshaped economic thinking.
After the 2007–2008 financial crisis and the deep, prolonged recession that followed 
it, fiscal policy came into focus again, as the traditional tools of monetary policy 
reached their constraints. As a result, the related theoretical and empirical research 
also received a new boost, and the purpose of our paper is to present these new 
research results.
Financial and Economic Review, Vol. 16 Issue 4., December 2017, pp. 58–85.
György Molnár was an analyst at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank at the time of writing the study.
E-mail: gyorgy.molnar@ogresearch.com
Gábor Dániel Soós is a senior economic analyst at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. E-mail: soosg@mnb.hu
Balázs Világi is a Head of Department at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. E-mail: vilagib@mnb.hu
The Hungarian manuscript was received on 20 December 2016.
DOI: http://doi.org/10.25201/FER.16.4.5885
59
Fiscal Policy and the Business Cycle
Although there is still much debate about the applicability of fiscal policy, the 
view that the impacts of fiscal policy are not constant, but rather depend on the 
state of the business cycle, has become increasingly common. Fiscal expenditures 
are capable of influencing the movement of real GDP, to a higher extent during 
recessions and to a lesser extent during booms.
Since our paper mainly focuses on the presentation of new research, and the new 
research efforts primarily deal with the circumstances under which fiscal policy is 
suitable to affect the business cycles, in this study we do not consider the long-
run effects of fiscal policy and only touch on the problem of government debt 
sustainability. We do not deny the importance of these problems, but also with 
a view to volume constraints, we have intentionally narrowed the subject of our 
paper and focused primarily on the new research which has not yet found its way 
to the broader community of professionals.
The study is structured as follows: In Section 2 we review how the theory of fiscal 
policy has changed since Keynes and the current position of economics on this 
subject. In Section 3 we discuss the problem of the empirical identification of 
the effects of fiscal policy and present empirical results. Section 4 deals with the 
implication of the above in economic policy, and Section 5 concludes.
2. Theory
The subject of the paper is the assessment of whether fiscal policy is capable of 
influencing business cycles. Therefore, we disregarded other issues belonging to 
fiscal policy, such as the role of the state in the creation of public goods or how the 
investments of the state influence the long-term growth potential of the economy.
The degree of efficiency at which fiscal policy is capable of influencing business 
cycles is characterised by the magnitude of the so-called expenditure multiplier. 
The expenditure multiplier measures how many units real GDP will be raised by a 
raise of one unit of real government expenditure.
If the value of the multiplier is zero, then each unit of the increase in public 
spending will reduce private consumption or investments by the same amount. 
In other words, public spending will crowd out private spending. In extreme cases 
the multiplier may even be a negative number, in such cases one unit of public 
spending will crowd out more than one unit of private expenditure. In such cases 
fiscal spending will not increase and might even reduce real GDP; therefore if this 
happens, the fiscal policy is entirely ineffective.
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If the expenditure multiplier is between 0 and 1, then government expenditures will 
only partially crowd out private expenditures, and an increase in public spending 
by one unit will reduce private consumption and investments by less than one 
unit. In this case, it is possible to increase real GDP by fiscal spending. However, in 
this case in parallel with the increase in GDP social welfare could decrease, if the 
government spending crowds out a significant volume of private consumption, or 
it may decrease long-run growth, if it crowds out important private investments. 
Therefore, in such a case the application of fiscal policy to boost the economy 
requires substantial caution, and the benefits and costs should be carefully assessed.
If the value of the multiplier is 1, then fiscal policy no longer crowds out private 
expenditures at all, and if it is higher than 1, then government expenditures not 
only do not crowd out private spending, they even generate additional private 
income. In such cases fiscal policy should clearly be used to boost the economy. 
In the remaining part of the study, when we use the term fiscal policy is effective, 
we refer to cases when the value of the expenditure multiplier is higher than 1.
Our paper primarily focuses on the magnitude of the expenditure multiplier, since 
after the crisis the main debated matter was whether the increase in government 
spending is able to mitigate the recession. In addition to the expenditure multiplier, 
the literature deals with the negative multiplier effects of various taxes in detail. 
We only assess this matter partially, primarily in the context of the extent to which 
various forms of funding for government expenditures could reduce the effect of 
the expenditure multiplier.
2.1. The Keynesian theory of fiscal policy
Today, Keynesian theory is an essential part of macroeconomic textbooks. For 
example, the system of IS-LM curves and its implications for fiscal policy are dealt 
with in detail in Chapter 2 of the textbook of Benczes and Kutasi (2010). Precisely 
because of that, following overview is not intended to convey new knowledge; our 
purpose is merely to prepare the presentation of new theories discussed later. The 
purpose of the following section is not to provide a formal presentation of the IS-
LM curves, but rather to clarify the key assumptions of the Keynesian theory from 
which its results applying to fiscal policy are derived.
Before the 1930s it was the prevailing opinion that fiscal policy has no effect on GDP, 
since government spending crowds out private expenditures.1 After the recession 
of 1929–1933, it was the works of Keynes that changed the majority opinion on 
that matter.
1  Nevertheless, classical theory did not completely reject the idea of accumulating deficits; in extraordinary 
cases, such as during wartime, it was considered acceptable.
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According to Keynes, one unit of real expenditure by the government raises real GDP 
by more than one unit. The arguments of Keynes are well known from introductory 
level macroeconomics textbooks. One unit of government spending will increase 
GDP by one unit2 in the first round, but this is not yet the end of the process. The 
increase in GDP will raise the incomes of households, and since according to Keynes, 
consumption moves closely in parallel with current incomes, the consumption of 
households and consequently, aggregate demand will also increase, which will 
further boost GDP, as a result of which the consumption of households will increase, 
and so forth (see Figure 1).
The relationship between the current income and consumption of households is 
captured by the marginal propensity to consume. This shows how many units of 
consumption are increased by one unit of current income. If we mark marginal 
propensity to consume with c, 0<c<1, then according to Keynes one unit of 
government expenditure will increase GDP by 1/(1–c). We call this latter formula the 
Keynesian expenditure multiplier, since c is positive and lower than 1, the Keynesian 
multiplier is higher than 1, furthermore, the higher the marginal propensity to 
consume, the higher the value of the multiplier.
The co-movement of current income and consumption is of key importance in 
Keynesian theory, but we also need other conditions to demonstrate that fiscal 
policy is capable of efficiently increasing economic activity.
Essentially, Keynesian theory is the theory of aggregate demand, and assumes that 
the development of aggregate demand determines GDP. In other words, supply 
does not respond to increasing aggregate demand by raising prices, but rather by 
quantitative expansion. To express this in the language of macroeconomics, the 
aggregate supply curve is horizontal: therefore, as a result of a shift in the aggregate 
demand curve, in the new equilibrium output will be higher while price level will 
remain unchanged.
2  To make the essence of this argument more accessible, following the simplification generally applied in the 
literature of macroeconomics, in this paper we presume all along that government expenditures include 
government consumption and government investments. We disregard household and corporate transfers, 
which are also part of government expenditures in practice.
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Since Keynesian theory was created as a reaction to the Great Depression of the 
1930s, it was a natural assumption that supply adjustment is primarily quantitative, 
since the depression economy of this era was, in fact, characterised by the fact that 
both prices and wages were inelastic, with a significant amount of idle capacities.
In addition to supply assumptions, the assumptions about the methods of financing 
government expenditures also affect the rate of the multiplier. The rate of the 
expenditure multiplier is affected by the methods used to finance expenditures. The 
multiplier only reaches its maximum value of 1/(1–c) if the government finances 
budgetary expansion from debt. If the expenditures are financed partly from tax, it 
will reduce the rate of the multiplier, since the disposable incomes of households 
will be lower, and therefore consumption growth and aggregate demand will be 
lower. It can be acknowledged that if the expansion of government expenditures is 
fully financed from taxes, then the rate of the multiplier will be reduced to 1. Figure 
2 summarises the underlying factors of the Keynesian expenditure multiplier theory.
Finally, a common misunderstanding related to Keynesian theory should be clarified. 
According to the theory, the rate of the multiplier is independent of whether the 
government spends the fiscal expenditures on useless things, or on useful purposes, 
such as infrastructure investments or the development of human capital. Keynesian 
theory was not intended to explain factors determining the long-term growth of 
the economy, but rather meant to find a way for recovery from the depression 
when aggregate demand is insufficient and monetary policy is no longer capable 
of stimulating the economy. The key to the Keynesian theory is that government 
expenditure generates additional private incomes, and from this point of view it 
makes no difference what the targets of the initial government expenditures are 
Figure 1
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that induce private demand. Naturally, the target of the government expenditures 
may have an impact on the long-term growth of the economy, since efficient public 
spending may increase potential output for the future. However, the Keynesian 
theory does not consider this question, as the subject of its assessment is the 
short-term effects of fiscal policy.
2.2. The criticism of Keynesian theory
As discussed in the previous section, from the aspect of the conclusions of Keynesian 
theory one fundamental assumption is that there is a close relationship between 
consumption and current incomes. However, subsequently severe criticism was 
formulated about the consumption theory of Keynes, with the most important 
challenges posed by the permanent income theory of Milton Friedman (1957) and 
the life cycle hypothesis of Franco Modigliani (1966). Both authors established 
empirically and theoretically that when making consumption-saving decisions, 
households consider not only the development of their current income but also 
the development of their incomes in the longer term.
To put it in another way, households smooth their consumption, i.e. fluctuation in 
their income is not fully followed by fluctuation in their consumption. This is also 
supported by the data, as the volatility of aggregate consumption is lower than 
the volatility of the GDP. Smoothing consumption specifically means that when 
households temporarily have lower incomes, they reduce their savings and try 
to maintain the level of their consumption. And if their income rises temporarily, 
then they will not spend their total increase in income on current consumption, 
but rather save part of it so that they can increase their consumption in the future 
as well.
Figure 2
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It follows from the above that the marginal propensity to consume is lower than 
had been presumed by Keynes. As noted, the rate of the Keynesian expenditure 
multiplier is 1/(1–c), if marginal propensity to consume, i.e. if c is low, then the 
value of the multiplier will also be close to 1.
Discarding the Keynesian consumption function also has further consequences. 
The Keynesian theory of consumption is basically static: current consumption is 
only affected by current income. By contrast, subsequent consumption models are 
dynamic: the household develops its optimal consumption path in consideration of 
a longer time horizon. Accordingly, in addition to income, the real interest rate also 
has a significant influence on consumption-saving decisions. Since monetary policy 
is capable of influencing the real interest rate, it therefore has a significant impact 
on both consumption and aggregate demand. As a result, monetary policy can 
neutralise the effect of fiscal policy. Let us assume that the decisions of the central 
bank can be described by the following interest rule: in the case of inflation or an 
increase in real GDP the central bank raises the interest rate. If fiscal expenditures 
increase, inflation and output will also be higher, as a result, the central bank will 
raise the interest rate, which will result in the increase in the real interest rate, which 
will in turn, reduce consumption and aggregate demand. As result, the efficiency of 
fiscal policy will decrease, and the expenditure multiplier might be lower than 1.
From the 1970s, Keynesian theory has been subjected to even more radical criticism 
from the new classical school, associated with the name of Robert Lucas. This 
school of economic thinkers questioned the Keynesian opinion on the behaviour of 
supply. In their opinion, prices and wages respond flexibly to changes in aggregate 
demand, and therefore the adjustment of supply is basically not quantitative. In 
their opinion, the aggregate supply curve is basically vertical: it only departs from 
vertical temporarily, if firms face unforeseen surprises (Lucas 1973; Sargent and 
Wallace 1975). As a result, if the aggregate demand curve shifts due to a predictable 
fiscal expansion then it will have no quantitative effect and real GDP will not change; 
by contrast, the price level will increase. In other words, in such a case the value 
of the expenditure multiplier will be zero. If the fiscal expansion takes firms by 
surprise, then supply will respond quantitatively as well, for a temporary period, 
but even in this case the growth of GDP will be much lower than the magnitude 
assumed by Keynes.
The views of the new classical theory on the behaviour of aggregate supply can 
be formally summarised by the new classical Phillips curve, which is discussed, for 
example, in Chapter 4 of Benczes and Kutasi (2010).
The other important element of new classical criticism was the Ricardian 
equivalence, which was first formulated by Barro (1977). It claims that if government 
spending is financed from deficit, it has exactly the same effect as that of tax 
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financing. This is supported by the following argument: According to the theory of 
permanent income, the consumption decisions of households are not determined 
by current income, but by the present value of expected lifetime income. If the 
consumers are appropriately rational, then they will also exactly understand that a 
current government deficit will imply higher taxes in the future, since government 
debt will have to be repaid in the future. In other words, if the fiscal expansion is 
not financed from current taxes, then it will be financed from future taxes. It is clear 
that the present value of the tax increase in the future is just as high as the current 
tax increase; therefore, in both cases the present value of the lifetime income will 
be reduced by the same extent, and accordingly, current consumption will decrease 
by the same amount.
It is important to underline that the Ricardian equivalence has the consequence that 
the rate of the expenditure multiplier is independent of the way the government 
expenditures are financed. However, this does not imply in itself that the value 
of the expenditure multiplier should be less than 1. Ricardian equivalence only 
claims that whatever the rate of the multiplier when the expenses are fully financed 
from taxes, it is not possible to increase this rate further. Therefore, the Ricardian 
equivalence will only corroborate the inefficiency of fiscal policy if the multiplier 
of expenditures financed from taxes is less than 1. For lack of the Ricardian 
equivalence, in such cases it could be argued that in the case of deficit financing this 
value could even be higher than 1, but if we accept the Ricardian equivalence, this 
cannot happen. Therefore, the Ricardian equivalence can only be used to support 
a sceptical position towards fiscal policy if we supplement it with other arguments, 
for example, those related to the behaviour of supply.
The critiques above are summarised in Figure 3. They were fundamentally intended 
to demonstrate that fiscal policy is not efficient and that fiscal spending of one 
unit will increase real GDP by less than one unit, because it crowds out private 
expenditures. But there are also counter-arguments related to the practical 
implementation of fiscal policy, which we review in the following section.
One frequent counter-argument is that monetary policy serves to smooth the 
volatility of the economy much more efficiently than does fiscal policy. This 
argument posits that monetary policy is capable of responding quickly and 
efficiently to changes in the economy: the decision-making body of a central bank 
can meet at any time and make a decision on the policy rate within a few hours, 
while the discretionary fiscal policy supplementing the automatic fiscal stabilisers3 
is the result of a slow and sluggish legislative process, and therefore it is only able 
to respond to developments in the economy with long delays.
3  We refer to automatic fiscal stabilisers when the budget balance changes automatically whenever the 
business cycle enters a new stage.
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Furthermore, it not only takes a long time for a decision to be made, there is also 
a long time between the decision and the implementation of the fiscal project. 
Therefore, it can take several years until the effect of fiscal policy is realised, whereas 
in the case of monetary policy new interest rates can be implemented practically 
instantly after an interest rate decision. All of this can have the consequence that if 
we try to boost the economy by fiscal policy during a recession, the recession may 
well be over by the time results start to appear. This was considered an especially 
important problem in the two decades preceding the crisis, at the time of the 
so-called Great Moderation, when the depth of business cycles’ volatility and the 
length of recessions decreased significantly in developed economies.4
2.3. Post-crisis view
So far we have summarised the opinion of economics on the efficiency of fiscal policy 
before the crisis. These results are known to the wider professional community. 
Our purpose with the review was to prepare the discussion of new research results 
and put these in context. Much of this research applies the stochastic dynamic 
framework of modern macroeconomics, and because this framework is technically 
demanding they still have not found their way into introductory textbooks or to 
the wider professional community. In the following section we attempt to present 
these results in an accessible way.
4  The idea that discretionary economic policy should not be pursued, owing to delayed effects, among others, 
can be traced back to Milton Friedman.
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The crisis of 2007–08 and the recession that followed it forced the profession to 
reconsider its views on the role of fiscal policy. As a result, the profession now 
has much more complex opinions on the possibility of applying fiscal policy than 
previously.
It is not like the pendulum has swung back from one extreme view into the other 
direction. The Keynesian theory is no longer acceptable today in its original form, 
but it has become clear that many of its elements can be once again relevant, under 
certain conditions. It has become clear that the applicability of fiscal policy is not a 
timeless property, but rather something that depends on the state of the business 
cycle. In this part, we overview this process of reconsideration.
First, we detail how the opinion of the profession has changed on the practical 
applicability of fiscal policy. On the one hand, it has been proven that monetary 
policy is not efficient in every situation. Keynes realised back in the 1930s that in 
a severe recession and in a low interest environment monetary policy becomes 
ineffective; this is what he called a liquidity trap. The liquidity trap is a rare 
phenomenon, which is why the profession did not take it seriously, although the 
long recession of Japan in the 1990s could have been a warning sign. However, after 
the crisis both the euro area and the United States found themselves in a liquidity 
trap, when the natural rate of interest, i.e. the real interest rate consistent with the 
natural rate of output, became negative, and monetary policy could not replicate 
this negative real interest rate, since – given the low inflationary environment 
– it would have required a significantly negative nominal interest rate, which is 
not feasible. Although it was possible to simulate the economy to some extent 
using unconventional tools, monetary policy basically reached its limits. In such a 
situation, the application of fiscal policy as an alternative tool was naturally raised.
Starting from the 1980s, the rate of economic volatility was lower than ever before. 
As mentioned, this period is called the Great Moderation in the literature. By 
contrast, since the Great Depression of the 1930s there has not been such a deep, 
prolonged recession in the developed world as the one that followed the year 
2008. Figure 4 shows the recession that unfolded in four developed economies. 
As illustrated in the figure, the economic downturn following the crisis was 
persistent and deep in all four countries. In addition, the post-crisis situation can 
be characterised by the concept of hysteresis: the economy grows on a lower trend 
line than before the crisis, or the growth rate even becomes lower than previously.5 
Based on the above, it can be concluded that the argument formulated at the time 
of the Great Moderation, i.e. that owing to the short duration of recessions fiscal 
policy should not stimulate the economy, does not apply.
5  See the study of Blanchard et al. (2014) on hysteresis.
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Revaluation of the extreme views of new classical economics on the aggregate 
supply curve began long before the crisis. This process was not motivated by 
thinking about fiscal policy, but rather by that view of new classical macroeconomics 
that monetary policy has no effect on the real economy, which ran counter to 
both the empirical results of academic research and to the practical experiences 
of central bankers.
From the 1990s, in most macroeconomic models the behaviour of supply has been 
described by the New Keynesian Phillips curve (see its formal presentation in the 
advanced textbook of Galí (2008). The New Keynesian Phillips curve is associated 
with the new classical Phillips curve discussed in the previous section only in name 
and is based on an entirely different concept. While in new classical theory the 
transitional frictions of supply can be explained by the imperfect information of 
Figure 4
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firms and households, the New Keynesian Phillips curve is based on Calvo’s (1983) 
theory of sticky prices.6
The New Keynesian Phillips curve describes the behaviour of supply in a much more 
balanced way than the new classical school does. As a result of the assumption 
of sticky prices, some firms respond to an increase in demand by raising their 
prices, while another parts respond with quantitative expansion. As a result, the 
aggregate supply curve is rising, not horizontal, as in the original Keynesian theory, 
or vertical, as in the new classical models. Therefore, if aggregate demand shifts as 
a result of a fiscal expansion, then it will cause both the price level and real GDP to 
increase. The flatter the curve, the higher the quantitative shift is. Compared to the 
original Keynesian approach, the GDP effect and the expenditure multiplier will be 
lower, but if the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve is not too high, then the 
expenditure multiplier is higher than 1. This conclusion is radically different from 
the arguments of the new classical school, which state that fiscal expansion will 
only have a real impact if it is introduced by surprise, but even that impact will be 
transitional and negligible.
It is obvious from the above that the lower the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips 
curve, the higher the expenditure multiplier will be. In recessions, when there 
is low capacity utilisation, the significance of price adjustment is reduced, and 
consequently, the slope of the curve will also be lower. All of this supports the 
argument that in crises, if a fiscal expansion is capable of efficiently increasing 
aggregate demand, then much of it will be ultimately reflected in GDP growth, and 
the inflationary effect will be minimal.
There is also an extensive body of empirical literature that deals with the process 
that during recent decades the slope of the Phillips curve had significantly decreased 
long before the crisis, which is discussed in the review of Szentmihályi and Világi 
(2015). The flattening of the Phillips curve started long before the crisis, but during 
the crisis this phenomenon intensified, because of the downward rigidity of wages 
and low capacity utilisation.
As discussed in the previous section, if consumption is affected not only by income, 
but also by the real interest rate, then it neutralises fiscal expansion to a significant 
extent. On the other hand, if during a crisis the economy falls into a liquidity trap, 
then monetary policy will reach the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates and 
the interest rates of the central bank will stabilise at around zero for a longer time. 
In such a case, monetary policy does not neutralise fiscal expansion. Christiano et al. 
(2011), Woodford (2011), and Erceg and Linde (2016) demonstrate that in a liquidity 
trap, if the nominal interest rates are unchanged, the expenditure multiplier will 
6  See also the study of Szentmihályi and Világi (2015) on the new classical and New Keynesian Phillips curve.
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be significantly higher than 1 even if the behaviour of households is described not 
by the Keynesian, but rather by the permanent income theory. In contrast with the 
static approach of Keynes, these papers present dynamic models, which shed light 
on channels increasing the multiplier that are lacking from the original Keynesian 
theory: according to these models, expected fiscal expansion will increase inflation 
expectations, as a result of which the real interest rate will decrease, which, in turn, 
raises current consumption and aggregate demand, and therefore the magnitude 
of the expenditure multiplier.
The importance of these studies cited above lies in the fact that these results 
are based on the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models of 
modern macroeconomics. Typically, prior to the crisis the literature on DSGE was 
sceptical concerning the applicability of fiscal policy. However, the above authors 
demonstrated that in the case of a liquidity trap even the standard DSGE models 
imply the efficiency of fiscal policy.
In the following part, we present new results that are also derived using the 
stochastic, dynamic framework of modern macroeconomics, but extend the 
standard DGSE models. While in the standard models the only constraint to the 
indebtedness of households is their expected lifetime income, the studies presented 
now take into account that in reality, and especially at the time of crises, debt 
constraints are much stricter than that.
The studies of Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), and Eggertsson and Mehrotra 
(2014) reconsider the relationship between current income and consumption: the 
authors point out that after financial crises, since the debt constraints become 
more stringent, households are not capable of smoothing their consumption, and 
therefore the permanent income theory does not work in the case of indebted 
households. Consequently, in a post-crisis recession the effect of current income 
on consumption will increase, i.e. the Keynesian consumption function becomes 
a good approximation of the behaviour of aggregate consumption. Based on that, 
the authors demonstrated that in a deep recession and liquidity trap the behaviour 
of the economy will become similar to that outlined in the original Keynesian 
theory, and therefore in such a case fiscal policy is effective and the value of the 
expenditure multiplier is higher than 1. Furthermore, the above studies highlight 
that if consumers with debt constraints exist, then the Ricardian equivalence will 
certainly not be valid, accordingly, it is possible to increase the magnitude of the 
multiplier if government expenditures are financed not from taxes, but rather by 
increasing the deficit.
Summarising the above points, although a significant portion of the criticism of 
the Keynesian theory of fiscal policy is justified, in deep, post-crisis recessions the 
major conclusions of Keynes are still valid. In such a case the economy falls into a 
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liquidity trap, which renders monetary policy ineffective; on the other hand, the 
effects of fiscal expansion will be strengthened, partly because these effects are 
not neutralised by the inefficient monetary policy, and partly because owing to the 
indebted consumers, consumption will be correlated with current incomes to a 
higher extent than in a normal situation. Furthermore, in a recession, due to slack, 
the downwardly rigid wages, the reaction of supply is also primarily quantitative.
If we compare the above arguments to the conclusions of the criticisms of Keynesian 
theory, it is safe to say that – according to the current position of macroeconomic 
theory – the efficiency of fiscal policy and the expenditure multiplier are state-
dependent. During booms the expenditure multiplier is lower than 1, and therefore 
fiscal policy is not effective, but there is no need to apply it since the business cycle 
can be appropriately controlled by monetary policy. By contrast, in recessions after 
crises the value of the expenditure multiplier is higher than 1, and therefore in such 
situations fiscal policy is an efficient tool to stimulate the economy and is necessary 
in this case, because the conventional tools of monetary policy become ineffective. 
The above train of thought is summarised in Figure 5.
2.4. Small open economies
The theoretical framework presented so far has been created fundamentally for the 
analysis of large economies, only open to a small degree, such as the USA. In order 
for this framework to be applicable to small, open economies, we must add some 
more considerations to the analysis presented so far. In a small, open economy 
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there are two important factors which have not yet been discussed so far, which 
influence the rate of the multiplier.
On the one hand, in an open economy if domestic production needs imported 
inputs, then part of the incomes primarily and additionally generated by fiscal 
expenditures will “leak” abroad. If the domestic economy is large enough, then 
the income generated abroad is capable of increasing foreign GDP significantly, 
which could increase foreign demand for domestic products, and this could partly 
compensate for the leaked income. However, if the economy is small, then this 
compensatory effect does not exist, because in this case the income leaking from 
the domestic economy is not sufficient to exert a meaningful influence on the 
foreign economy. Therefore, in the case of a small open economy the rate of the 
expenditure multiplier decreases owing to the import needs of the economy. For 
example, if we apply the original argument of Keynes to a small open economy, then 
the value of the expenditure multiplier with deficit financing will be determined by 
the following formula: 1/(1–c+m), where c means marginal propensity to consume, 
and m stands for marginal propensity to import. If the demand for imports of 
the economy, i.e. the value of m is high, then the rate of the multiplier will be 
significantly lower than in the case of a closed economy.
On the other hand, the magnitude of the multiplier is not independent of the 
exchange rate regime. The effects of fiscal policy in the case of small open 
economies were first analysed by Fleming (1962) and Mundell (1963). Chapter 2 
of Benczes and Kutasi (2010) contains a formal presentation and discussion of the 
Mundell–Fleming model.
According to the Mundell–Fleming model, in the case of a fixed exchange rate 
regime, fiscal expansion will increase output more efficiently. The reasoning is the 
following: if fiscal policy raises demand, then interest rates will rise, and the higher 
interest rate will put the domestic currency under pressure for appreciation. In 
the case of a fixed exchange rate regime, the central bank will respond to this with 
intervention, to mitigate (or terminate) the appreciation by easing the monetary 
stance; therefore, ultimately monetary policy will support the boosting of the 
economy. By contrast, in the case of a flexible exchange rate regime, the central 
bank does not respond exclusively to the movement of the exchange rate, and if it 
does not boost the economy or only boosts it to a smaller extent compared to the 
fixed exchange rate regime, then the more appreciated exchange rate will mitigate 
the increase in output via more restricted export performance, and ultimately the 
impact of the fiscal spending will be smaller. Farhi and Werning (2016) analyse the 
effects of fiscal expansion in a modern dynamic stochastic model framework in open 
economies, but their fundamental conclusions are in harmony with the results of 
Fleming and Mundell.
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There is another very important element that is missing from the fiscal theory 
developed for large economies, which is of key importance for small economies: 
the issue of the sustainability of the deficits related to fiscal expansion, see, e.g. 
Chapter 3 of Benczes and Kutasi (2010) or the study of D’Erasmo et al. (2016). In 
the case of some large economies – such as that of the USA or Germany – there is 
practically no constraint to increasing public debt: even in the case of a relatively 
high public debt-to-GDP ratio the financial markets regard the funding of the public 
debt as a risk-free investment. The financing practice of small economies is in sharp 
contrast with that. In these economies, an increase in public debt will raise the risk 
premium of the debt, and beyond a certain threshold this premium may even rise 
at an extreme pace. Furthermore, it is possible for the debt to reach a level when 
the sources of financing dry up completely.
The above factors have a significant impact on the effectiveness of fiscal policy. 
When the public debt is appropriately high, a fiscal expansion financed from 
deficit would increase the public debt and the burdens of financing to such an 
extent that it would no longer stimulate the economy and instead would have a 
contractionary effect. If the burdens of financing are extremely high, sooner or later 
the government will have to introduce such fiscal austerity, which will result in a 
significant growth sacrifice. How quickly the contraction of the economy occurs 
depends on how rational the expectations of the relevant economic agents are. But 
regardless of the timeframe, if we do not regard the problem statically, then with 
a high public debt the increase of fiscal expenditures will ultimately not increase, 
but rather lower real GDP.7
3. Empirical research
3.1. Identification
The empirical identification of expenditure multipliers is fundamentally difficult,8 
since their value depends on several other factors, including interactive effects. 
The fiscal multiplier depends on the state of the business cycle, the expectations of 
economic agents, the reaction function of economic policy, i.e. in general on several 
structural parameters, the accurate measurement of which poses a challenge to the 
analyst. The main problem lies in the fact that it is not sufficient merely to divide the 
changes in GDP over time by the changes in the fiscal instrument that occurred over 
the same period, using actual data, in order to find out the change that a change 
of one unit in the fiscal variable causes in GDP. This is particularly true because 
the level of activity in the economy is affected by several other factors as well. In 
7  The study of Baksa et al. (2014) discusses in detail in what way expectations affect the multiplier. At the same 
time, this model does not assess the impacts of fiscal policy in the case of a liquidity trap, and therefore 
they find low multiplier values.
8  This is generally true for other kinds of fiscal multipliers, such as tax multipliers.
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the identification, we want to know what the ultimate exclusive effect of the fiscal 
instrument is on output. A two-way causal relationship may exist between the two 
variables. On the one hand, changing fiscal expenditures affects GDP, as this is the 
channel which practically identifies the fiscal multiplier itself (Figure 6, arrow no. 1). 
On the other hand, economic policy may and does also respond9 to changes in GDP, 
for example, exactly by the stimulation or possibly by the restraint of public sector 
spending (Figure 6, arrow no. 2). Therefore, the so-called identification problem 
lies in whether or not we only capture the first channel. Therefore, in terms of 
the causal relationships we look for the effect of the one that is exerted by the 
governmental instrument on economic growth and not vice versa.
As a solution, there are two major and widely used methods in the literature, 
which we discuss later on in more detail. One approach identifies the fiscal shocks 
by a structural vector-autoregressive model (SVAR), and based on that, it becomes 
possible to determine the multiplier values. This method was first applied by 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) for estimating the fiscal multipliers. In this case, the 
condition of identification is usually the requirement that the change in GDP should 
not affect public sector spending in the given period. This assumption is not only 
a simplifying methodological condition necessary for the SVAR simulations, but 
also an approach defined based on economic considerations. The GDP of the given 
period is not known to start with, and naturally, its exact value will be known 
only later on, at least one quarter later; on the other hand, owing to institutional 
features, the steps of economic policy can also not necessarily be immediately 
ascertained.10
9  Either by direct steps, or through the automatic fiscal stabilisers. We explain this latter in more detail in the 
part titled 4. Implications on economic policy.
10  For example, major changes in taxation or expenditures are preceded by social, professional, parliamentary 
debates concerning the effects of the fiscal measure, which could, by necessity, generate some subsequent 
actual response.
Figure 6




Note: Legend: Y means output, Z is the fiscal instrument in question. Channel 1 is the exclusive effect of 
public sector spending and changes in taxes on the output, while channel 2 is the response of the 
government to changes in GDP.
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The other approach builds on the search for a fiscal variable that is presumably 
independent of the fluctuation in GDP. The first cases in point concerning such a 
variable are those of Barro (1981), and then Ramey and Shapiro (1998), in which 
the authors identified fiscal shocks by relying on figures on military expenditures. 
They simply used information taken from reports on planned military expenditures 
as a shock variable. Changes in military expenditures are independent of domestic 
growth and mainly depend on external factors (a period of wars), therefore from 
the aspect of identification using that figure is a good choice.
Among the empirical methods used to assess the impacts of other, fiscal shocks, 
we should also mention the one in which the authors use full econometric models. 
However, the development of these models is not exclusively aimed at estimating the 
fiscal impulses and owing to their econometric structures they are suitable for creating 
simulations, enabling the exploitation of these opportunities.11 In addition, another 
approach is when the authors use a New Keynesian macroeconomic model, the major 
parameters of which are estimated and then the fiscal multiplier can be calculated 
using the estimated parameters, based on simulation.12 The empirical strength of 
this latter practice is fundamentally weakened – in addition to the usual estimation 
properties of the Bayesian estimation, characteristic of complex models – because the 
applied models result in strong theoretical restrictions in themselves, and therefore 
they provide much less room for information deriving from the observed data.
The methods are presented in detail, and several methodological, literature 
references are given in: Chinn (2013), and Spilimbergo et al. (2009). In the following, 
we will mainly focus on the first two methods and on investigations where the 
authors specifically analysed the factors affecting the value of the fiscal multipliers.
3.2. Results – an overview of the literature
The study of Ilzetzki et al. (2011) contains a detailed analysis of the multiplicative 
effects of public sector spending, in which over forty countries were assessed in 
the period between 1960 and 2007. They were merely seeking answers as to what 
is the impact of the most important economic properties on the effect of the fiscal 
stimulus. Of the factors determining the rate of the multiplier, the authors assessed 
the following: level of development (developed or emerging), the exchange rate 
regime (fixed or flexible), the openness of the economy and indebtedness.
They prepared their estimate using a panel SVAR model, with the structural 
condition that the GDP of the given quarter has no impact on governmental 
consumption, only one quarter later.13 They assessed both short-term and long-
11  See e.g.: Horváth et al. (2006)
12  See e.g.: Zubairy (2010)
13  The SVAR model included the following endogenous variables: governmental instrument (e.g. government 
consumption), base interest rate of the central bank, GDP, current account, real exchange rate. In their 
estimates, they used four lags uniformly. The various lags did not significantly affect their conclusions.
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term effects, and furthermore, whether the difference between the multipliers of 
public-sector consumption and public investments are significant. We summarise 
their results in the following table.
Table 1
Multiplier values of fiscal expenditures









Developed economies 0.37 0.41 0.8 1.15
Developing economies –0.21 0.57 0.18 0.75
Fixed exchange rate 0.09 0.36 1.5 1.42
Flexible exchange rate –0.28 0.46 –0.41 0.16
Closed economy 0.02 0.46 1.29 0.7
Open economy –0.28 0.51 –0.75 –0.23
Source: Ilzetzki et al. (2011)
In general, they conclude that the multiplier of government investments is higher 
than that of government consumption, but at the same time, in several cases 
there is no statistically significant difference between the two. In relation to the 
level of economic development, the multiplier is much higher for developed 
economies. In emerging economies, the long-term, demand-stimulating effect of 
governmental consumption is, in fact, not significantly different from zero, while 
that of government investments is a positive figure and is substantially higher. 
Estevão – Samake (2013) and Kraay (2012) estimate similarly lower multiplier values 
for developing economies.
As for the assessment of various exchange rate regimes, they found that the value of 
the fiscal multiplier is higher in the case of a fixed exchange rate regime compared to a 
flexible exchange rate regime. Born et al. arrived (2013) at a similar conclusion: in the 
case of a fixed exchange rate regime they measured a multiplier effect that is 2 or 3 
times higher compared to a flexible exchange rate regime. Underlying this conclusion 
is the intuition that – in the case of a fiscal shock – a flexible exchange rate regime 
enables faster implementation of mechanisms that initiate economic adjustment.
In assessing the openness of economies, the authors usually found a higher fiscal 
multiplier for closed economies, in accordance with the results of Flemming (1962) 
and Mundell (1963) cited above.
The study of Ilzetzki et al. (2011) uses a sample that lasted until 2007, i.e. the period 
preceding the crisis, and primarily supports the sceptical approach to fiscal policy. 
Studies that also considered the post-crisis period in the estimations arrived at 
significantly different results.
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Of these, it was the study of Blanchard and Leigh (2013), two researchers at the IMF, 
that attracted the most attention. They came to the conclusion that the value of the 
fiscal multiplier is higher than 1 after the crisis, which was much higher than assumed 
previously. This study stirred up quite a storm when it was published, since up to 
that point the IMF had taken a rather sceptical approach. In making their estimates, 
they used the following considerations. They estimated the following equation:
forecast error of growth = α + β · forecast of fiscal consolidation + ϵ
In the equation, they regressed the forecast error of GDP growth from one year to 
the next by the forecast of the change of fiscal consolidation. The structural balance 
of the government is contained on the right side. With rational expectations and 
assuming that an appropriate model was used for the forecasts, the value of β 
should be zero. The investigation was conducted for the 2010–2011 period, on a 
sample of 26 countries.14 They arrived at a significantly negative value as the value 
of the estimated β. A large number of robustness tests were carried out, with 
different specifications, and although different results were obtained in several 
cases, in total, significantly negative values were estimated for this parameter. 
For example, certain countries were left out from the estimate, the outliers were 
treated by different statistical procedures, the above equation was extended by 
various additional explanatory variables (e.g. CDS, fiscal balance, initial debt, debts 
of households, current account balance, actual fiscal measures instead of planned 
fiscal steps); in addition, the sample was expanded for the period between 2009 
and 2012. Furthermore, the estimate was also performed for the pre-crisis period 
(1997–2008), and a significantly zero β value was found.
The results were robust for the various specifications and revealed that the current 
fiscal multiplier values are higher than believed previously. Although the definition 
of the exact multiplier values that were used for earlier forecasts is unclear, since 
it fundamentally depends on the structure of fiscal consolidation and on economic 
conditions, it was a general opinion based on the results of several studies that in 
respect of developed economies the value of the multiplier is about 0.5 for two 
years. For example, in IMF (2008) a multiplier value of 0.5 was estimated for 21 
developed economies for the period between 1970 and 2007; furthermore, the IMF 
(2010) also estimated an average value of about 0.5 on average for 15 developed 
economies for the period between 1979 and 2009. In light of the above, the authors 
conclude that based on the results of their estimates currently the value of the 
multiplier is above 1. At the same time, they note that the results should be treated 
with caution, particularly because fundamentally there is not one single multiplier 
value for every economy, for every fiscal shock. The value of the multiplier may vary 
14  Basically, it was the EU27, however, there were no data on the structural fiscal balance for Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Luxembourg in the WEO of April 2010. On the other hand, they added three developed 
European economies – Iceland, Norway, Switzerland – to the sample and thus carried out the test on a 
total of 26 countries (27–4+3).
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by country and by period of time, and furthermore, as economies recover from a 
crisis, their multiplier values will presumably return to pre-crisis levels.
Applying the methods outlined above, Mohlmann and Suyker (2015) also conducted 
the estimate for later periods. On the one hand, they refreshed it: they used a 
version of the database of Blanchard and Leigh (2013), that was updated 3 years 
later. They also found a similarly significant negative β value for the periods between 
2009 and 2010 and 2010 and 2011, but the coefficient is no longer significant for 
2011–2012. They estimated a value close to zero for later years.15
Based on the empirical results reviewed so far, it can be understood that the 
value of the expenditure multiplier is not constant and that it depends on the 
state of the business cycle. This is clearly underpinned by the studies of Auerbach 
and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013). The authors estimate fiscal multiplier values of 
about 1.0–1.5 by estimating a regime-changing model for a recession environment, 
while for a boom the estimate is around 0.0–0.5. Therefore, according to their 
main conclusion, fiscal expansion is much more efficient in a period of recession 
compared to a period of expansion.16 The results are summarised in Figure 7.
15  The authors note that, naturally, this result could also reflect that the forecasters of the IMF have “learned 
their lessons” from the crisis, and for the later periods indicated they already used higher multipliers 
compared to the pre-crisis period.
16  They also assessed to the various fiscal expenditures and typically arrived at higher values for military 
expenditures and government investments, in contrast to the less powerful demand-stimulating effect of 
government consumption.
Figure 7
Development of the expenditure multiplier in the United States



















Note: Shaded regions are recessions defined by the NBER. Blue dashed lines are 90 per cent confidence 
interval. 
Source: Auerbach – Gorodnichenko (2012)
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The above results are confirmed by the study of Huidrom et al. (2016), 
demonstrating that in a period of recession the stimulating effect of fiscal 
expenditure is significantly higher. While in a period of recession multipliers of 
around 1.5–2 are obtained for a time horizon of 1–2 years, the values estimated 
for periods of expansion are statistically typically not different from zero.
Nonetheless, the value of the fiscal multiplier is not only affected meaningfully 
by the cyclical state of the real economy, the level of indebtedness of the given 
country may also affect it. According to the study of Ilzetzki et al. (2011), the level 
of indebtedness of the given economy significantly affects the efficiency of fiscal 
spending. Excessive indebtedness substantially mitigates the growth effect of 
fiscal expansion. In proportion to GDP, in the case of economies with a level of 
indebtedness exceeding 60 per cent a negative fiscal multiplier is arrived at, which 
is a strong indication and also a serious challenge concerning the recovery from the 
crisis of economies with an excessive level of indebtedness. In their assessment of 
robustness, the authors found that indebtedness exceeding broadly the threshold 
of 60 per cent will result in an insignificant multiplier. Huidrom et al. (2016) obtained 
similar results. The authors assessed 34 countries (of which 19 were developed 
and 15 emerging) for the period between 1980 Q1–2014 Q1, with the application 
of the so-called IPVAR.17 model. In respect of the immediate effect, fiscal multiplier 
becomes insignificant starting from an indebtedness level of roughly 65–70 per 
cent, and in the case of a low level of indebtedness the long-term value is close to 1.
4. Implications for economic policy
In this section, we provide an overview of what conclusions can be drawn based on 
the theory and empirical research on the operation of fiscal policy. Our purpose is not 
to describe an optimal rule of fiscal policy in the strict sense, but rather to consider 
those basic principles that are characteristics of a proper fiscal policy in our opinion.
As demonstrated in the previous sections, both the theoretical models and the 
empirical studies confirm that the magnitude of the fiscal expenditure multiplier 
is state-dependent: during booms it is relatively low, while in recessions, and 
especially after major crises, it is relatively high, higher than 1.
From that it follows that the proper fiscal policy is also state-dependent. It is not 
useful or possible to apply fiscal stimulus to the economy over the whole business 
cycle; at the same time, the claim that strict fiscal policy is required always and 
under any circumstances is not true either.
One frequent argument against fiscal policy is that it is much more difficult to 
implement than monetary policy; therefore, it is not recommended to be used 
17  Interacted Panel Vector Autoregressive model.
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for smoothing the business cycles.18 However, after the crisis of 2007–2008 it was 
proven that in a deep recession monetary policy can quickly reach its limits and 
become ineffective. In such a case, the only tool to stimulate the economy is fiscal 
expansion, without the application of which the economy could easily move into 
a state of persistent stagnation, as is demonstrated by the paper of Eggertson and 
Mehrotra (2014). In addition, the fiscal multiplier is the highest in such a situation, 
and therefore fiscal policy is not only desirable, but also efficiently applicable.
At the same time, from the aspect of the sustainability of the deficit the professional 
literature has been traditionally sceptical about fiscal stimulus. It is believed that 
even with a high value of the expenditure multiplier it is impossible to implement 
a meaningful stimulus of the economy, since it will relatively quickly lead to an 
unsustainable deficit; calculations on this are included, for example, in the study 
of Chand (1993).
By contrast, the post-crisis research supports the claim that fiscal expansion 
implemented in a crisis does not necessarily lead to an unmanageable deficit. 
Delong and Summers (2012) demonstrate that if the recession is so deep that it 
has long-term negative impacts on growth – i.e. in the case of hysteresis – with 
realistic parameters fiscal expansion can even be self-funding, i.e. the additional 
tax revenues arising from the long-run growth could cover the deficit used to 
finance the expansion. The empirical study of Auerbach and Gorodichenko (2017) 
is in accordance with the above results: according to their research on developed 
economies, projects of fiscal stimulus carried out at the time of crisis did not result 
in a permanent increase in debt as a percentage of GDP or that of the risk indicators.
On the whole, the above claims do not mean that in small countries that are 
indebted crisis management based on fiscal stimulus is necessarily a viable option, 
but the most recent crisis serves to demonstrate exactly that fiscal restriction also 
does not necessarily work in such cases. In fact, if the value of the multiplier is high, 
then the decrease in fiscal expenditures by one unit will probably reduce GDP by 
more than one unit. As a result, debt as a percentage of GDP will not decrease, but 
will instead rise. Therefore, the result of restriction will be the exact opposite of the 
original aim. A similar story was observed in Greece after the crisis.
Therefore, if an economy enters into a deep crisis and a liquidity trap in which it 
has no fiscal space for manoeuvre, then it has fallen into a trap from which it will 
not be able to escape on its own. Fiscal easing is not feasible, but tightening will 
also not resolve the situation. Blanchard et al. (2016) assessed this problem with 
a sophisticated DSGE model in the case of the central and peripheral countries of 
the euro area. According to the calculations of the authors, in such a case the fiscal 
18  Naturally, here we mean such a degree of volatility in business cycles that cannot be sufficiently managed 
by automatic fiscal stabilisers.
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expansion of the central countries may help the peripheral countries. The reason 
is that the increase in fiscal expenditures of the centre will increase the real GDP 
of the periphery countries by more than one unit.
Since the lack of space for fiscal manoeuvre in a deep recession and liquidity trap 
makes recovery from the crisis extremely difficult, it is very important to build 
up fiscal space during booms. This means that in booms strict fiscal policy is 
recommended. On the one hand, during such times there is no need for fiscal 
stimulus, stimulating an overheated economy contradicts the principle of smoothing 
the cycles. On the other hand, during such times the fiscal multiplier is low, and 
therefore increasing expenditures would not significantly stimulate the economy, 
but reducing them would also not cause a substantial loss in output. But the most 
important aspect is that during periods of booms a tight fiscal policy could serve to 
build up the fiscal space that is very much needed should a crisis occur.
Based on the arguments presented so far, it is safe to say that counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy is recommended to be pursued. However, the application of counter-
cyclical policy requires great caution. It is important to estimate the state of the 
business cycle as robustly as possible and to carefully estimate the current value 
of the expenditure multiplier. The application of automatic fiscal stabilisers could 
significantly support the implementation of counter-cyclical fiscal policy. We call 
it an automatic fiscal stabiliser when the budget balance changes automatically 
whenever the business cycle enters a new stage. For example, in the case of a 
recession expenditures grow on a stable course, while revenues will fall short owing 
to the shrinking tax bases. An advantage of automatic stabilisers is that they provide 
an immediate, symmetric fiscal response to the change in the business cycle, 
whereas they do not influence budget sustainability over the cycle.19 The application 
of automatic fiscal stabilisers does not exclude the application of discretionary steps, 
for example, in a deep and persistent recession individual economy-stimulating 
fiscal programmes may also be necessary.
It should be highlighted that the opportunity of applying a counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy is independent of the steady state size of the public spending in a given 
economy.20 There are various feasible regimes in the case of developed economies, 
the average ratio of government spending as a percentage of GDP is relatively low 
in the United States, for example, while in Sweden it is relatively high. Theoretically, 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy is feasible in both cases; from this aspect it is the cyclical 
position of fiscal spending that is important, rather than its average weight. The 
19  As is detailed in the study of Buti and Gaspar (2015), originally the automatic fiscal stabilisers were aimed 
at redistribution, their business cycle smoothing effect is only a beneficial by-product. Precisely because of 
that, the matter of automatic fiscal stabilisers should be reconsidered and their business cycle smoothing 
capability should be improved. 
20  Although this has an effect on the size of the automatic fiscal stabilisers, it is independent of the extent of 
the discretionary decisions that can be made.
82 Studies
György Molnár – Gábor Dániel Soós – Balázs Világi
average size of fiscal spending does not necessarily affect the fiscal space. If the 
weight of public expenditure is high, but together with that, the tax burdens are 
also proportionately high, then public debt remains manageable in terms of size 
and will not restrict the fiscal space.
Finally, we would like to highlight that the principle of counter-cyclical fiscal policy in 
itself is not a new result, it was already known before the crisis. The novelty is that 
since the crisis both the theory and empirical research has confirmed that the size 
of the fiscal multiplier depends on the state of the business cycle, which provides 
another strong argument for counter-cyclical fiscal policy.
5. Conclusions
In the study we explored how efficient fiscal policy is as a tool for smoothing 
business cycles. According to the current economic theory and the most recent 
empirical research, both the efficiency of fiscal policy and the magnitude of the 
expenditure multiplier that measures it are state-dependent. During recessions, 
especially prolonged and deep ones that follow financial crises, when monetary 
policy becomes ineffective, the magnitude of the expenditure multiplier is high. By 
contrast, during times of booms the value of the expenditure multiplier is low. In 
addition to the state of the business cycle, the structure of the economy also affects 
the magnitude of the expenditure multiplier: in the case of small open economies 
the value of the multiplier is lower than in similar, but closed economies.
Since the rate of the expenditure multiplier is state-dependent, it is recommended 
to pursue fiscal policy in a counter-cyclical manner. During times of recessions, 
when monetary policy is ineffective, fiscal expansion can be used to stimulate 
the economy in such a manner that no consumption or private investments will 
be crowded out. By contrast, during times of booms strict fiscal policy should be 
applied in order to build up the fiscal space that will enable the required fiscal 
expansion during times of crises.
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Trade Credit or Bank Credit? – Lessons 
Learned from Hungarian Firms between 2010 
and 2015
Dániel Havran – Péter Kerényi – Attila Víg
This paper addresses the way in which trade credit was used by Hungarian firms 
in the period between 2010 and 2015. Relying on Burkart and Ellingsen’s (2004) 
theory of trade credit, we use panel data on 14,554 Hungarian firms (including 
68 large corporations) to estimate the relationship of trade credit and short-term 
bank credit. Estimated on sub-samples broken down by profitability, our results only 
confirm a complementary relationship. We also examine the relationship separately 
for each category of firm size. We found a complementary relationship for small 
and microenterprises, whereas the results obtained for large corporations imply a 
substitution effect. In Hungary, in the period after 2013 accounts payable tended 
to be increased by financially constrained micro and medium-sized enterprises and 
mostly held steady by financially unconstrained firms.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: G32, C23
Key words: trade credit, financial constraints
1. Introduction
Firms consider trade credit to be an important channel of external funding, 
particularly in cases when they have no other access to finance. Trade credit is 
often a substitute for short-term bank credit, while it is also possible that access to 
bank credit is facilitated by the willingness of suppliers that are more familiar with 
the firm to finance it. Accordingly, in various stages of the business cycle, certain 
firms rely on trade credit more heavily, and others less so. In recent years, Hungarian 
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firms experienced both a period of recession in the financing environment and the 
subsequent recovery. This paper is concerned with how accounts payable were 
used for financing purposes in the period between 2010 and 2015 by Hungarian 
non-financial and non-utility firms which draw up annual accounts.
For the same period, a number of studies have been produced on the trends in 
the funding of Hungarian firms, mostly addressing the practice of bank financing or 
the effect of stimulating credit supply (Funding for Growth Scheme), e.g. Csubák – 
Fejes 2015; Bálint – Fellner 2016, 2017; Bokor – Hidasi 2014; Endrész – Harasztosi 
– Lieli 2015. In the literature, few analyses have been carried out on the use of 
trade credit in respect of the past years (Szűcs 2008; Nábelek 2016). However, 
understanding firms’ short-term financing practices could vary and complement the 
overall picture about long-term financing. With our paper, it is on that issue that 
we wish to contribute to the Hungarian discourse on corporate finance.
Our analysis has both cross-sectional and temporal aspects.
In taking a cross-sectional approach, we seek to explore whether in the period 
concerned, trade credit was used by firms to complement or substitute bank 
credit. We rely on Burkart and Ellingsen’s (2004) model to establish the theoretical 
framework required to address this issue. To segment firms, we use indices 
representing firms’ financial constraints – Kaplan–Zingales1, Whited–Wu2, Cleary3 
– as well as corporate profitability (low, medium and high EBIT/ASSET), in contrast 
to the empirical work of Cunningham (2005), who used firms’ “wealth” (i.e. profit, 
a proxy for the size of internal or own funds) to measure the presence of financial 
constraints. The propositions of theory are only supported by our estimates 
unambiguously for small and microenterprises.
We are also interested in the extent to which the result changes according to the 
category of firm size. Using Hungarian data, our empirical results mostly confirm 
that for large and medium-sized enterprises, there is no or only weak substitution 
between trade credit and bank credit, whereas the relationship is complementary 
for small and microenterprises. We find that the presence of accounts receivable 
also leads to increased use of trade credit, and that the effect is the strongest in 
the case of financially constrained firms.
Owing to the difference in the relationship between these channels of finance, 
firms respond differently to cyclical changes. In the period under review, the pattern 
emerging in the use of trade credit may be pro-cyclical for some firms (with the 
volume of accounts payable falling in crisis and growing in recovery), and counter-
1  Kaplan – Zingales (1997)
2  Whited – Wu (2006)
3  Cleary (1999)
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cyclical for others (with days outstanding becoming longer in crisis and shorter in 
recovery). Could it be argued that firms tend to accumulate payables during times 
of crisis? Or, conversely, do payables increase when firms use them to finance their 
growth during times of recovery? Industry character notwithstanding, what are the 
characteristics of firms in these two groups? What was the level of volatility in each 
case? Although less reliably in statistical terms, the empirical analysis of cyclicality 
has found the accumulation of payables in the recovery period to be a feature of 
financially constrained firms, whereas with financially unconstrained firms days 
payable outstanding did not increase in the period of recovery. These tendencies 
could mostly be shown for small and microenterprises.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. First, an overview is offered on the 
general financing situation of Hungarian firms in the period between 2010 and 
2015, and then a theoretical framework is established as a basis for the empirical 
analysis. This is followed by the presentation of data and the approach used. The 
Results section presents tables for the estimates obtained, with the corresponding 
interpretations. A brief summary is provided at the end of the paper.
2. Payables as reflected in corporate finance: 2010–2015
For Hungarian firms, recovery from the 2008 crisis was protracted, with the turning 
point arriving only in 2013/2014 after another dip in 2012. A period characterised by 
financial constraints and pessimistic expectations was followed by one that offered 
improved access to credit and a better outlook. In the following, a brief summary 
is provided of that period in terms of firms’ financing practices. Our primary focus 
will be the MSME segment.
Figure 1 represents some of the trends emerging from the database we processed 
for the period under review. (The Bisnode database, which contains the financial 
accounts collected by the tax authority for all firms in scope, will be explained in 
detail as part of the empirical analysis.) The diagrams show the medians derived 
from individual ratios.
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The settlement of accounts payable took the longest in 2013 in commerce, 
industry and services alike. After 2013, both accounts payable and receivable days 
outstanding became shorter. In firms with bank loans outstanding in the period, 
there was a steady decline in the ratio of short-term loans to total assets. The 
share of long-term bank loans within the balance sheet also declined, although at 
a much slower rate. Relative to total assets, net non-cash working capital remained 
level at around 25–26 per cent, while the median of net trade credit in the sample 
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Note: The indicators represented in each diagram were derived as follows: days payable outstanding 
were derived as the ratio of accounts payable on year-end to material costs, multiplied by 365, and days 
receivable outstanding were derived as the ratio of accounts receivable on year-end to annual sales, 
multiplied by 365. Short-term and long-term bank credit outstanding and accounts payable as at the end 
of the year were related to total assets. Net trade credit refers to accounts receivable less accounts 
payable, relative to total assets; and non-cash working capital refers to non-cash current assets less 
accounts payable, relative to total assets.
Source: Calculations based on data from Bisnode Kft.
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stagnated at around 0 per cent. This also implies that accounts receivable frequently 
correlates with accounts payable, and that out of the components of net working 
capital, the highest financing requirement is attributable to inventories.
According to Csubák and Fejes (2014) and MNB (2015), the volume of lending to 
MSMEs dropped from its 2008 peak of HUF 3,896.9 billion by almost one third to 
HUF 2,753.3 billion in 2011, followed by an increase of some HUF 750 billion in 
2012. The SAFE reports produced in the same period (SAFE 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015) 
show that for small and medium-sized enterprises, access to external finance was 
the most difficult in 2011, following which firms found their situations to be steadily 
improving. At the same time, finding skilled staff became increasingly difficult, while 
a steadily narrowing group of respondents identified market competition as the 
key challenge. A summary of the responses is provided in Table 1. Questionnaire 
responses also show that the period between 2013 and 2015 saw a decrease 
in the ratio of respondents that had their request for financing rejected. As the 
questionnaires for European countries were administered to relatively small samples 
in Hungary, the ratios obtained for the attitudes identified must be treated with 
caution.
Table 1
Main challenges to Hungarian SMEs
(SAFE questionnaire surveys)
Which of the following problems is the most 
challenging for your firm? 2009 2011 2013 2014 2015
Finding customers 43.50% 24.80% 18.90% 16.22% 26.14%
Competition in the market 1.70% 23.50% 17.10% 14.51% 9.57%
Access to finance 18.70% 22.00% 17.30% 14.06% 11.29%
Costs of labour or production 3.10% 6.10% 11.90% 10.73% 12.37%
Availability of skilled staff 4.20% 6.60% 10.90% 18.36% 21.93%
Regulatory environment 12.40% 10.90% 11.20% 14.68% 9.33%
Other 16.40% 6.10% 12.70% 11.44% 9.37%
Source: Data from the SAFE (2011, 2013, 2014, 2015) questionnaire surveys
The MNB’s reports following up on developments in lending (Bálint – Fellner 2016, 
2017) also confirm the tendency perceived by firms, i.e. that the terms of bank 
lending to firms significantly improved from 2013 onwards. The study argues that 
the differential between the lending rate and the cost of funding also dropped, 
collateral requirements and the required level of creditworthiness were eased, 
and the available credit lines increased. From June 2013 onwards, subsidised loans 
(primarily the Funding for Growth Schemes, “FGS”) played a major role in facilitating 
access to finance. While the main focus of FGS 1 was loan replacement, FGS 2, 
launched in autumn 2013, already brought about improvements in the terms of 
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access to working capital and investment loans as well (FGS 3 in 2016 already 
falls outside of the period under review). Analyses are provided in Módos, Bokor 
and Hidasi (2014) and Bokor, Fellner and Plajner (2014) on the developments of 
the period, and in Endrész, Harasztosi and Lieli (2015) on the effect of the FGS on 
investment.
While financing opportunities clearly improved in 2013–2015, developments in the 
demand for finance appear more gloomy. Demand for finance was predominantly 
determined by selling opportunities and expectations of growth. The SME Survey of 
January 2015 by the Institute for Economic and Enterprise Research (“GVI”) (Nyírő 
and Hajdu 2015) shows that while cyclical indicators consistently identify summer 
2009 and summer 2012 as the two troughs, expectations improved considerably 
from 2013. Juhász and Reszegi (2017) conclude that – although the change in 
expectations brought back the sentiment preceding the crisis – firms remained 
unable to produce growth relative to pre-crisis levels. On balance, demand for 
finance grew once the effects of the recession were eliminated; however, that 
meant returning to the previous level without any additional financing requirement 
resulting from growth. Bálint and Fellner’s (2017) report, referred to earlier, also 
investigated developments in credit demand. The authors explain that while 
demand for long-term loans dropped significantly in 2010–2013 and then increased 
again later, no typical trends could be identified in demand for short-term bank 
loans. As a combined result, between early 2010 and 2013 Q2 the growth rate of 
long-term corporate loans was negative in each quarter, but the situation improved 
from 2013 Q3, although without any significant growth yet. Even before the period 
under review, circular debt was common, especially in construction and among 
firms with a headcount below 50 employees (Szűcs 2008), and this persisted even 
in 2016. Such debt generally qualified as past due accounts payable, and often also 
as bad debt from the suppliers’ perspective. According to the GVI survey (Nábelek 
2016), an outstanding improvement was recorded in payment discipline in 2014.
Of respondents to the SAFE (2015) survey, 21.6 per cent had used short-term bank 
financing (credit line, overdraft, credit card) in the preceding six months, and 44 
per cent considered this channel to be relevant to their business. Leases were 
the second most popular form of financing, used by 14.2 per cent of respondents 
recently, and considered as relevant by 37.7 per cent. Collectively, subsidised bank 
loans and grants were used by 8.9 per cent of respondents over the period, and 
29.3 per cent considered them to be relevant. Non-subsidised bank loans were 
used by 6.7 per cent, and other loans by 8.4 per cent of respondents on a six-
month time horizon. Trade credit was both less used (4.3 per cent of respondents) 
and considered to be less relevant (13.22 per cent) than the channels mentioned 
previously. The use of factoring was reported by an even lower percentage. 
According to the MNB Financial Stability Report based on credit institution data 
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(MNB 2017), finance was used for investments in tangible assets and the purchase 
of inventories.
Although the cited studies vary as to the precise timing of the turning point due 
to differences in terms of focus, the periods under review and the availability 
of samples, on balance access to finance improved from 2013 Q3 onwards. In 
the banking sector, the volume of loans disbursed increased, but at the level of 
individual firms there was no significant change in the ratio of long-term bank loans 
to total assets. Trade credit was most used in 2013. Although trade credit was not 
listed among the most important sources of external finance, the data suggest that 
it was an important factor in the operations of domestic firms.
3. Theoretical framework
Trade credit can have a variety of unique motivations. In Petersen and Rajan 
(1996), the theories seeking to identify the reasons for the use of trade credit are 
grouped around three motives: (1) special financing advantages (in information 
acquisition, in controlling the buyer, in salvaging value from existing assets); (2) 
price discrimination; and (3) transaction costs.
Financing advantages (1) are built on three different arguments. According to the 
argument based on the first, suppliers – by virtue of their relationship with their 
buyers – may have more extensive and more accurate information, and better 
monitoring opportunities compared to other lenders (Emery 1984; Smith 1987; 
Freixas 1993; Biais and Gollier 1997). Arguments for the supplier’s bargaining power 
over buyers hold that the supplier’s position enables it to control the buyer, or even 
hold it at bay, through its ability to decide on future supplies. In explanations arguing 
with advantages from collateral assets, current assets obtained from the supplier 
may be used as collateral in the event of a payment default, an opportunity that 
cannot be taken in the case of cash advances. In the price discrimination approach 
(2), the phenomenon is captured from the supplier’s point of view: Schwartz (1974) 
construes trade credit as the supplier’s pricing policy, whereas Brennan, Maksimovic 
and Zechner (1988) argue that suppliers apply price discrimination through their 
ability to set more flexible payment terms for more price-sensitive buyers. The 
main proponent of explanations based on transaction costs (3) is Ferris (1981), 
who argues that trade credit exists because payments could be settled cheaper for 
both buyers and suppliers if settlement only takes place periodically (e.g. monthly 
or quarterly).
Burkart and Ellingsen’s (2004) model provides a comprehensive theoretical 
description of the rationale for firms to use trade credit instead of other forms of 
finance. The model allows firms to use both bank finance and trade credit, but with 
both forms of finance there is information asymmetry between the firm and the 
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lender, which imposes a credit constraint. Since under the model the bank knows 
less about the firm than the supplier does, the firm will face stricter constraints 
in the course of obtaining external funding. Consequently, due to the closer 
relationship, the firm can use trade credit even when it no longer has access to 
bank credit. Another difference is that the firm will get cash in the case of bank 
credit, and inputs, i.e. current assets that it can use for production, in the case of 
trade credit. While it is easy for the firm to realise private benefits from the cash, 
it is more difficult to transform less liquid inputs to private benefits. One possible 
consequence is that given a high level of information asymmetry, it is worthwhile 
for a firm to acquire assets by becoming indebted to suppliers, and then to obtain 
bank credit on grounds of the collateralisation so established. Burkart and Ellingsen 
identify that scenario as the case where trade credit is able to complement bank 
credit.
The relationship between the two forms of external funding was investigated 
empirically on samples of US firms by Nilsen (2002), Canadian firms by Cunningham 
(2005), and Chinese firms by Ying, Guo and Yang (2014). Most of their findings are 
consistent with Burkart and Ellingsen’s theory. Burkart and Ellingsen viewed trade 
credit as a source of finance that matured in 1 to 3 months but could be prolonged, 
and loans provided by commercial banks typically maturing in 1 to 3 years. The 
primary focus of the theory is therefore on short-term sources of funding. The 
question of how long-term bank finance is related to trade credit is addressed by 
Fazzari and Petersen (1993) as part of their analysis of US firms’ data. The authors 
observe that investments in fixed assets and net working capital compete with each 
other for finance, which makes long-term bank credit and trade credit possible 
substitutes. Ferrando and Mulier (2013) find that trade credit may also be an 
important source of growth.
The decision between trade credit and bank credit may also be strongly influenced 
by how the firm’s buyers are financed. Firms with the capacity to increase 
their accounts payable will have more room to finance their buyers for price 
discrimination purposes. Moreover, accounts receivable are less liquid than cash, 
and additional collateral may also improve the capacity to borrow from banks. For 
European firms, the components of trade credit were analysed by García-Teruel 
and Martínez-Solano (2010), whose findings, inter alia, confirmed the theory of 
price discrimination.
Decisions on inventories may also play a part in the use of trade credit, as shown 
in a theoretical model by Bougheas, Mateut and Mizen (2007), who also test their 
argument empirically on a sample of firms operating in the UK. Chittenden and 
Bragg (1997) confirm the relationship between inventory holdings and accounts 
payable on samples of three countries (Germany, France, UK). As regards cash 
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holdings, also analysing the data of firms in the UK, Kling, Paul and Gonis (2014) 
find that a higher cash ratio improves access to trade credit.
For our empirical analysis, we invoke the following conclusions by Burkart and 
Ellingsen (2004):
1)  With financially unconstrained firms that are still within their bank debt and 
trade credit capacities, according to the theory complementary, substitution or 
no relationship between short-term bank credit and trade credit may be possible.
2)  With financially constrained firms beyond their capacity for bank debt, short-term 
bank loans and trade credit are:
a)  substitutes in the case of firms that are still within their capacity for trade 
debt; and
b)  complements in the case of firms that are beyond their capacity for trade debt.
The implications can also be extended in terms of business cycles. Where the size 
of bank credit is pro-cyclical over time in a firm (i.e. showing signs of constraints), 
trade credit would be:
•  counter-cyclical in case 2a; and
•  pro-cyclical over time in case 2b.
Therefore, the sensitivity of trade credit to business cycles could vary according 
to the respective levels of the capacity constraint on trade credit and bank credit. 
The authors identify the wealth (own funds) available to the firm as the factor that 
influences whether capacity constraints are reached. Firms with a low level of own 
funds are constrained in their access to both bank credit and trade credit, those with 
a medium level of own funds only in their access to bank credit, and firms with a 
high level of own funds are not constrained in their access to either type of credit.
In our first analysis, we explore how accounts payable are related to short-term 
and long-term lending. We also address the effect of accounts receivable on 
accounts payable. Our second question is whether patterns that are similar to the 
theoretical conclusions are obtained by capturing own funds through firms’ average 
profitability, and the constraints on bank debt in ways commonly reported in the 
literature (using Kaplan–Zingales, Whited–Wu and Cleary indices). In practice, the 
capacity for trade debt can be influenced by a number of factors in addition to 
internal funds. Where a firm has stronger bargaining power over its supplier, it 
may have much greater capacity for trade debt. Therefore, in the third step we 
will investigate the extent to which the relationship between bank credit and trade 
credit varies according to firm size. As an additional fourth step, we profile the 
behaviour of accounts payable over time.
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4. Data and methodology
The data were provided by Bisnode Magyarország Kft. The raw database includes 
all Hungarian firms that use double-entry bookkeeping and submit annual accounts 
to the tax authority. Of that population, our analysis includes Hungarian firms 
that draw up their annual accounts in Hungarian forints and are neither financial 
firms (NACE 6400–6699) nor utility providers (NACE 3500–3799). The sample does 
not include firms submitting simplified annual accounts or the type of accounts 
provided for microenterprises. Although there is a high number of firms of the 
latter type, their collective size is considerably smaller than the group of firms 
submitting annual accounts. Consequently, the macro-weight of the dataset used 
may be considered significant. In cleaning the data, we filtered out firms showing 
economically nonsensical or erroneous items (such as negative total assets or other 
negative balance sheet items), and where we found missing data that could not be 
provided (e.g. missing P/L accounts), we also filtered out the corresponding firm/
year observations. Subsequently, the dataset used for analysis was constructed to 
include firms for which the database contained balance sheets and P/L accounts 
for at least three consecutive years.
This corresponds to a total of 14,554 firms, comprised of 68 large corporations, 1,332 
medium-sized enterprises, 4,354 small enterprises, and 8,800 microenterprises 
according to the EU sales classification. Except for financial firms and utility 
providers, which operate using different a business logic, our database thus includes 
all Hungarian firms on which the tax authority has data of adequate quality. Within 
the sample, large corporations account for approximately 10 per cent, medium-
sized enterprises 46 per cent, small enterprises 37 per cent, and microenterprises 
7 per cent of the total sales.
Table 2
Annual number of observations by sector
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Commerce 3,190 3,375 3,547 3,215 2,918 1,710
Industry 4,372 4,594 4,773 4,418 4,079 2,502
Services 5,167 5,616 5,840 5,188 4,557 2,507
Total 12,729 13,585 14,160 12,821 11,554 6,719
Note: Authors’ calculation on the sample used for analysis
Based on the NACE classification, the sample included 3,665 firms in commerce, 
4,896 firms in industry, and 5,993 firms in services (Table 2). Except for 2015 (where 
the annual accounts were not available for all of the firms), the database includes 
data on an average of 12,000 to 13,000 firms, with a low ratio of new entries and 
exits.
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Table 3
Names of the variables
ACCOUNTS_PAYABLE: Accounts payable (purchases of goods and services)
ACCOUNTS_RECEIVABLE: Accounts receivable (goods and services)
ST_LOANS: Short-term loans
LT_LOANS: Long-term loans (for investment and development purposes)
ASSET: Total assets (for regression analysis, its logarithm is used: LOGASSET)
SALES: Net sales
AP_SALES: Accounts payable / Net sales
AR_SALES: Accounts receivable / Net sales
EBIT_SALES: Earnings before interest and taxes / Net sales
ST_LOANS_SALES: Short-term loans / Net sales
LT_LOANS_SALES: Long-term loans / Net sales
LEVERAGE: (Short-term liabilities + Long-term liabilities) / Total assets
CURRENT: Current assets / Short-term liabilities
CASH_SALES: (Cash and cash equivalents) / Net sales
INTEREST_COV: Interest coverage ratio: Earnings before interest and taxes /
(Interest payable and similar charges + Approved dividends and profit 
sharing)
CAPEX_SALES: (Fixed assets – Depreciation) /
Net sales
SALES_GROWTH: Sales growth rate as a percentage of the previous year
PROFIT_SALES Profit after taxest / Salest-1
ROE: Profit after taxest / Shareholders’ equityt-1
ROIC: NOPLATt / ICt-1 where: NOPLAT: EBIT × (1 – teff)
IC: Fixed assets + Current assets – Short-term liabilities
DIVIDEND_RATIO: Approved dividends and profit sharing / Profit after taxes
KZ: Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index for unlisted firms:
KZ = –1.002 × CF/ASSETS + 3.3139 × LEVERAGE – 39.368 × DIV  
– 1.315 × CASH/ASSETS
WW: Whited-Wu (2006) index:
WW = –0.091 × CF/ASSETS – 0.062 × DIVIDEND_PAYER + 0.021 × LEVERAGE
– 0.044 × LOGASSET + 0.102 × IND_SALES_GROWTH  
– 0.035 × SALES_GROWTH
where IND_SALES_GROWTH is the industry average sales growth (NACE 2 
digits), and DIVIDEND_PAYER is the dummy for firms paying dividends
CLEARY: Cleary (1999) index:
CLEARY = –0.119 × CURRENT – 1.904 × LEVERAGE + 0.001 × INTEREST_COV
+1.456 × PROFIT_SALES + 2.035 × SALES_GROWTH – 0.048 × SLACK,
where the indicator of financial slack
SLACK = (Cash and cash equivalents + 0.5 × Inventories  
+ 0.7 × (Accounts receivable – Short-term liabilities)) / Fixed assets
COST_SALES Material costs 
AP_COST_SALES: Accounts payable / Material costs
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Table 3 lists the short names and descriptions of the variables used in our analysis. 
In the international literature, it is common (cf. e.g. Petersen and Rajan 1997, 
Nilsen 2002, Cunningham 2005, or Bougheas, Mateut and Mizen 2007) that 
instead of using the AP/Sales ratio to derive the Days Payable Outstanding (AP/
COST_SALES × 365) variable, it is used as a measure of the size of accounts payable, 
normalised for the size of sales. For the sake of international comparability, we have 
opted for the latter variable. We measured accounts payable using the “Accounts 
payable (purchases of goods and services)” line of the balance sheets. To identify 
short-term loans, we used data from the “Short-term loans” line within the “Short-
term liabilities” item of the balance sheet, disregarding the “Short-term advances” 
item. The item short-term loans may also include repayments due within one year 
on loans maturing in more than one year; to that extent, a critical approach is 
needed to our findings concerning short maturities. Although the item chosen 
does not necessarily include bank loans only, in terms of its function it aggregates 
short-term funds that are not from suppliers, and as such may be considered as an 
alternative to trade credit.
With one indicator group (AP_SALES, AR_SALES, CASH_SALES, ST_LOANS_SALES, 
LT_LOANS_SALES, SALES_GROWTH, AP/COST_SALES) we winsorised the upper 1 per 
cent, whereas in other cases (EBIT_SALES, PROFIT_SALES, CAPEX_SALES, ROIC) this 
was done for both the lower and upper 1 per cent. With more special variables we 
applied different rules, e.g. COVERAGE_RATIO (20%; 70%), INTEREST_COV (20%; 
70%), SLACK (5%; 90%), ROE (8%; 90%).
We summarised the descriptive statistics on the most important variables in the 
database in Table 4. In Panel A, we considered data for the entire 2010–2015 period, 
while Panel B only contains data for 2011–2015, because with several calculated 
ratios the denominator contains a value for 2010. In the sample, the median of 
accounts payable was approximately HUF 16 million, and that of accounts payable 
was HUF 20.5 million. More than one third of the firms had short-term bank debt, 
and a smaller percentage had long-term bank debt. The median of total assets was 
HUF 385 million in the sample. The median of the AP/Sales ratio was 5 per cent, 
and that of the AR/Sales around 8.4 per cent.
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Table 4
Summary statistics
Panel A: Key items
(HUF thousands) N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max
ACCOUNTS_PAYABLE 71,568 105,172 228,182 0 694 15,916 98,422 2,138,715
ACCOUNTS_RECEIVABLE 71,568 154,412 404,037 0 976 20,588 139,871 16,552,101
ST_LOANS 71,568 75,464 390,532 0 0 0 17,542 15,724,355
LT_LOANS 71,568 26,932 142,189 0 0 0 0 2,146,469
ASSET 71,568 1,254,481 7,441,845 1 51,983 385,357 1,172,100 1,240,000,000
SALES 71,568 1,220,289 2,762,188 101 35,276 332,765 1,300,015 111,000,000
Panel B: Indicators describing operations
Ratios N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max
AP_SALES 57,014 0.139 0.352 0.000 0.010 0.050 0.127 2.838
AR_SALES 57,014 0.154 0.258 0.000 0.016 0.084 0.182 1.805
EBIT_SALES 57,014 –0.053 0.747 –5.643 0.000 0.035 0.111 0.964
ST_LOANS_SALES 57,014 0.074 0.263 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.033 2.126
LT_LOANS_SALES 57,014 0.049 0.270 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.362
LEVERAGE 57,014 0.488 0.302 0.000 0.232 0.473 0.734 0.989
CURRENT 57,014 3.555 5.388 0.000 0.960 1.538 3.109 22.548
CASH_SALES 57,014 0.352 1.081 0.000 0.017 0.066 0.220 8.546
INTEREST_COV 57,014 4.753 12.281 –14.587 0.007 1.865 21.187 22.445
CAPEX_SALES 57,014 0.074 0.408 –1.653 0.000 0.012 0.058 2.777
SALES_GROWTH 57,014 0.186 0.958 –1.000 –0.119 0.028 0.200 7.063
ROE 57,014 0.155 0.521 –0.907 0.002 0.085 0.316 1.201
ROIC 57,014 0.247 1.302 –4.487 –0.000 0.076 0.256 8.685
In empirical literature on corporate finance, the variables measuring the presence 
of financial constraints are compared by Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014) and 
Elsas and Klepsch (2016). Of the variables used by the authors, we measure the 
presence of constraints on access to short-term bank credit against the three most 
common variables: the Kaplan–Zingales, the Whited–Wu and the Cleary indices 
for unlisted firms. We define the presence of financial constraints based on the 
statistical procedures summarised in Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014). The 
Kaplan–Zingales and Whited–Wu indices and the Cleary index multiplied by minus 
one are arranged in ascending order, and then observations above the upper 30th 
percentile are defined as unconstrained, and those below the lower 30th percentile 
are defined as constrained. Items in the middle 40 per cent belong to neither class 
and are considered as representing a grey zone. We applied this procedure and the 
sorting to the entire sample and to the entire firm/year observation. This means 
99
Trade Credit or Bank Credit?
that the classification of certain firms may change over the year, but change is not 
characteristic of the sample. The three classifications are compared in Table 5. 
Except for large corporations, the Kaplan–Zingales approach can be used to classify 
firms more or less independently of firm size. With large firms, the share of firms at 
the limit of their capacity constraints is about 50 per cent, which indicates the poor 
reliability of the KZ procedure (in their original paper, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
used a relatively homogeneous sample to estimate the index for categories based 
on self-assessment). The Cleary procedure has a moderate tendency, while the 
Whited–Wu procedure has a strong tendency to classify smaller firms, particularly 
microenterprises, as financially constrained. It is to be noted that these procedures 
are also not considered to be perfect alternatives in the international literature, 
which is why we use several classifications for our analyses.
Table 5
Classification of financial constraint measures
Size Year Number of firms
Number of financially constrained firms in each classification











Large 2011 68 39 5 0 3 0 0 0 57% 7% 0%
Large 2012 68 35 5 1 2 1 1 1 51% 7% 1%
Large 2013 67 30 8 1 3 1 1 1 45% 12% 1%
Large 2014 67 34 6 0 2 0 0 0 51% 9% 0%
Large 2015 34 14 6 1 1 0 1 0 41% 18% 3%
Medium 2011 1,269 434 143 5 63 5 0 0 34% 11% 0%
Medium 2012 1,310 431 181 11 80 9 7 5 33% 14% 1%
Medium 2013 1,298 416 195 15 79 11 12 9 32% 15% 1%
Medium 2014 1,254 365 192 18 64 13 12 9 29% 15% 1%
Medium 2015 734 184 128 9 43 6 9 6 25% 17% 1%
Small 2011 3,966 1,177 698 110 317 72 50 32 30% 18% 3%
Small 2012 4,201 1,233 867 121 353 86 74 49 29% 21% 3%
Small 2013 4,168 1,150 864 134 369 92 103 68 28% 21% 3%
Small 2014 3,967 1,041 818 131 324 86 90 57 26% 21% 3%
Small 2015 2,333 498 494 72 160 47 57 35 21% 21% 3%
Micro 2011 8,282 2,497 2,791 4,110 1,085 1,538 1,827 656 30% 34% 50%
Micro 2012 8,581 2,735 3,273 4,392 1,200 1,684 2,164 799 32% 38% 51%
Micro 2013 7,288 2,179 2,706 3,448 957 1264 1,659 576 30% 37% 47%
Micro 2014 6,266 1,758 2,311 2,873 773 976 1,390 446 28% 37% 46%
Micro 2015 3,618 854 1,413 1,652 388 477 888 240 24% 39% 46%
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In the first analysis, we examine how accounts payable are related to short-term 
and long-term bank loans and generally to accounts receivable under constrained 
access to bank finance. For that purpose, the following regression equations are 
estimated:
AP/SALES = ST_LOANS/SALES + LT_LOANS/SALES + AR/SALES +
 + controls + Firm FE + Year FE 
(1)
AP/SALES = ST_LOANS/SALES + LT_LOANS/SALES + AR/SALES +
 + FINC_Dummy + FINC_Dummy × ST_LOANS/SALES + (1A)
 + controls + Firm FE + Year FE 
AP/SALES = ST_LOANS/SALES + LT_LOANS/SALES + AR/SALES +
 + FINC_Dummy + FINC_Dummy × LT_LOANS/SALES + (1B)
 + controls + Firm FE + Year FE 
AP/SALES = ST_LOANS/SALES + LT_LOANS/SALES + AR/SALES +
 + FINC_Dummy + FINC_Dummy × AR/SALES + (1C)
 + controls + Firm FE + Year FE 
where FINC_Dummy (financially constrained) is the indicator variable for financially 
constrained firms beyond their capacity for bank debt. Firm FE indicates firm fixed 
effects, and Year FE the time fixed effects. The control variables include all variables 
that, in addition to the effects in individual firms, adequately capture individual 
operational and growth characteristics: firm size (log(ASSET)), operating margin 
(EBIT_SALES), profitability (ROE), interest coverage ratio (INTEREST_COV), leverage 
ratio (LEVERAGE) lagged, liquidity ratio (CURRENT) lagged, cash to sales ratio (CASH_
SALES) lagged, capital expenditures to sales (CAPEX_SALES) lagged, dividend ratio 
(DIVIDEND_RATIO), sales growth (SALES_GROWTH).
The first idea for constructing Equation (1A) came from Cunningham (2005), 
but we use different set of base and control variables. Equation (1B) explores 
the relationship of accounts payable and long-term credit in order to determine 
whether firms increase their long-term credit by increasing trade credit. Equation 
(1C) is not derived from the theoretical model, but is based rather on practical 
considerations. In this case, we seek to determine whether in cases with higher 
AR/Sales ratios firms pass financing on to their suppliers.
In the second analysis, we also examine access to trade credit. In the theoretical 
model, Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) consider the wealth of the firm to determine 
the finance option in terms of which the firm will become constrained. In the case of 
high wealth, firms are less reliant on external funds, and neither constraint applies. 
In the case of medium wealth, they exploit their capacities for bank debt, but not 
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that for trade debt. In the case of low wealth, they are strongly reliant on external 
funds, and as such face constraint in both forms. As firms’ wealth is difficult to 
observe, average profitability (EBIT/ASSET, i.e. Earnings before interest and taxes 
to Total assets) is used as a proxy for wealth, the rationale being that a highly 
profitable firm has the ability to utilise internal funds. We divide the database into 
three sub-samples according to low (<0 per cent), medium (0–14 per cent) and 
high (>14 per cent) business profitability based on the firms’ average EBIT/ASSET 
ratios. On the sub-samples, of the previous model specifications we run (1A) for 
the three constraint indicators, of which we use only the indicator variable for 
firms constrained in their access to bank finance, and consider the control group as 
including both the grey zone and firms unconstrained in their access to bank credit.
In our third analysis, we seek to determine the extent to which firm size influences 
the relationship between trade credit and short-term bank credit. In the case of 
US firms, Nilsen (2002) found firm size to be the factor that adequately captured 
access, although he did not carry out his analyses on micro-level panel data. We 
re-estimate our previous Equations (1) and (1A) for four sub-samples, i.e. the groups 
of large, medium, small and microenterprises, using the criteria for sales (EUR 50 
million, EUR 10 million, and EUR 2 million, respectively; assuming an exchange 
rate of EUR/HUF 300) from the size definitions commonly applied to Hungarian 
firms. In a supplier-buyer relationship, larger size may give a firm more bargaining 
power over its supplier, as a result of which larger firms rarely face strict supplier 
constraints. Primarily, we seek to determine the extent to which this relationship is 
captured by firm size, but exploring the differences between firms of various sizes 
could in itself also produce noteworthy findings. For that purpose, the previously 
constructed Equation (1A) is again estimated with the three constraint dummies.
The fourth analysis quantifies the sensitivity of trade credit to business cycles. For 
each sub-sample (segmented by size), the following regression equation is used to 
obtain a direct estimate of days payable outstanding:
AP/COST_SALES × 365 = AR/SALES × 365 + ST_LOANS/SALES + LT_LOANS/SALES +
+ FINC_Dummy + FINU_Dummy + YEAR_Dummytt=1
4∑  +
 + YEAR_Dummytt=1
4∑  × FINC_Dummy + (2)
+ YEAR_Dummytt=1
4∑  × FINU_Dummy +
 + controls + Firm FE 
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where the dummies FINC and FINU (financially unconstrained) do not cover the 
entire sample, given that 40 per cent of it falls into the grey zone. From the estimate, 
we seek to establish time fixed effects and the interactions with those effects. In 
other words, we seek to determine the developments in days payable outstanding, 
solely attributable to cyclical effects and other things being equal, for the segments 
of firms with varying access to finance, assuming their capacities for bank debt to 
be exploited. For this purpose, we multiply the dependent variable by 365 days in 
order to construe the result in terms of days. As regards the COST_SALES variable, 
we also had to take into account the fact that not all firms follow the same logic in 
calculating the effect of the cost of sales on profits. Some of the firms submitted P/L 
accounts on a total cost basis, and others on a turnover basis. The base which, if not 
settled immediately, could become accounts payable, was the sum of materials and 
consumables and contracted services in the first case, and the sum of the cost of 
goods sold and the value of services sold in the second case. Both types of reporting 
included the item of material costs, which differed from the sum calculated using 
the two methods in fewer than 1 per cent of all cases, and even then the difference 
was small.
Regressions were estimated with the fixed effects within panel method, where 
unique firm fixed effects were filtered using the within estimator, and time (year) 
effects using dummy variables. The panels are unbalanced because it was possible 
for the firms observed to be included in the sample for less than five years. Both 
the Breusch–Pagan and the Honda LM test rejected the null hypothesis that the 
time effect was not significant in the regressions. Unique (firm) effects were also 
mostly significant. The Hausmann tests run for the estimates supported the use of 
fixed effects versus random effects. The error terms of the estimated models implied 
heteroscedasticity, but in the error terms autocorrelation was not significant for 
four observation years. Consequently, we used White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors for our statistical tests.
5. Results
The estimation results for the first question of our analysis (Equations (1), (1A), (1B) 
and (1C)) are summarised in Table 6, where the coefficients of the basic equation 
are shown in the first column, followed by the three equations with the constraint 
indicators derived using classifications based on the Kaplan–Zingales, Whited–Wu 
and Cleary indices. The dependent variable is the ratio of accounts payable to sales, 
which is reported as multiplied by 100 to ensure the readability of the coefficients. 
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Based on an overview of the table, we find that the level of accounts payable was 
increased by the presence of bank credit in all estimates, which is implied by the 
significantly positive ST_LOAN_SALES coefficients. Due to the specific nature of 
the within estimator, R-square values are low, but overall the variables significantly 
explain the ratio of accounts payable with a 1 per cent threshold for each of the 
regression equations.
In the estimate for the basic equation, with firms where the ratio of short-term 
loans to sales was 10 percentage points (0.1) higher, the ratio of accounts payable 
was also 1.269 percentage points higher on average. This essentially suggests that 
if Burkart and Ellingsen’s theoretical model is assumed to be correct, and this kind 
of complementarity is observed in low-wealth firms that are constrained in their 
access to both trade credit and bank credit, then according to the authors’ theory 
most Hungarian firms are financially constrained. This could also mean that the 
credit constraint indicators introduced capture the extent of the capacity constraint 
rather than the fact of its presence.
A brief overview of the coefficients obtained for the control variables is also 
appropriate. We found that larger firms and those working with higher profit 
margins have a lower average AP-to-sales ratio. The ROE indicator, as a measure 
of profitability, failed to significantly explain the size of accounts payable, while 
the coefficient of the dividend ratio showed zero effect. For firms with a higher 
level of indebtedness, we found higher accounts payable in the following year. 
The AP-to-sales ratio was observed to be higher for firms with higher cash ratios, 
and lower for firms with higher growth rates. All of this is not contrary to general 
business intuition.
Financial constraint indicators did not produce consistent results in every case. 
Other than the above argument, this could also result from the differences in 
constructing the indicators, as well as from the fact that the indices used for 
classification were constructed on US data, while differences in the firms’ operations 
may also undermine the reliability of application. Consequently, we only consider 
estimation results as robust where all three indicators produced similar results. Note 
that in interpreting our results, we refer to firms as constrained where the value of 
bank credit is one, and unconstrained where the value is zero (grey zone and firms 
marked as unconstrained above the 30th percentile collectively).
In analysing Equations (1A), we essentially found short-term loans and accounts 
payable to be complementary. In themselves, constraint dummy indicators produced 
mostly insignificant or inconsistent results, but interactions were significant 
and combined effects (with an average volume of short-term loans) also imply 
complementarity.
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In the case of Equations (1B), no correlation was found between long-term credit 
and accounts payable: estimating for the entire sample, there is no evidence of 
any relationship between taking out additional long-term loans and the use of 
accounts payable.
Estimates for Equations (1C) show that in financially unconstrained firms, an 
increase in accounts receivable in a given year will be accompanied by a higher ratio 
of trade credit. On the entire sample, for financially constrained firms combined 
effects are both insignificant and contradictory. This implies that the ability of firms 
to pass financing on to their suppliers may depend on sector, size and other factors.
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The results of the second analysis are summarised in Table 7. We estimated 
Equations (1) and (1A) on three sub-samples. These included firms (a) with negative 
average EBIT/ASSET ratios (representing the lower 26.6 per cent of the sample); (b) 
ratios between 0 and 14 per cent; and (c) ratios above 14 per cent (representing the 
upper 18.7 per cent of the sample). The selection of the thresholds was determined 
by the fact that firms with average negative performance are adequately described 
by Burkart and Ellingsen’s low wealth, while the average 14 per cent threshold was 
supported by the tendency that in business practice, a higher level of profitability 
already enables firms to raise internal funds, and the fact that the number of items 
in the sub-sample is not very low either.
The propositions of Burkart and Ellingsen’s model are only partially confirmed by 
our empirical results. In the first sub-sample, we are able to confirm the predicted 
complementarity. In this subsample, according to the theory, constraints apply in 
terms of both trade credit and bank credit, which is why a breakdown of the analysis 
by KZ, WW and Cleary-based indicators would not make any sense. Nevertheless, 
these indicators, constructed on the basis of other theories, will classify firms as 
both constrained and unconstrained even in this range. In such cases, the indicators 
are construed as suggesting that it is difficult for all participants to access bank 
credit due to their low profitability, and the capacity constraint actually even more 
applies to firms that are also marked by the indices. This will make short-term loans 
and accounts payable complements on the sub-sample: a higher ratio of loans will 
be accompanied by higher accounts payable; however, the result is only robust for 
severely constrained firms where the combined effects also include interactions. 
The second sub-sample shows barely significant complementarity in Equation (1). In 
such a case, for constrained firms the theoretical model would predict substitution, 
but we found none. We consider it plausible that under Burkart and Ellingsen’s 
theory this falls in the category of low wealth, which explains the complementarity 
found. In the third sub-sample, that of highly profitable firms, we found no 
correlation at a significance level of 0.05, and neither is correlation predicted 
according to the theory. If we accept that we were overly lenient in selecting the 
wealth threshold, then zero effect could mean that the sub-sample includes firms 
characterised by substitution as well as firms characterised by complementarity. By 
way of comparison to research carried out on Canadian data for similar purposes, 
Cunningham (2005) did not succeed in identifying the third category, but did identify 
complementarity in the first category and then substitution in the second.
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In terms of substitution, noteworthy features are identified by the analysis carried 
out on sub-samples by firm size, the results of which are reported in Table 8. In 
the sub-sample of large corporations, the estimated coefficient of short-term 
loans is always negative. This implies substitution in the case of large corporations 
(regardless of whether they have become financially constrained according to 
the three indices). The model did not produce an estimate for the Whited–Wu 
interaction (presumably because only zero or one company is marked by the index 
as constrained), and the other two indices were found to be inconsistent. In this 
scenario, we should argue that the relationship between large corporations and 
banks is different from other cases, i.e. that often the size of large corporations 
makes it easier for them to use trade credit rather than bank credit, which represents 
the case of “medium wealth” in Burkart and Ellingsen’s theory. In the category of 
medium and small enterprises, we found significant complementarity between bank 
credit and trade credit for financially unconstrained firms. The KZ and WW indices 
also failed on this sub-sample; only the interaction of the CLEARY dummy was 
significant. With microenterprises (which are presumably constrained in terms of 
both forms of funding), we found no correlation in firms where the bank constraint 
did not actually apply, and found complementarity in firms where it did. This 
scenario corresponds to the case of “low wealth” in Burkart and Ellingsen’s model.
Table 9
Summary of the results of sub-sample analyses
Wealth (EBIT/ASSET)
Low (<0%)
(trade credit constraint 
applies)
Medium (0–14%)
(no trade credit 
constraint applies)
High (>14%)
(no trade credit 
constraint applies)
In general  
(where segmentation is 
solely based on EBIT/
ASSET)
strong 







(the category is not 
applicable to the model)
Unconstrained 
(measured separately)
(the category is not 
applicable to the model)
(the category is not 
applicable to the model) no correlation*
Firm size
Micro Small/Medium Large
Constrained complementarity complementarity (not robust) substitution
Unconstrained no correlation complementarity  (not robust) substitution
Note: In the upper part of the table, items marked with * indicate results that are consistent with the 
theory.
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Table 9 summarises the relationship between bank credit and trade credit on a 
case-by-case basis.
In the context of the empirical analysis, a few methodological limitations also 
emerged, in relation to which improvements may be appropriate in future 
research. It would be beneficial to construct the Kaplan–Zingales, Whited–Wu and 
Cleary indices on Hungarian data, and classify Hungarian firms on that basis. This 
would presumably produce more consistent estimates compared to our current 
results. Notwithstanding that, literature relying on US data is also divided over 
classification procedures. It is even uncertain whether average profitability can 
adequately capture the wealth variable used in the theoretical model. Although in 
prior investigations we arrived at similar results in breakdowns by other variables, 
we do not believe that an indicator consisting of a single component could be a 
good separator. The outcome was somewhat improved when firm size was also 
taken into account. For that reason, it could be appropriate to use the Burkart and 
Ellingsen’s model to construct a trade credit constraint index on Hungarian data, 
which could be the Hungarian proxy for the model’s “wealth” variable.
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The trends of trade credit are addressed in our fourth analysis, which relates 
to Equation (2). Here we investigate the average development of days payable 
outstanding over time for financially constrained and financially unconstrained 
firms, adjusted for the unique (sector-specific, operational, etc.) characteristics of 
firms. By analysing the time effect, we wish to capture typical individual (non-
aggregated) responses to cyclical developments, i.e. a behavioural pattern. The 
results of the estimation are reported in Table 10, and the parts related to cyclicality 
are illustrated in Figure 2.
Table 10
Estimation of the development of days payable outstanding over time
(1A)
AP_COST_SALES × 365 Large Medium Small Micro
AR_SALES × 365 0.40** 0.44*** 0.56*** 0.34***
(0.13) (0.12) (0.07) (0.03)
LOANS_ST_per_SALES –19.17 170.07*** 71.65*** 33.26***
(30.11) (47.69) (19.32) (10.05)
LOANS_LT_per_SALES 87.99 191.95* 54.42· –3.46
(136.89) (86.87) (31.44) (10.89)
YEAR2013 1.69 3.12 4.99*** 5.06·
(3.93) (2.65) (1.46) (2.88)
YEAR2014 –2.79 4.19 6.83*** 3.11
(3.74) (3.54) (1.78) (3.53)
YEAR2015 1.92 –0.25 9.25*** 3.67
(4.63) (4.35) (2.46) (3.77)
D.KZ.constr –9.07* –7.92 –7.43 12.21*
(4.53) (6.35) (4.84) (5.83)
D.KZ.unconstr 2.01 0.28 3.98 –17.42***
(4.74) (3.41) (2.44) (3.73)
YEAR2013:D.KZ.constr 3.74 11.07· 8.51· 8.62
(5.66) (6.56) (4.64) (5.42)
YEAR2014:D.KZ.constr 8.54 7.42 11.18* 20.35**
(5.64) (4.84) (4.65) (6.83)
YEAR2015:D.KZ.constr 2.91 11.57· 14.83* 26.36**
(7.66) (7.02) (6.94) (9.17)
YEAR2013:D.KZ.unconstr –3.73 –4.60 –2.58 1.67
(5.45) (3.55) (2.06) (4.03)
YEAR2014:D.KZ.unconstr 4.96 –3.62 –4.77* 3.62
(6.27) (3.46) (2.30) (4.50)
YEAR2015:D.KZ.unconstr –5.29 –2.31 –4.20 3.40
(5.90) (5.32) (2.83) (4.82)
lag(LOGASSET) –6.79 –20.08** –31.20*** –19.82***
(4.12) (6.99) (7.21) (3.80)
EBIT_per_SALES 14.91 –23.91 –27.63* –3.42
(10.99) (16.35) (10.97) (3.27)
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Table 10
Estimation of the development of days payable outstanding over time
(1A)
AP_COST_SALES × 365 Large Medium Small Micro
ROE –6.79 5.70 –4.80 7.14*
(4.16) (4.03) (4.18) (2.84)
COVERAGE_RATIO 0.01 0.01 0.01· 0.01*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
lag(LEVERAGE) 30.72 3.05 59.10*** 14.91·
(18.66) (25.04) (15.64) (8.25)
lag(CURRENT) 0.03 0.37 0.19 0.60*
(1.88) (0.57) (0.79) (0.27)
lag(CASH_per_SALES) 292.14*** 1.81 18.86· 6.27**
(85.81) (13.33) (9.76) (2.34)
lag(CAPEX_per_SALES) 222.38* 3.22 –11.66 –4.37
(86.39) (40.23) (7.17) (3.46)
SALES_GROWTH –10.26· –2.98 –3.48 –8.09***
(6.06) (3.58) (3.47) (1.62)
DIVIDEND_RATIO 0.54 0.82 0.02 –0.00***
(0.41) (0.73) (0.01) (0.00)
N 235 4,432 13,739 24,000
n 68 1,332 4,352 8,790
T 2012–2015 2012–2015 2012–2015 2012–2015
R2 0.7289 0.3613 0.2706 0.0748
Note: ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; ·p < 0.1 ; while character ‘:’ represents interaction between 
variables.
Although the estimation coefficients were not found to be statistically significant for 
large corporations and medium-sized enterprises, and thus the results are primarily 
applicable to small and microenterprises, all categories are represented. The 
diagrams are based on the average days payable outstanding in 2012 for unclassified 
firms. The diagrams show the differences relative to the base for each type.
Based on the estimated coefficients, days payable outstanding are found to have 
increased in financially constrained microenterprises. Between 2012 and 2013, a 
relatively moderate increase is also indicated for firms which are unconstrained 
according to their Kaplan–Zingales classification. The increase is also observed for 
constrained small enterprises, which implies pro-cyclical behaviour. By contrast, 
rather than an increase at a similar rate, stagnation is found for unconstrained firms.
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6. Summary
This paper investigates the role of trade credit in Hungarian non-financial, non-utility 
firms that submit annual accounts prepared in Hungarian forints. In 2010–2015, 
firms initially faced difficulties in accessing finance and then benefited from the 
easing of terms. In this study, we sought to determine how firm’s use of trade 
credit was related to their use of bank credit. For our empirical analysis, we relied 
on Burkart and Ellingsen’s (2004) theory. Although it was only possible to partially 
confirm the theory, some findings of practical relevance were made beyond the 
scope of the theory on the basis of our data. On the entire sample, we found short-
term loans and accounts payable to be complementary, the effect of which was 
stronger in firms that better exploited their capacity for bank debt. For firms with 
low own funds (equivalent to low wealth in Burkart and Ellingsen’s model and a low 
EBIT/Sales ratio in the statistical analysis), we found strong complementarity, while 
no substitution could be demonstrated for highly profitable firms. We repeated the 
analysis in a breakdown by firm size, which indicated substitution in the category of 
large corporations. Although firm size cannot be considered as a proxy for wealth, 
we thought it important to document the differences in the other size categories 
as well. In the paper, primarily for illustration purposes, we also represented the 
trend of trade credit over time in a breakdown by size, and found that in the period 
of improving finance, the role of trade credit became more prominent in financially 
constrained firms, and remained level in unconstrained firms.
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Explanations of Asset Price Bubbles
Gergely Lakos – Tibor Szendrei
The study provides an overview of the theories explaining asset price bubbles found 
in the literature. Six different explanations are identified that can cause asset price 
bubbles on their own as well as in some combination: informational frictions, short 
selling constraints, limited liability of financial intermediaries, herd behaviour 
among market participants, perverse incentives in the provision of information, 
and market participants’ bounded rationality. Mispricing arising from asset price 
bubbles can considerably hamper the efficient allocation of resources, which may 
warrant government intervention. Nevertheless, most of the underlying factors that 
induce asset price bubbles can only be limited or offset rather than fully eliminated. 
Financial stability is mainly threatened by debt-financed asset price bubbles. 
With respect to asset price bubbles, the mandate and available instruments of 
macroprudential policy are limited to the mitigation of cyclical fluctuations in the 
related lending.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: G10, G12, R31
Keywords: asset price bubble, excessive lending, bounded rationality, financial 
stability, macroprudential policy
1. Introduction
Bubbles develop in the price of an asset when the asset is substantially overvalued 
for a relatively long time. Such bubbles can emerge in the price of various assets.1 
Significant mispricing distorts the allocation of resources, goods and services, 
resulting in considerable economic losses. In this context, the impact of asset price 
bubbles which threaten financial stability is the main concern for macroprudential 
authorities. This is because the build-up of real and financial asset price bubbles 
may lead to systemic risk in the financial system. When these risks materialise, 
there is a high probability that the disruptions in the financial intermediary system 
will considerably damage the overall economy.
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1  A comprehensive account of major historical examples can be found, for example, in Kindleberger and 
Aliber (2011).
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The main systemic risks consist of excessive lending risks linked to asset price 
bubbles. In a developed asset price bubble, economic actors mainly purchase 
the overvalued asset on credit. During price corrections, the solvency of debtors 
diminishes, since selling the assets only yields a fraction of the expected income. 
In addition, the assets concerned are usually the collateral for the loans. Therefore, 
decreasing asset prices also lower the value of potential collateral pledged when 
borrowing. Both effects considerably dampen credit demand. Furthermore, 
asset price corrections also affect lenders negatively, as they incur heavy losses 
due to part of their loan portfolio becoming non-performing. One method of 
stabilising their weakened capital position is to curb lending. All in all, when debt-
financed asset price bubbles burst, both credit demand and credit supply may 
contract considerably. This may even impair the realisation of companies’ efficient 
investment plans as well as households’ ability to temporally smooth consumption.
Macroprudential policy can only be effective if we have a proper understanding of 
the reasons behind the emergence of asset price bubbles. The primary aim of this 
study is to present the factors identified in the literature. In the case of perfectly 
rational actors interacting on a perfect market, overvaluation of assets cannot be 
sustained, since in such a scenario holding the asset yields much lower profits 
than the cost of purchasing or what can be received by selling it. Therefore, the 
explanations of asset price bubbles hinge on the presence of investors exhibiting 
bounded rationality or some imperfection in the market allocation mechanism. In 
line with the literature, we distinguish five main groups of the latter: informational 
frictions, short selling constraints, limited liability of financial intermediaries, herd 
behaviour among market participants, and perverse incentives in the provision of 
information.
Chapter 2 of the study presents a more accurate definition of asset price bubbles, a 
key element of which is the definition of the fundamental value. Due to the difficulty 
in observing the fundamental value, the identification of asset price bubbles in 
practice poses challenges even in hindsight. This observability predicament is 
partly the reason why asset price bubbles can emerge. Chapter 3 presents the 
basic features of the different phases in the asset price cycle. An asset price bubble 
emerges in the so-called boom phase, and develops during the so-called euphoria 
period. Chapter 4 gives an overview of the theoretical explanations of asset price 
bubbles, grouped by explanatory factors. Through the short description of a few 
relevant theoretical models, the paper illustrates how the different reasons can 
create asset price bubbles. Since asset price bubbles mainly threaten financial 
stability when coupled with excessive lending, Chapter 5 briefly discusses why and 
how the two phenomena can strengthen each other. Finally, the paper summarises 
the major lessons for state intervention – with a focus on macroprudential policy– 
that can be drawn from the explanations behind debt-financed asset price bubbles.
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2. Definition of asset price bubbles
Financial or real assets are overvalued when their market price exceeds the 
expected present value of the future cash flows and other benefits derived from 
holding the asset for an extended period of time. The latter is also referred to as 






The fundamental value of the asset in the tth period is Ft. dτ denotes the monetary 
value of the profits realised in the τth period, which is uncertain in the tth period. rt,τ 
denotes the expected return on investments in general from the tth period to the 
τth period, which also includes the risk premium compensating for the uncertainty 
of investments. Et is the expected value operator derived from the information 
available in the tth period. 
Substantial and persistent overvaluation of an asset is commonly referred to as an 
asset price bubble.3 The extent of the price bubble is the difference between the 
market price and the current fundamental value. Since the fundamental value is 
the value of uncertain future returns discounted to the present, the fundamental 
value cannot be observed directly. Identifying exactly what information pertaining 
to future returns is considered available in the present is already difficult. This is 
because the various economic actors have different amounts of information with 
varying degrees of accuracy. This is also influenced by the economic actors’ effort 
to acquire relevant information. It is similarly difficult to observe the extent of 
uncertainty surrounding potential future returns and to gauge the realistic risk 
premium expected in exchange for this uncertainty. Due to the above, even with 
the benefit of hindsight, in practice it is hard to establish whether a bubble emerged 
in an asset’s price or to determine the size of a bubble.
Nevertheless, in several cases, overvaluation or asset price bubbles can be 
identified with great certainty. One such example is from the study by Huberman 
and Regev (2001), where the authors examine the price developments of the 
2  This formula is equivalent to the general pricing formula of the asset pricing theory:
Ft = Et mt ,τdττ=t+1
∞∑( )
where mt,τ is the so-called stochastic discount factor (see Chapter 1 of Cochrane (2005), especially pages 
24–25).
3  The definition of asset price bubbles varies slightly. The definition used in this study is the dominant 
variety (see Brunnermeier 2008, Brunnermeier – Oehmke 2013, Hirshleifer 2001, Scherbina 2013 and Xiong 
2013), although this is not accurate either, since it only roughly distinguishes asset price bubbles from 
overvaluation. As we detail later, the inaccuracy is due to the fact that these are two very similar phenomena, 
which primarily differ in their magnitude.
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shares of EntreMed,4 a biotech firm, on the market. On 3 May 1998, The New 
York Times published an article on the development of cancer-treatment medicine, 
mentioning the name EntreMed several times. In the following weeks, the share 
price of the company soared from USD 12 to USD 52, in parallel with a steep rise 
in the volume of trading in the shares. However, EntreMed’s research results had 
already been published in Nature magazine in November 1997, which had also 
boosted EntreMed’s share price, albeit by far less than in May the following year. 
It is reasonable to claim that the fundamental value of EntreMed shares rose only 
in November, and therefore a major part of the price increase in May contributed 
to the emergence of an asset price bubble.
3. Phases of the asset price cycle
The starting point in the explanation of asset price bubbles was established by 
Minsky (1992), and was later detailed by Kindleberger and Aliber (2011). The study 
divides the asset price cycle into six5 phases: displacement, boom, euphoria, profit 
taking, Minsky Moment, and panic (Figure 1). The theoretical models of asset 
price bubbles seek to explain this comprehensive asset price cycle. Despite the 
considerable progress in recent decades, no uniform theory has been devised that 
is able to accurately and simultaneously capture all the phases of the asset price 
cycle described by Minsky. In this chapter, Minsky’s intuitive characterisation will 
be reviewed, while the next chapter focuses on describing market imperfections 
that can cause asset price bubbles to build up and persist. 
Displacement is the phase in the life of the asset price cycle when the fundamental 
value suddenly rises on account of some factor (Figure 2). In the case of stocks, 
this can occur, for example, when a listed firm develops or uses a more efficient 
technology, successfully ends a legal dispute, or acquires another company that 
it can make more efficient through reorganisation. In the case of properties, the 
fundamental value may rise, for example, when larger employers appear in a given 
geographical region, which raises the future rents for residential and commercial 
properties. The asset’s market transitions from displacement to the boom phase 
endogenously.
In the boom phase, the demand for the now undervalued asset rises, lifting 
the market price and moderating undervaluation. In this period, the economic 
environment is usually stable; the volatility of asset prices is low, and is coupled 
with increasing lending and investments. During this stage, the expansion in lending 
mostly finances investments that seek to utilise the increased efficiency, thus 
4  Today, the company is called CASI Pharmaceuticals.
5  Some divide Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis into five phases (see: Brunnermeier and Oehmke 2012), 
as the Minsky Moment merely refers to a point in time.
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boosting the asset’s fundamental value. In the case of real assets, this manifests 
in the production of more real assets, for example the construction of properties. 
In the case of financial assets, the expansion of activities that ensure future cash 
flows may be targeted. In the context of stocks, this can take the form of increasing 
the market share of a listed company using new technology. Often the change that 
raises the fundamental value is a novelty, the future impact of which is difficult to 
evaluate, leading to the conundrum of estimating the asset’s new fundamental 
value. Therefore, the asset may be inaccurately priced in the boom phase, making 
the undervalued asset overvalued. 
In the euphoria phase, the overvaluation of the asset increases and persists for a 
longer period, i.e. the asset price bubble emerges during this stage. The asset price 
increases steeply, coupled with large price volatility and a high number of transactions. 
Based on the accelerating price dynamics or due to the fundamental value that 
is becoming increasingly easy to identify, more and more market participants may 
realise that an asset price bubble has built up. However, they may have various 
reasons for holding the asset for some time, thereby sustaining the asset price bubble.
During the euphoria phase, new types of investors appear on the market of the 
assets. To use Keynes’s (1936) terms, professional investors are accompanied 
by swarms of speculators. The first group was already present on the market of 
the asset during the boom, and invested in the asset to secure the higher future 
payments from holding the asset. However, speculators principally purchase the 
asset in the hope of the expected profit generated from selling the asset later, at 
a higher price. Demand for the asset is further boosted by the fact that lending 
may now be used to finance the purchase of the asset, in addition to financing the 
underlying investments. In the stock example, loans are taken out not only by the 
companies with increased efficiency to expand their activities, but also by a myriad 
Figure 1







Note: According to the model, the light blue phases of the asset price cycle occur due to exogenous 
effects.
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of leveraged investors who purchase shares in the company on credit. The supply 
of the asset can only catch up to the rapidly expanding demand with a considerable 
lag, which exacerbates asset price bubbles. One typical example is the world of real 
estate, where renovations and construction take more time.
It should be noted that the boom phase is not necessarily followed by euphoria, and 
even if it is, it is not always easy to identify when this happens, even in hindsight. 
If it becomes clear in time that the asset is slightly overvalued, an investment 
frenzy is unlikely to occur which would be necessary for the boom period to 
transition into euphoria. However, if information on the new fundamental value 
disseminates slower, the probability of the emergence of an asset price bubble is 
greater; therefore, it is also harder to establish the exact onset of the euphoria 
phase. Certain characteristics of the asset price bubbles are easier to observe, 
e.g. the rapid rise in market prices, the related excessive lending or the ensuing 
distortion in resource allocation. On account of this, the empirical studies on asset 
price bubbles often identify the bubbles with the help of such variables.
The final stage of euphoria marks the start of profit taking. In this phase, so-called 
sophisticated market participants, who recognised the asset price bubble earlier, 
sell the asset, while others do not start selling in large numbers. New actors, mainly 
speculators, continue to enter the market, who proceed to buy the assets from the 
sophisticated market participants. Thus, the sophisticated players get a high price for 
their assets, achieving considerable gains. This is when trading in the asset becomes 
Figure 2
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analogous to a Ponzi scheme, since the price is maintained by less sophisticated 
participants who will probably sell their newly acquired assets at a loss. In practice, 
isolating the phases of euphoria and profit taking is even harder than delineating 
the boom and euphoria phases. This is because the withdrawal of capital cannot be 
accurately observed, and because distinguishing sophisticated market participants 
from unsophisticated players is even more difficult than identifying fundamental 
traders and speculators.
The Minsky Moment is an event that impacts market participants’ expectations 
about the future development of the asset price simultaneously, en masse and 
considerably. As market participants revise their price expectations downwards, 
panic ensues on the asset’s market: market participants seek to sell the asset in 
large numbers, and the price nosedives, often at a pace exceeding that of the earlier 
price increase. The intention of selling as soon as possible is rational at the individual 
level, since the expected price is continuously decreasing, but collectively it results 
in a suboptimal situation. The resulting price correction is often too large due to the 
panic, making the asset undervalued. Many are unable to repay the loans amassed 
in the euphoria phase at the pace stipulated in the loan contract, leading to mass 
debt problems. The bigger the asset price bubble created by excessive lending in 
the euphoria phase, the greater the drop in prices, the undervaluation, and the 
extent of the debt problems.
4. Reasons behind asset price bubbles
The theoretical literature has identified six factors that can cause and maintain 
asset price bubbles in certain combinations: informational frictions, short 
selling constraints, limited liability of financial intermediaries, herd behaviour 
among market participants, perverse incentives in the provision of information, 
and bounded rationality of market participants (Table 1). This chapter presents 
these in more detail, through the brief introduction of some relevant models. 
The chapter does not aim to provide a comprehensive review of the literature; it 
merely undertakes to show examples of how asset price bubbles are formed, using 
a selection of studies.6 
4.1. Informational frictions
One necessary condition for the price correction of overvalued assets is that enough 
information about the fundamental values is available on the markets of the assets 
in a timely manner. The factors hampering the spread of information are called 
6  Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013), Hirshleifer (2001), Scherbina (2013) and Xiong (2013) give a 
comprehensive overview about the explanations behind asset price bubbles from different aspects.
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informational frictions, due to which market participants’ beliefs can be persistently 
disparate.7
In the model of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), the informational friction is 
embodied in the phenomenon called sequential awareness. In this framework, the 
traders do not simultaneously realise when the asset price exceeds the fundamental 
value, and they do not know when other traders become aware of this. Therefore, 
the development of the asset price bubble never becomes common knowledge. 
The other important assumption of the model is that no trader is “big” enough 
to make a considerable impact on prices with their intention to sell. Thus, for the 
market price to drop a critical mass of the traders have to recognise that there is 
an asset price bubble simultaneously and act accordingly by selling at the same 
time. Since traders forego the extra profits derived from selling later at a higher 
price by selling too early, the traders who are aware of the asset price bubble are 
unwilling to part with the asset until this critical mass comes together. However, 
the requirement of selling together introduces a coordination problem. In such a 
scenario, all readily observable and perhaps even irrelevant news can cause a selling 
wave, which entails a rapid correction of the prices and uncertainty regarding the 
time of the correction. This conclusion is supported by the empirical studies of 
Cutler et al. (1989) and Fair (2002), where the authors find that most large price 
movements on the stock exchange did not happen as a result of news pertaining 
to fundamental values.
Table 1
Factors explaining asset price bubbles
Explanatory factor Content
Informational frictions Beliefs regarding the fundamental value converge 
to the real figure too slowly.
Short selling constraints The option of short selling is limited.
Limited liability Financial intermediaries are required to absorb the 
losses only to the extent of their capital. 
Herd behaviour Market participants excessively imitate each 
other’s market behaviour.
Perverse incentives in the provision of information There is a conflict of interest for certain 
organisations tasked with assessing products and 
market participants. 
Bounded rationality Market participants are not fully rational.
7  The extent of persistently different beliefs is difficult to measure directly, however, in line with, for example, 
the questionnaire-based survey of Mankiw et al. (2004) on the different inflation expectations, we can 
argue that this phenomenon can truly be significant. Persistently different beliefs can result not only from 
informational frictions but also from the bounded rationality of market participants. The role of bounded 
rationality is discussed in Chapter 4.6. One comprehensive overview of the literature on the role of 
heterogeneous beliefs in the explanations of asset price bubbles can be found in Xiong (2013).
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Another type of informational friction is caused by heterogeneous priors. If the 
initial beliefs regarding the asset’s fundamental value differ among traders, they also 
assess obtainable new information differently. Their beliefs about the fundamental 
value may differ even if they share all their information with each other. Therefore, 
even if news on the fundamental value spreads fast on the market, the exaggerated 
optimism of certain traders only wears off slowly.
With heterogeneous priors, the market price may even exceed the assessment of 
the most optimistic traders regarding the fundamental value. This is illustrated by 
the following example which is based on the model by Harrison and Kreps (1978). 
Let us assume that two types of traders are active on the market for an asset. At the 
onset of the trading process, all of them believe that the same fundamental value 
is likely. Next, news about the fundamental value arrives in several waves, until it 
becomes fully observable. Traders in one group trust their initial beliefs and thus 
they adjust their beliefs less in response to the new information. In this example, 
the initial market price of the asset will be higher than the common assessment 
of the traders. This is because both types of traders can expect lucrative future 
selling opportunities. If in the subsequent periods good news on the fundamental 
value arrives, more adaptive traders are willing to purchase the asset even at a 
higher price than the initial assessment because of the good news. If bad news on 
the fundamental value arrives, less adaptive traders will still be willing to purchase 
the asset, even at slightly lower prices than the initial assessment. Accordingly, 
both types of traders can sell the asset to the other type at a relatively high price 
precisely at the time when they wish to sell. This mutually beneficial resell option 
lifts the market price of the asset above the initial assessments.
4.2. Short selling constraints
The prospect of pouncing on the arbitrage inherent in a mispriced asset is also 
hampered by limiting the possibility of short selling. Short selling refers to the 
immediate selling of a borrowed asset and its return after its future purchase. 
This makes the selling of an asset available to those who currently do not own 
enough of it. This trading technique is important because accurate information 
on the fundamental value does not necessarily reach the market participants who 
currently hold the given asset in large volumes.
There is often no option for short selling because the market for the given asset is 
not standardised enough. One typical example is the property market. In other cases, 
administrative barriers hinder its use. Restrictive measures are usually implemented 
to avoid a panic due to simultaneous, large-scale short selling, which would make 
prices fall excessively and rapidly. Bris et al. (2007) analysed the regulations on and 
the practice of short selling in securities markets of 46 countries between 1990 and 
2001, and found that short selling was prohibited in 10 countries during the period 
reviewed. At the end of the period, it was permitted in 35 countries, but it was 
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common practice in only 25. The lower number of countries where short selling is 
common practice can be attributed to the fact that in certain countries short selling 
was hampered by a considerable tax burden.
In Miller’s (1977) model, the asset price reflects the beliefs of optimistic traders 
due to short selling constraints, which makes the asset overvalued. The buying 
intentions of optimistic traders are reflected in the market price without restrictions, 
in contrast to the selling intentions of pessimistic traders. Chen et al. (2002) 
expanded the model and formulated theoretical predictions regarding the impact of 
short selling on stock prices, which were tested empirically. The study approximated 
the effectiveness of short selling constraints through the number of shareholders. 
In the case of fewer owners, it is more likely that market actors who believe the 
fundamental value to be lower will hold shares in the company in small proportion; 
therefore, the limits on short selling can take hold more effectively. The authors 
find that the stocks held by fewer owners yielded lower returns later on, which is 
consistent with their theoretical conclusion that the limits on short selling make 
these stocks more overvalued.
4.3. Limited liability
Trading in overvalued assets often involves financial intermediaries managing 
others’ savings. Savers usually trust them with their money because financial 
intermediaries are better at picking good investments. Financial intermediaries can 
use this information advantage partly to their own advantage and to the detriment 
of their clients. This practice can be further strengthened by the fact that financial 
intermediaries share the returns generated by the investments with their clients, 
but since their liability is limited, they do not have to incur losses in excess of their 
own capital.
In the model of Allen and Gale (2000), financial intermediaries use debt financing for 
their activities, i.e. in exchange for these funds they promise interest that is largely 
independent from their profitability. In such a scenario, it is worthwhile for financial 
intermediaries to invest in risky assets with high expected returns, since they can 
retain a larger portion of the potential profit, while they are not obligated to repay 
their debt in full in the case of losses due to their limited liability. Since lenders 
are at an information disadvantage compared to the financial intermediaries, they 
cannot appropriately limit this risk shifting. Excessive risk appetite can generate 
excessive demand for certain assets, which can lead to the evolution of asset price 
bubbles.
In the model of Allen and Gorton (1993), there are two types of financial 
intermediaries both with limited liability but with different levels of sophistication. 
In the model, the asset price bubble is generated by the less sophisticated financial 
intermediaries. The difference between the two types of financial intermediaries 
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is similar to the distinction made by Keynes (1936) mentioned earlier: more 
sophisticated intermediaries are able to determine the fundamental value of the 
assets, while less sophisticated ones cannot. Savers cannot directly observe the 
quality of financial intermediaries. They pay the financial intermediaries by ceding 
a fixed share of the money entrusted to them, and in the case of losses, they do 
not pay the intermediaries anything but incur all the losses. If the less sophisticated 
financial intermediaries are not active enough on the market, they will reveal to 
their clients that they are unable to pick the undervalued assets, which could 
mean the end of their contract. They seek to avoid this, which encourages active 
behaviour on the market. They do not have to fear buying overvalued assets, since 
in the event of a potential price correction, their limited liability shields them from 
large losses anyway.
4.4. Herd behaviour
Herd behaviour is when economic actors imitate others’ market behaviour too 
much, in the belief that they will be better off as a result. This process entails 
wasting the information dispersed among the individual economic actors. In this 
case, even if the majority believe that an asset price bubble has emerged, they 
are prone to buying the given asset in line with the trend on the market, thereby 
contributing to the persistence and potentially further inflating the asset price 
bubble. Several factors may motivate herd behaviour. Bikhchandani and Sharma 
(2000) distinguish three types of herd behaviour on financial markets (Table 2): 
information-based herding, reputation-based herding and compensation-based 
herding.
Table 2
Three basic types of herd behaviour
Explanatory factor Content
Information-based herding Investors imitate the investment decisions of 
others because they believe that the others can 
better identify good investments.
Reputation-based herding Investors imitate the investment decisions of 
others because this makes them competent in the 
eyes of their (potential) employers.
Compensation-based herding Investors imitate the investment decisions of 
others because their compensation depends partly 
on their performance relative to others.
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In the case of information-based herding, all market participants have information 
regarding the potential investment decisions that only they can observe (so-called 
private information). Market participants do not have the time, expertise and 
other resources available to examine all of the investment opportunities in depth 
themselves. Therefore, nobody is perfectly informed. Furthermore, the private 
information obtained by the various actors can be dissimilar. In such a situation, 
market participants aim to gain an insight into others’ private information through 
their observable behaviour on the market so that they can make the best investment 
decision.
In the basic models describing information-based herding (Banerjee 1992; 
Bikhchandani et al. 1992; Welch 1992), assets are traded sequentially, i.e. 
investors acting later can observe the earlier investment decisions of the other 
market participants before making their own investment decision. All investors 
can purchase the same asset at the same prices. Players making the decisions 
earlier, who engage in similar investments, may easily induce herd behaviour. This 
is because all investors acting later can deduce that there are many earlier investors 
whose private information is similar to each other, which can convince them to 
copy earlier decisions, even if their own private information is contrary to this. In 
such a scenario, market participants exert negative externalities on those making 
decisions later. Therefore, the emerging market practice will appropriately reflect 
the information of only those market participants who make decisions earlier 
and will not include the private information of those who make decisions later. 
Investments can be concentrated in certain assets even if the private information 
of the majority does not substantiate this investment strategy.
Due to the constant asset price assumed in basic models, such models are not 
suitable for explaining asset price bubbles. However, Avery and Zemsky (1998) 
have relaxed this assumption. In their model, they examine two types of investors, 
who can trade in only one asset. Of the two types of investors one has accurate 
private information regarding the fundamental value of the asset, while the other 
has access only to inaccurate private information. All investors know their own 
type, but they do not know exactly what the proportion of well-informed investors 
to poorly informed investors is on the market. The investment decisions are made 
sequentially, thus information-based herding can emerge in line with the logic of the 
basic model. In this model, poorly informed investors imitate the observed earlier 
investment decisions because they assume that the decisions were made by mostly 
well-informed investors, even if that was not the case. In such a scenario, the asset 
price on the market becomes detached from the fundamental value, which may 
lead to an asset price bubble.
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The basic models of reputation-based herding rest on the assumption that financial 
experts differ in terms of expertise, experience, diligence, and other qualitative 
aspects, which cannot be directly observed by their employers. In such situations, 
the employees seek to perform their duties in a way that their observable 
performance convinces their current and potential employers that they are better 
than the others, since this creates better career opportunities for them. However, 
in certain cases professional reputation can only be improved by imitating other 
financial experts’ investment decisions even if the employees believe that these 
decisions are not optimal for their employers (Scharfstein – Stein 1990; Trueman 
1994; Zweibel 1995; Prendergast – Stole 1996; Graham 1999).
In the model of Scharfstein and Stein (1990), the employed investors all have some 
private information about the good investment opportunities, independently of 
each other. The authors distinguish two types of investors: better investors have 
more accurate private information than bad ones. Each investor has a different 
employer, but neither investors nor the employers know which investors belong 
to which category. However, employers can observe the decisions made by all the 
employees (not only their own), and the profits generated. In such a situation, 
employers should remunerate their employed investors based not only on the final 
performance (profits), but also based on how much their decisions differ from other 
investors’ decisions. This is because employers know that the private information 
of better investors differs less than that of poor investors. If all investors followed 
their private information, worse investors would be more likely to make decisions 
deviating from market trends, which would be indicative of their poor quality. 
Investors strive to avoid this, even if based on their private information they risk 
making an investment with low returns. Therefore, in equilibrium, investors making 
sequential decisions can imitate earlier investment decisions, which may generate 
excessive demand for assets with a lower fundamental value, thereby potentially 
contributing to the build-up of asset price bubbles.
Zwiebel’s (1995) model differs from the previous one in three major assumptions. 
First, employed investors can be of more than two qualities, and what is even more 
important, they are aware of their own type. Second, employers cannot observe 
the quality of the investment decisions made by their employees, only the profits 
generated from the investments made by their own investors and those employed 
by others. Third, in this model being a better quality investor does not entail that 
their private information about investment opportunities is more accurate, instead 
it merely increases the profitability of all chosen investments deterministically and 
to the same extent. The large group of average investors making their decisions 
simultaneously pick the usual investment opportunities, which are in line with 
earlier market practices, and which are not necessarily the most efficient, because 
if many investors do so, when employers compare the profits, they can identify 
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the relatively good investors quite accurately. Only few investors (the best and 
the worst) choose investment opportunities diverging from the market practices, 
therefore their relative performance is more uncertain ex ante. The best trust their 
excellence, while the worst need to take this risk, since they can only avoid their 
employers finding out about their poor quality in the event they make a fortuitous 
investment.
The latter model is a transitional type on the road towards the third group of 
models, comprising of compensation-based herding models (see, for example, 
Maug – Naik 1996; Admati – Pfleiderer 1997). In these models, herd behaviour 
ensues because the remuneration of the employed investors also depends on the 
observable performance of other, similar investors, i.e. employers use a relative 
performance assessment system.
In the model of Maug and Naik (1996), employers tie the remuneration of the 
employed investors to a benchmark on the market, i.e. the more the investors 
outperform the benchmark, the more their compensation grows. In such a case, 
imitating the practice widespread on the market can be profitable for risk-averse 
investors because it reduces the possibility of their performance falling short of the 
benchmark on the market. This can occur even if based on the private information 
of a market investor, another investment strategy is expected to yield more profits. 
Just as in the model of the authors, employers usually use relative performance 
assessment because they can urge their employees to make greater efforts (tackle 
moral hazard), and because it helps them select the best candidates (tackle adverse 
selection), whom they can task with more complex duties. This is because relative 
performance assessment can be used to pit the individual investors against each 
other, and better investors exerting more effort outperform others. In other words, 
employers should use relative performance assessment even if it causes herd 
behaviour generating poorer investments as an adverse side effect.
4.5. Perverse incentives in the provision of information
One group of economic actors are tasked with providing information on certain 
products and market participants. This is performed, for example, by credit rating 
agencies, audit companies and financial advisers. If these organisations do not work 
adequately, the information necessary for the correction of asset price bubbles 
can spread only slowly. Certain perverse incentives can partly divert the behaviour 
of economic actors from this basic information provision goal (Scherbina 2013).
According to the study cited, giving a better assessment than warranted about 
certain firms is worthwhile for financial analysts for various reasons. First, in 
order to preserve the option of obtaining appropriate information in the future, 
financial analysts are averse to infuriating the companies under review with 
negative assessments. Second, the financial analysts of investment banks profit 
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from generating transactions for the trading department with a positive stock 
assessment. Furthermore, in the context of short selling constraints, it is easier 
to generate trading if the financial analysts make recommendations for more 
purchases. Scherbina’s (2007) empirical study has confirmed that the negative 
information withheld by financial analysts was incorporated into stock prices with 
a considerable lag.
The clients of audit organisations and credit rating agencies are usually the 
companies under review themselves, and they are not interested in making these 
organisations disclose all the negative information revealed about them. In such a 
situation, the extent to which audit companies and credit rating agencies perform 
their job in line with their core function depends on how much they are willing 
to risk their reputation in the hopes of higher short-term profits. This is because 
withholding some of the negative information increases their chances of receiving 
further work from their current clients. However, some of the negative information 
may become public over time, which undermines the perceived competence and 
reliability of auditors and credit rating agencies.
4.6. Bounded rationality
Despite the fact that asset price bubbles are widely considered to be irrational 
phenomena, the market imperfections described so far can explain asset price 
bubbles with the assumption of perfectly rational market participants. Nevertheless, 
psychological reasons that limit perfect rationality do indeed play a central role 
in the build-up of asset price bubbles. In the models of behavioural economics, a 
more realistic decision-maker is assumed instead of a perfectly rational one, i.e. 
the market participants’ ability to process the available information is influenced by 
the imperfections of memory, attention, calculation skills, and self-control, among 
other factors. According to another important example, the information reception 
can also be selective in order to preserve one’s own convictions and self-image. 
The different forms of bounded rationality appearing in the models of behavioural 
economics are based on empirical psychological results. Decision-makers exhibiting 
bounded rationality usually create an asset price bubble through their bounded 
rationality leading to overly optimistic beliefs, which in turn can generate significant 
purchasing pressure for an overvalued asset. The explanations presented in the 
study are summarised in Table 3.8
8  For a more detailed overview of the models explaining asset price bubbles with the assumption of bounded 
rationality, see Hirshleifer (2001).
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Table 3
Forms of bounded rationality in the presented models
Explanatory factor Content
Overconfidence Investors consider their initial private information 
more accurate than it actually is. 
Biased self-attribution Investors attribute past successes to themselves 
and failures to outside factors.
Conservativism bias Investors change their beliefs less based on new 
information as compared to their perfectly rational 
peers.
Representativeness heuristic Investors overestimate the probability of the 
future occurrence of past events. 
Newswatching Investors disregard the portion of others’ private 
information that can be deduced through 
observing market prices.
Momentum traders Investors only take into account the information 
discernible from market prices.
Noise traders Investors’ beliefs differ to an uncertain extent from 
the perfectly rational expected value of the future 
market price.
Daniel et al. (1998) explain asset price bubbles with the combination of 
overconfidence and biased self-attribution. The essence of overconfidence in the 
model is that investors regard their private information concerning the fundamental 
value of the asset to be more accurate than it actually is; biased self-attribution 
means that investors attribute past successes to themselves and failures to outside 
factors. In the model, subsequent news confirming the initial private information 
exacerbates the actors’ overconfidence.
Investors perform their own analyses at the beginning of the period under review, 
thereby gaining private information on the fundamental value of the asset. Later 
information observable by all investors arrives until the end of the period, making 
the fundamental value accurately observable. The investors who, based on their 
private information, assume at the beginning of the period that a value higher 
than the fundamental value is likely, overreact to the initial information due to 
their overconfidence, becoming overly optimistic. The public news arriving later 
can hardly correct this excessive optimism, since overconfident investors trust 
public news less. In fact, due to biased self-attribution, their excessive optimism 
is typically heightened even further, since these investors assign greater weight to 
the new information confirming their initial optimism than contrary information. 
Over time, the increasing amount of public news convinces everyone about the 
real fundamental value, but the optimism among the investors exhibiting bounded 
rationality is greater and more persistent than what would emerge among perfectly 
rational investors.
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Barberis et al. (1998) explain asset price bubbles with the help of two other 
assumptions limiting rationality, conservativism bias and representativeness 
heuristic. Decision-makers characterised by conservativism bias change their beliefs 
less based on new information than their perfectly rational peers. The decision-
makers following the representativeness heuristic overestimate the probability of 
events that are noticeably similar to already observed earlier events.
The authors analyse securities, the return of which exhibit random walk over time. 
Accordingly, the best rational estimate regarding the return for the next period 
equals the current return. Market investors do not know that the return exhibit 
random walk and establish their beliefs concerning future returns based on past 
returns. This process is influenced by the two biases mentioned above. In this model, 
the excessive optimism regarding future returns and thus the current fundamental 
value of the securities emerges as follows. If by chance increasing returns are 
realised in a few consecutive periods, the representativeness heuristic takes hold. 
The pattern of earlier, similarly increasing returns is easy to remember, and it may 
indicate to investors that returns are on an upward trend once again. Inevitably, 
the realised returns will diverge from the assumed trend and conservatism bias 
can manifest in the investors i.e. they do not update their expectations about the 
security adequately. Eventually, on account of the returns repeatedly falling short 
of the expected rising trend, investors update their expectations and assume that 
the returns fluctuate around a lower average value. This updated expectation is 
a “conservative” because it assumes that the next period’s returns will be closer 
to the expected average rather than the same value that is currently realised. 
Ultimately, the excessive optimism is curbed, and the assets’ price drops to around 
the fundamental value.
In the model by Hong and Stein (1999), there are two types of traders exhibiting 
bounded rationality. So-called newswatchers establish their beliefs on the 
fundamental value of the asset solely based on the private information derived 
from the analysis of the asset under review, and they disregard the information 
from market prices that is otherwise observable. So-called momentum traders do 
the opposite: they disregard the information pertaining to the fundamental value, 
and instead estimate the fundamental value of the asset based on the development 
of market prices observed earlier. In this model, the new positive information 
pertaining to the fundamental value spreads slowly among investors, since first it 
only reaches newswatchers who concentrate only on their own information, and not 
on the potentially new information of other investors. In view of the relatively slow 
rise in prices, momentum traders can rightly conclude that the asset is undervalued, 
and thus worth buying. However, since based solely on the price movements they 
are unable to accurately judge when exactly the undervaluation of the asset ceases, 
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the price increase does not stop at the real fundamental value, and overvaluation 
ensues.
DeLong et al. (1990b) include a perfectly rational trader in a model framework 
similar to the previous one. The main finding of the analysis is that these traders do 
not use the opportunity for arbitrage inherent in the asset price bubble created by 
their peers exhibiting bounded rationality. They are even better off if they exploit 
their peers’ bounded rationality and first make them inflate an even larger asset 
price bubble. In the model, this can be achieved by increasing demand for the 
asset more than warranted on account of the initial positive news. This generates 
a huge initial price increase, which convinces more momentum traders in the next 
period that the asset should be bought, which drives the price of the asset even 
higher. The large number of momentum traders entering the market will buy the 
asset from the rational traders even at this high price, resulting in greater gains than 
would be possible by not generating extra demand at the beginning of the period. 
One important lesson from the model is that the asset price bubble engendered by 
bounded rationality is not necessarily shrunk by the introduction of rational traders, 
but in fact, it can even be bloated by it.
Perfectly rational traders and those exhibiting bounded rationality are present at 
the same time in the model of DeLong et al. (1990a) as well. Traders exhibiting 
bounded rationality are the so-called noise traders who estimate the future 
expected value of the asset under review inaccurately as compared to rational 
expectations. The extent of their error is random in all periods, fluctuating around 
an average; however, this error is persistent in time. If rational traders are risk-
averse and impatient enough, they cannot eliminate the overvaluation created by 
the currently overly optimistic noise traders. Rational traders know that in such a 
situation the asset should be sold, but they are unwilling to engage in short selling, 
since that is profitable in the short run only if the market price starts dropping 
promptly (this is because the borrowed and sold asset has to be bought and given 
back later). Noise traders remain overly optimistic for a while, and over the short 
term they can become even more optimistic, which can further increase asset 
prices. Therefore risk-averse rational traders who heavily discount future profits are 
prone to putting off large-scale selling until the excessive optimism of noise traders 
diminishes. In this model as well, the presence of rational traders does not ensure 
that the overvaluation created by traders’ exhibiting bounded rationality disappears 
through a large-scale selling wave immediately when the mispricing is observed.
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5. The role of excessive lending
Excessive lending is the situation where there is a high risk that debtors will not 
repay a major portion of their loans. Similar to the cyclical development of asset 
prices, the periods characterised by excessively intensive and subdued lending 
alternate. According to international experiences, the corresponding phases in asset 
price cycles and credit cycles are prone to aligning with each other, and when that 
happens, the cyclical positions are greater than on average (Claessens et al. 2011). 
Furthermore, asset price bubbles that are linked to excessive lending are more 
likely to end in a financial crisis (Borio – Lowe 2002) and entail greater losses for 
the real economy (Brunnermeier – Schnabel 2015; Jordà et al. 2015) than those 
that are not coupled with excessive lending. Furthermore, the dangerous mix of 
excessive lending and asset price bubbles can emerge relatively easily if one of them 
is already present (in the case of properties see: Anundsen – Jansen 2013: Tables 1 
and 2; Mian – Sufi 2011). Therefore, excessive lending can considerably exacerbate 
the adverse effects of asset price bubbles. The focus of this chapter is the reasons 
behind the emergence of excessive lending related to asset price bubbles, and its 
effect on the bubbles.
Lending linked to asset price bubbles can easily become excessive for many reasons. 
One of the main factors is collateral pledged during borrowing. In the case of 
mortgages, properties are widely used as collateral, just like securities in interbank 
lending. Loans extended for an overvalued asset as collateral can easily become 
excessive, since the correction of the asset price over time devalues the collateral, 
which thus cannot provide adequate compensation to the lender in the case of the 
debtor’s non-performance. Moreover, excessive lending and asset price bubbles can 
easily reinforce each other’s impact. This requires the debtor to invest the loan in 
the same asset type as the one pledged as collateral. One typical example for this 
is the mortgage extended for purchasing residential and commercial properties.
The other important reason behind the linkage between excessive lending and 
asset price bubbles is that the appearance of the bubbles can prompt excessive 
risk-taking among not only borrowers but also lenders. Excessive lending, i.e. loans 
provided by lenders to subprime debtors in exchange for inadequate collateral, is 
only one form of excessive risk-taking. Banks may also be willing to reduce their 
funding costs just to extend their lending activity. The typical examples for this 
include disproportionate leverage and overly tight maturity and FX structure. These 
factors combined can entail significant systemic risk, since in such a scenario an 
unforeseeable large liquidity need of one of the banks’ clients, or a large loss 
sustained by one of the banks can cause disruption in financial intermediation.
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Excessive risk-taking by banks can be explained by several market imperfections that 
are partly identical to the reasons behind asset price bubbles.9 Investors who wish 
to invest in an overvalued asset more than their own capital generate large credit 
demand vis-à-vis financial intermediaries. When assessing loans, even financial 
intermediaries themselves often try to gauge whether it is worth investing in the 
given asset, since in certain cases it is known that the loan will finance the purchase 
of such an asset. In this scenario, lenders are in a similar situation as the economic 
actors who wish to invest in the asset directly. That is why it comes as no surprise 
that the limited liability of financial intermediaries can contribute to the emergence 
of not only asset price bubbles, but also the related excessive lending. Similarly, 
herd behaviour in lending practices can emerge among banks. Additionally, a banks’ 
management’s or owners’ bounded rationality can also explain the emergence of 
excessive lending.
Among the explanations of excessive risk-taking of financial intermediaries there 
is also an important specific element: larger financial intermediaries can receive 
various forms of state assistance in the event of systemic stress. In the case of a 
systemic liquidity shortage, commercial banks can use the central bank as the lender 
of last resort. Deposit insurance payments protect them from the self-fulfilling bank 
runs of small depositors. Finally, insolvent financial intermediaries may also receive 
state capital injections. The instruments of state assistance seek to mitigate the real 
economy losses of an already developed financial stress. At the same time, they 
encourage excessive risk-taking on the part of the financial intermediary ex ante, 
since a large portion of the potential losses are incurred by the state instead of the 
owners, while the potential profits go to the latter.10 State assistance is more likely 
if multiple financial institutions are in dire state, since such an event threatens 
the functioning of the financial system as a whole. Therefore, state assistance 
encourages not only excessive but also correlated risk-taking, thereby strengthening 
herd behaviour among the institutions.
It is important to note that, according to the empirical literature, the mutually 
reinforcing processes of asset price bubbles and excessive lending are especially 
dangerous in the case of residential properties.11 Claessens et al. (2012) expanded 
the study by Claessens et al. (2009) and examined the business and financial cycles 
9  For more details, see, for example, Chapter 4 of Freixas et al. (2015).
10  The resolution of banks on the brink of insolvency is also a form of state assistance, which, in contrast 
to the other interventions mentioned, reduces the excessive risk-taking of the banking system ex ante. 
This is because efficient resolution can prevent insolvency, which is often only alleviated with a capital 
injection by the state. The state-owned organisation in charge of the resolution temporarily assumes the 
ownership and management rights, and it uses these rights to separate the good assets of the distressed 
financial institution, and to sell them to other, solvent market participants. Timely reorganisation can 
steadily maintain the critical functions of the financial institution concerned, for example access to bank 
deposits and corporate credit lines.
11  One recent, comprehensive description of the empirical and theoretical results pertaining to the 
macroeconomic role of residential properties can be found in Piazzesi and Schneider (2016).
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of 21 developed OECD countries and 24 emerging countries between 1960 and 
2010, and found, among other things, that a rapid drop in housing prices entailed 
twice as large a decline in GDP on average than other crises. This loss was even 
greater when the drop in housing prices was coupled with a major contraction of 
the volume of credit, although the sample contained too few such elements to 
make the result statistically significant.
Jordà et al. (2015) examined stock prices, housing prices, banking system credit 
and other macroeconomic data from 17 developed countries between 1870 and 
2013. The periods of credit boom coupled with housing price bubbles were more 
likely to be followed by a recession with financial stress than the periods of mere 
credit booms. On average, during recessions that were not preceded by asset price 
bubbles, real GDP per capita declined by approximately 2 per cent (until the trough) 
in roughly a year, and it took another year for it to return above its initial level. On 
average, for recessions following housing price bubbles, the trough was reached 
after around one year as well, and they entailed a similar extent of real economy 
losses, but a longer recovery given that the housing price bubble was not coupled 
with rapid credit growth. However, if the recession followed a housing price bubble 
coupled with a credit boom, real GDP per capita fell even in the second year of the 
crisis, by about 4 per cent on average before reaching the trough, and it was not 
able to return to its original level even after three years. Estimates for stock price 
bubbles yielded similar results between the bubbleless events and the housing price 
bubble scenarios. All in all, it can be said that the longest and most severe economic 
crises were preceded by a housing price bubbles coupled with large-scale lending.
Three special features of residential properties make the emergence of a housing 
price bubbles lead to considerable real economy losses (Crowe et al. 2013). 
First, housing prices are often prone to becoming decoupled from fundamental 
values. There are several reasons for this. Homes are not standardised products, 
they have no standardised market, and many actors are insufficiently informed. 
The latter is due to the fact that purchasing a home is simultaneously a crucial 
consumption decision (housing) and a complex investment decision (real asset). In 
such an environment, the role of informational frictions can be substantial, which 
hampers the rapid spread of the relevant information on the fundamental value. 
The high transaction costs incurred during the purchase of a home (e.g. moving, 
duties, retaining a real estate broker and a lawyer, rebuilding in line with personal 
preferences) and the uncertain supply reactions due to the time-consuming nature 
of construction, make identification of the current fundamental value even more 
complex. In addition, information-based herding can easily emerge among the many 
insufficiently informed market participants. Average home buyers are not familiar 
with the methodologies to accurately assess investments; therefore, many rely on 
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the naïve extrapolation of past market price developments or similar rules of thumb, 
i.e. they may be characterised by bounded rationality as well.
Second, normally home purchases are mainly financed from loans with the collateral 
being the home itself. The price is usually much higher than the average steady 
income, and therefore external funds are required as well. Furthermore, the home 
itself is a durable, immovable real asset; hence lenders readily accept it as collateral. 
Third, homes play a central macroeconomic role. Even without a housing price 
bubble and excessive lending, homes comprise a huge portion of households’ 
wealth, and mortgages secured with homes comprise a major part of banks’ assets. 
In addition, home construction contributes substantially to GDP and employment.
6. Conclusions
6.1. Asset price bubbles are endogenous phenomena affecting many assets
The explanations of asset price bubbles note that they do not necessarily emerge 
and burst as a result of some unexpected shock coming from outside the asset’s 
market. All of the explanations claim that asset price bubbles are the aggregate 
result of the individually optimal decisions of the economic actors active on the 
market for the asset. Accordingly, state intervention has to change the decisions 
of market participants so that the aggregate of the optimal individual decisions 
creates as small an asset price bubble as possible.
The theoretical literature has identified several reasons behind asset price bubbles. 
Therefore, state intervention must potentially employ several types of targeted 
regulatory instruments. The explanations are less specific about what type of real 
or financial instruments prices are prone to becoming a bubble. Thus, the need for 
state interventions aimed at the elimination or mitigation of anomalies can arise on 
several asset markets. According to international experience, asset price bubbles 
coupled with excessive lending usually threaten greater losses in the real economy, 
especially in the case of residential properties.
6.2. Most factors that induce bubbles are difficult to eliminate
A large part of market participants’ bounded rationality cannot be changed. 
Similarly, the basic reason behind the existence of financial intermediary institutions 
is that they have more expertise in investments than savers, and if their limited 
liability was eliminated, few actors would take the elevated business risk, and there 
would be a significant shortage of a vital service. It is also unlikely that we will 
have much more accurate and readily available information about future uncertain 
payments. Therefore, the current fundamental value of assets remains difficult 
to identify, and the information pertaining to them will not spread faster. Thus, 
we should always expect informational frictions and information-based herding. 
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The incentives due to the information advantage of financial experts are hard to 
overcome, and therefore reputation-based and compensation-based herding cannot 
be completely eliminated either. Nonetheless, all the above-mentioned reasons 
can be constrained or offset to some extent, and state interventions should seek 
to do so.
Of the reasons behind asset price bubbles the easiest to tackle are short selling 
constraints and the perverse incentives in the provision of information. The former is 
often enforced by state regulation, which can be changed, and in the case of stocks 
several analyses call into question the social benefits of short selling constraints 
(Marsh – Payne 2012; Beber – Pagano 2013; Boehmer – Wu 2013). Some perverse 
incentives in the provision of information can be corrected effectively through more 
efficient regulation, and state organisations can complement the activities of market 
participants.
6.3. Partly paternalistic state interventions are necessary
State intervention has to be partly paternalistic due to the bounded rationality 
of market participants. As portrayed in the examples of Chapter 4.6, asset price 
bubbles emerge in line with the desire of most market participants, not as an 
unintended and adverse side effect of a functioning market. The question in regard 
to state intervention is of normative basis, since everything happens in line with 
the expectations of most market participants. Furthermore, the reason behind 
state intervention can vary depending on the specific form of bounded rationality.
According to one possible approach, the state can reasonably guide decision-makers 
towards decisions they would probably make themselves if their rationality was 
not bounded, and if they are willing to shed these constraints (Thaler – Sunstein 
2003). One example for this is the excessive optimism arising from limited memory 
and calculation skills.
6.4. Lessons for macroprudential policy
One of the most important state interventions related to asset price bubbles is 
macroprudential policy which is in charge of preventing and mitigating financial 
crises. Since asset price bubbles threaten the stability of the financial system through 
the related excessive lending, it is vital that macroprudential policy identifies when 
the boom phase of the asset price cycle turns into euphoria, where the asset is 
increasingly purchased from credit. Identifying the transition in time can help stop 
excessive lending before it fully unfolds. The spread of herd behaviour, excessive 
and correlated risk-taking of financial intermediaries with limited liability and the 
mass entry to the market of less informed and overly optimistic market participants 
exhibiting bounded rationality all take time. However, once these processes get 
underway, they can continue to strengthen in a self-reinforcing fashion, which is 
increasingly difficult to stop and neutralise.
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The explanations of asset price bubbles reviewed also point out that in many 
respects the overvaluation emerging in the boom phase differs from the asset price 
bubble developing in the euphoria phase only in its extent rather than qualitatively. 
They share several reasons, and often the only difference is the time available for 
the effect of these reasons to take hold. Accordingly, the transition between the 
two periods is usually smooth and difficult to observe.
Two special factors can be identified that increase the asset’s overvaluation primarily 
in the euphoria phase. The first is the excessive optimism of the market participants 
exhibiting bounded rationality, which can persist for a long time and thus foster 
euphoria. The second is excessive lending itself, which is also encouraged by the 
greater number of actors exhibiting bounded rationality entering the market, and 
which provides additional funds for boosting demand for the overvalued asset. 
Therefore, macroprudential policy striving to put an end to excessive lending can 
only seek to identify one special reason – apart from excessive lending itself – 
behind the euphoria that spread on the market: excessive optimism (or more 
broadly bounded rationality). Therefore, the euphoria can be mostly identified 
through the consequences of the asset price bubble rather than the special reasons, 
for example a rapid rise in market prices, more volatile prices, the increasing number 
of transactions or the distortion in resource allocation.
Macroprudential policy can efficiently constrain asset price bubbles in certain 
cases by spreading information pertaining to the fundamental value. Several of 
the explanations behind asset price bubbles are based on the difficulty of making 
the information dispersed among market participants widely available. This includes 
informational frictions, herd behaviour, the perverse incentives of information 
provision and certain cases of bounded rationality. When monitoring the asset 
markets concerned, the current overvaluation should be sought to be estimated as 
accurately as possible. One important aspect here is that the organisation shaping 
macroprudential policy should not necessarily know more about the fundamental 
value than what market participants know collectively. It is sufficient if it has 
incentives to collect this information, even partially, and to make it widely available. 
This is what the market often performs inadequately.
In other cases, only passing on information is not enough to halt asset price 
bubbles. This is the case with short selling constraints, the limited liability of 
financial intermediaries, and asset price bubbles that emerge due to certain types 
of bounded rationality. In such cases, the primary task of macroprudential policy 
is to rein in the potential related excessive lending and to mitigate its adverse 
consequences on the financial system (see, for example, ESRB 2014a: Chapter 
3). International experience shows that the so-called debt cap rules are the most 
effective in curbing excessive lending (see, for example, McDonald 2015; Cerutti 
et al. 2017, and the references in them). Debt cap rules typically limit the credit 
amount that can be borrowed by households relative to the value of the collateral or 
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income, and they also limit the repayment instalments pledged as a percentage of 
income. Surplus capital requirements are also used, and they principally strengthen 
banks’ resilience to external shocks. Another important supplementary feature is 
that they help cover banks’ losses on not only household loans but also corporate 
and project loans.
It may be important from the perspective of the accurate calibration of interventions 
that in certain cases identifying excessive lending is easier than observing asset 
price bubbles. For example, according to the ESRB (2014b), various credit-to-GDP 
figures can be a good measure of excessive lending. The study claims that current 
values that significantly exceed their long-term trend indicate an amount of credit 
that makes a financial stress likely in the following couple of years.
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Operation of the International Monetary and 
Financial System – Structural Tensions of a 
“Non-system”
Gusztáv Báger 
Over the past few decades, the international monetary and financial system has 
been a subject of constant economic debate. More recently, topics such as the 
activity of global financial institutions and corporations, developments in money and 
capital flows, international regulation and the role of central banks were thrust into 
the limelight by the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007 and its culmination into a 
global crisis in 2008. The depth and impact of the crisis highlighted the deficiencies of 
the system, prompting participants to seek solutions that may facilitate sustainable, 
inflation-free and balanced economic growth by eliminating or at least mitigating 
the negative externalities of the system.
With that in mind, one of the objectives of this study is to provide a brief presentation 
of the conceptual framework and main structural components of the existing system. 
This is also necessitated by the considerable changes that have taken place relative 
to the Bretton Woods system. The second objective of the study is to present a 
comprehensive overview of the complicated operation of the system by outlining the 
role and the interaction between the key elements of the system without intending 
to offer an in-depth examination of the details. 
We found that, owing to its significant deficiencies, the international monetary 
and financial system fails to meet the criteria of a well-functioning system. It is not 
suitable to keep exchange rate and capital flow developments in balance on a global 
scale, to ensure an optimal level of international liquidity, and to harmonise the 
relationship between international (economic and monetary policy) cooperation, 
spillovers and diverging volatility levels.
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1. Main structural components of the international monetary and 
financial system
The international monetary and financial system (IMFS) includes arrangements, 
mechanisms and institutions designed to organise and regulate the financial 
exchanges and transactions between countries in relation to goods and services. 
Table 1 illustrates the components that make up the system and their changes.
Following the gold standard system and the gold-exchange standard operating 
between the two world wars, under the direction of the IMF the Bretton Woods 
system, which was put into a legal framework by the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, 
was implemented and successfully operated between 1946 and 1971.
One of the most typical features of the period since the inception of the system 
to date is a quest to find a way to build a sustainable global monetary system built 
on trust rather than bullion. In the quarter century following World War II, the US 
dollar component of the gold-dollar currency structure was, in effect, trust-based, 
fiduciary money.1 In this case, the source of confidence was the United States’ 
obligation to exchange dollars for gold at a fixed exchange rate2 and the fact that 
the rest of the national currencies were pegged to the dollar.
Table 1
The international monetary and financial system, then and now
Bretton Woods system Current system
Monetary anchor Exterior: Ultimately gold Internal goals (e.g. price stability)
Exchange rates Fixed, but variable exchange rate Mixed type (floating exchange 
rate in focus)
Key currencies Actually, US dollars Dollar dominance (less excluded)
Capital mobility Limited Mixed type (without limitation in 
focus)
International pass-through* Regulated (conventions) Cooperative collaborations, ad hoc
Organisation, coordination* IMF, central banks G8, G20, IMF, central banks
Note: * these system components are the author’s additions.
Source: BIS, 2015
In the Bretton Woods system, (partly) linking the US dollar to gold and the exchange 
rate negotiation mechanism operated by the IMF played a dominant role. Under 
the mechanism, the parity of national currencies was established in terms of the US 
dollar and maintained for some time (the dollar was the only currency convertible 
into gold). National governments were required to negotiate with the IMF with 
1  The Latin term fides means confidence or trust.
2  1 ounce of gold = USD 35
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respect to any change in the exchange rate of their national currencies.3 When a 
country was running a balance of payments deficit, it had access to credit from the 
contributions of IMF member states and from the reserves of the IMF. As such, the 
mechanism was based on the principle of mutual assistance.
The progress, however, was only half a step forward, as gold still remained in 
the system. On a positive note, the United States implicitly agreed to maintain 
its stock of gold through its balance of payments deficit (around USD 1.5 billion 
per year). The outflow of purchasing power from the United States to foreign 
countries significantly contributed to the recovery of global economy in general 
and Western Europe in particular. Meanwhile, substantial US dollar holdings had 
accumulated in the reserves of Western European banks, and the banks slowly 
started to exchange dollars for gold. Consequently, by the end of the 1960s, the gold 
reserves of the United States fell to USD 10 billion from around USD 25 billion in the 
years following the war. In the early 1950s, experts had assumed that the United 
States would not allow its stock of gold to fall below this – safe – level. When the 
US gold stock approached this level, the United States unilaterally terminated the 
dollar’s convertibility to gold on 15 August 1971 (for more detail, see Báger 2011).
The structure and characteristic features of the new IMFS emerging from 1971–1973 
were markedly different from those of the Bretton Woods system. As opposed to 
the exchange of dollars for gold as an external monetary anchor, the role of the 
internal monetary anchor increased sharply in ensuring price stability and also in 
terms of a number of other important economic indicators, such as the employment 
level in the USA. Consequently, domestic factors and objectives became the primary 
drivers of monetary policies. (Note that at the time of the – original – gold standard 
regime, exchange rate stability was practically the only economic policy objective of 
governments/central banks and it remained a crucial aspect in the Bretton Woods 
system as well).
Another important difference was the transition to a floating (market) exchange 
rate regime, at least in key developed countries. With the existence of various other 
exchange rate systems in several other countries, the new regime is considered to 
be a hybrid system.
While the possibility had been raised several times in professional circles (and 
indeed attempts have been made to that effect), no steps were taken to restore the 
fixed exchange rate regime. This can be partly attributed to the rapid development 
of information technology, which afforded quick and comprehensive access to 
3  If the exchange rate change was less than 10 per cent, it sufficed to notify the Board of Governors of the 
IMF. Any change in excess of 10 per cent had to be approved by IMF members representing at least 75 per 
cent of the IMF’s quota.
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financial markets for large-scale international capital flows that by then rejected 
any new restrictions. To explain the reasons, we refer to Isard (2005):
•  The United States, Japan and the euro area are subject to different political and 
economic shocks and exhibit different stabilisation responses to these shocks.
•  In terms of economic performance, the three countries (groups) are in a different 
position, and they cannot risk giving priority to exchange rate stability over 
domestic macroeconomic stability.
•  Maintaining greater stability of key currency exchange rates would require such 
an immense and consistent effort that would not have clear beneficial effects 
either for the countries concerned or for the rest of the world.
It should be noted that the reasons listed above can only be interpreted in 
relation to the Bretton Woods system; they do not rule out the possibility that the 
stabilisation of exchange rates would be beneficial for smaller groups of countries, 
integrations or currency areas.4
In the Bretton Woods system, the US dollar was clearly the world’s leading currency, 
and it retained its dominant role even under the new IMFS. Meanwhile, however, 
other currencies also gained significance (initially the euro and more recently, the 
Chinese renminbi). As of 1 October 2016, the latter became the fifth member of 
the SDR basket with a weight of 10.92 per cent.
It is yet another important difference that, as opposed to the previous system, the 
restriction on capital flows was lifted in most developed and emerging countries 
in the new IMFS. The gradual unfolding of financial globalisation over the past four 
decades was a key driver in this process. In the context of economic globalisation, 
financial globalisation may be defined as the complex integration process of the 
financial system of a country and the country’s relationship with international 
financial markets and institutions. In the 1980s and 1990s, this integration process 
was primarily dedicated to development finance. In addition to such drivers as 
commercial openness, the development of domestic financial systems, the level 
of economic development, regional integration and the establishment of financial 
centres, the liberalisation of domestic financial systems also facilitated the process. 
Besides governments and financial systems, the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank played a pivotal role in tearing down the barriers to capital flows 
(for more detail, see Báger 2010).
In relation to the shift to floating exchange rates and the abandonment of controls 
on international capital flows we should also mention the impossible trinity 
4  See, for example, Mundell (1960; 1961a)
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(“trilemma”) concept, which offers an important interpretation option with regard 
to the change in the IMFS. According to the theory developed in the early 1960s 
(Fleming 1962; Mundell 1961b; 1962), it is impossible for any country to maintain 
a fixed exchange rate regime, an autonomous monetary policy aimed at domestic 
stabilisation objectives, and the strong presence of mobile foreign capital at the 
same time. Of the three factors, the creators of the Bretton Woods system must 
have recognised – and obviously gave priority to – the significance of the autonomy 
of national monetary policy in the 1940s already, and allowed individual countries 
to place a restriction on international capital flows. This solution contributed 
significantly to ensuring the efficient operation of the Bretton Woods system up 
until the mid-1970s.
In the Bretton Woods system, monetary systems and conditions exerted their 
mutual effect on one another in a regulated, institutional form, primarily through 
the transactions of international trade and balance of payments items. This feature 
ensured and at the same time eased international macroeconomic coordination. In 
the new IMFS, this objective is served by the various forms of cooperation stemming 
from the increased role of the internal monetary anchor on the one hand and 
the highly diverse international spillover effects on the other hand. According to 
Caruana (2015), spillover effects take hold through the following four channels:
•  monetary policy stance, which may support loose or tight monetary conditions;
•  the international use of currencies (USD, euro, etc.), which may influence – 
through the monetary policy of the given country – the user country’s monetary 
policy stance;
•  the integration of financial markets, which allows global common factors to move 
bond and equity prices;
•  the availability of external funding, which can be a complement to internal loans 
in times of boom and economic crisis.
Through the transactions of these channels, monetary and financial regimes can 
reinforce each other, but they can also amplify domestic imbalances to the point 
of instability.
After the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system, developed countries had a 
clash of opinions regarding the formulation of the institutional conditions of the 
new IMFS. After the Group of Ten (the ten most advanced economies) had come 
to the foreground, the focus shifted once again to the role of the IMF and the 
Group of Twenty, as a ministerial-level Advisory Board. This Board had an adequate 
institutional background and political support on the part of both developed and 
emerging economies. However, it did not have any acceptable plan about how 
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to restore the stability of the international payment system; consequently, the 
principle of exchange rate stability – despite the proposal of France and the USA 
in support of it – was ultimately rejected. In addition, the IMF’s controlling role of 
exchange rate regime proved to be far weaker than anticipated, and survived only 
within the framework of bilateral and multilateral supervision, as reflected in the 
second amendment to the IMF’s Articles of Agreement in 1978.
In light of the growing instability of the exchange rate regime, in the first half of 
the 1980s France, the USA and a few other countries repeatedly called for “a new 
Bretton Woods”. The Group of Five (G5, composed of France, Germany, Japan, the 
United Kingdom and the United States), however, stood up against the proposal, 
taking steps in 1985–1987 such as the Plaza Agreement signed on 22 September 
1985 in New York in an effort to halt the sustained multiannual appreciation of the 
dollar and to stabilise the rates around a new equilibrium (Boughton 2009).
From the beginning of the 1980s, various collegial leadership arrangements such as 
the G5, the G7 (G5 plus Canada and Italy) and then the G20 assumed an increasingly 
important role in international macroeconomic coordination, representing a higher-
level alternative practice than independent national policies. Experts describe the 
role of the USA in these bodies as first among equals.
2. Main features of the operation of the international monetary and 
financial system
Due to space limitations, the primary focus of this study is on countries wielding 
global influence in general and on the activity of the USA and its role in the operation 
of the IMFS in particular. Narrowing down our topic allows us to provide an overview 
of the trends in the operation of the IMFS, the main progressive changes related 
to the factors constituting the system and the shortfalls of the system’s operation.
2.1. Changes in exchange rates
Floating rates are of great significance for inflation targeting monetary policies, 
as the exchange rate influences changes in prices. Changes in the real exchange 
rate also affect the current account balance. However, it poses a problem that the 
volatility of floating rates is greater than that of a fixed exchange rate; therefore, 
the intent to mitigate this volatility is understandable.
Practical experiences show that the operation of the floating exchange rate regime 
falls short of “textbook” expectations in several regards.
•  A large part of the world employs different exchange rate regimes (fixed exchange 
rate regime, currency board, etc.) with significant asymmetry between some of 
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these, which may give rise to inconsistent political decisions from a national and 
global perspective.
•  The volatility of exchange rates is a typical feature, and the magnitude of this 
volatility is larger than warranted by either the macroeconomic fundamentals or 
the exchange rates of the key currencies.
•  The – occasionally manipulated – changes in exchange rates contributed to the 
build-up of significant and persistent imbalances (the substantial balances of the 
current items of international balances of payments) and to the accumulation 
of excessively large official foreign exchange reserves.5 Numerous studies have 
pointed out that the deficit on the USA’s current account could only be reduced 
with a sharp decline in the US dollar’s real exchange rate.6
•  Owing to the dollar’s dominant role in the IMFS (Saccomann, 2012) (for example, 
it accounted for 87 per cent of the turnover of forex markets in April 2013 and 
made up 62.9 per cent of foreign exchange reserves in 2014 Q4), the United States 
enjoyed a privileged position in financing its external deficit at low cost.
According to its real effective exchange rate indicator, before the global financial 
crisis the US dollar depreciated by 25 per cent between 2002 and 2007, while the 
balance of payments of the USA remained above 5 per cent of GDP. As illustrated by 
Figure 1, following its outstanding appreciation in the first few years of the 1980s, 
the depreciation of the US dollar in the period of 1985–1991 was also initially 
accompanied by a high balance of payments deficit; the two indicators converged 
to a near-balance position in 1991. This convergence, however, did not occur in 
the period of 2002–2007: the difference between the indicators continued to grow 
until 2006, whereas the balance of payments deficit stood at 5.5 per cent of GDP 
even in 2007.
According to an analysis by the IMF (IMF 2008), the diverging trends in the two 
indicators can be attributed to factors such as:
•  the erosion of the USA’s competitiveness in the light of the real effective 
exchange rate, which resulted from increased trade with “low-price” emerging 
and developing economies in the early 1990s (Thomas – Marquez – Fahle 2008);
5  Official foreign exchange reserves represent the reserve assets held by central banks, which may comprise 
the five freely usable currencies acknowledged by the IMF (US dollar, euro, British pound sterling, Japanese 
yen and, from 2016, the Chinese renminbi). The bulk of the reserves consists of allocated reserves, the 
currency composition of which is released by the official foreign exchange reserve databank of the IMF 
(COFER).
6  According to econometric estimations, a 10–20 per cent real effective depreciation of the US dollar is needed 
in order to reduce the current account deficit of the United States by 1 per cent of GDP (Krugman 2006; 
Mussa 2004). See also Edwards (2005).
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•  favourable business cycle developments up until 2006, rapid economic growth 
accompanied by rising imports;
•  a surge in oil prices, which raised the balance of payments deficit of oil importers; 
and
•  a financial market situation where the balance of payments deficit of the USA 
could be financed from FDI inflows.
According to the assessment of the IMF’s Consultative Group on Exchange Rate 
Issues (CGER), with the low exchange rate level reached in 2007 following the 
dollar’s depreciation, the dollar’s exchange rate became broadly consistent with 
its medium-term equilibrium. At the same time, however, the national currencies 
of numerous countries with positive balance of payments developed a close 
connection to the dollar, which hampered the necessary adjustment process. 
Indeed, rather than reducing existing imbalances or preventing the build-up of 
new ones, this merely resulted in the redistribution of global imbalances.
Figure 1













1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 
Per cent of GDPREER (index 1990 = 100)
Current account deficit (right-hand scale)
Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER)
Note: Real effective exchange rate: CPI-based.
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors; Haver Analytics; IMF staff calculations
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2.2. The emergence of global imbalances
Another momentous phenomenon of the operation of the IMFS was the emergence 
of unsustainable global imbalances. The current account deficit – or surplus – 
persisted in numerous countries and eventually posed a global challenge.
It was heightened demand for the US dollar as a reserve currency that led to the 
accumulation of global imbalances after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
system, especially in the years following the 1997–1998 South-East Asian crisis. 
Apart from China’s successful growth, this was fostered by the decision of several 
Asian countries to accumulate dollar reserves at an increasing rate in order to 
prevent such crises originating from exchange rate changes as the one seen in 
1997–1998. In addition, the substantial savings of Chinese households and the 
low savings rate of the United States also contributed to the emergence of global 
imbalances, the increase in China’s dollar reserves and the current account deficit 
of the United States.7
These processes raised the deficit on the US current account balance in such a way 
that the increase in the deficit did not exert a significant adjustment pressure, which 
“normally” would have called for tight monetary policy. This, however, was not the 
case. We should note that even countries running balance of payments surpluses 
failed to experience inflationary pressures that would have prompted adjustment 
in similar cases. In such a situation the USA’s low savings rate not only allowed 
but indeed, supported the accumulation of dollar reserves as did the fact that a 
shortage of dollars, as a reserve currency, did not cause any economic or political 
problems for the United States.
As a result of these underlying processes, from 1998 global imbalances started to 
build up on a large scale, exceeding the levels seen in previous years and peaking 
around 2006 (Figure 2).
In 2006, the aggregate balance of current accounts (deficits and surpluses together) 
equalled 5.6 per cent of world GDP; it declined by nearly one third at the height 
of the global crisis in 2009 and then, after a moderate increase in 2010, dropped 
to 3.6 per cent in 2013. Deficits accounting for larger distortions were recorded in 
2006–2008 in the USA and some parts of Europe, while China, Germany, Japan and 
oil exporters reported considerable surpluses.
7  Kürthy (2013) provides a multi-faceted, detailed analysis of the triggers of global imbalances in his study 
entitled “Global imbalances in a stock-flow consistent model”. It is a significant accomplishment of the study 
that the author sought a systemic explanation to the imbalances by: analysing the conflicts arising from 
the co-existence of economic and social coordination mechanisms; rethinking the role of the international 
financial system and investigating why mainstream economics fails to give a consistent answer to the 
sustainability issues of global imbalances.
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The constellation of deficits and surpluses also changed significantly (Table 2).
Representing a substantial weight among the deficit economies, the US deficit 
accounted for –5.8 per cent of GDP in 2006. Of the ten largest deficit economies, 
the US figure was exceeded by Greece (–11.3 per cent), Portugal (–10.7 per cent), 
Spain (–9.0 per cent) and Turkey (–6.0 per cent). In 2013, US deficit shrank to –2.4 
per cent of GDP, while Turkey’s deficit rose to –7.9 per cent. In the same year, the 
deficit of the United Kingdom rose to 4.5 per cent of GDP, and Brazil (–3.6 per cent), 
Indonesia (–3.3 per cent), Canada (–3.2 per cent) and Australia (–3.2 per cent) 
joined the ranks of the ten largest deficit economies.
Figure 2
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Note: Oil exporters = Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bolivia, Brunei, Chad, Republic of Congo, 
Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, 
Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, United Arab 
Emirates, Venezuela, Yemen, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, India, Indonesia, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand. European economies (excluding Germany and 
Norway) are sorted into surplus or deficit each year by the signs (positive or negative, respectively) of 
their current account balances.
Source: IMF Staff calculations (IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2014)
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In the lead of countries running surpluses, China and Germany switched places: 
Germany, which took second place in 2006 with a balance of payments surplus of 
USD 182 billion, ran a USD 274 billion surplus in 2013, while the surplus of China 
amounted to USD 183 billion. In 2013, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait increased their 
respective surpluses of USD 99 billion and USD 45 billion in 2006 to USD 133 billion 
and USD 72 billion, respectively. It is noteworthy that in 2013 South Korea, Kuwait, 
the United Arab Emirates and Qatar joined the top 10 countries with balance of 
payments surpluses, while Russia dropped out.
Based on the “flow” analysis of global imbalances presented so far, we may draw the 
reassuring conclusion that by 2013, the total current account balance moderated 
to an acceptable level as a percentage of world GDP. The USA’s balance of payment 
deficit and the surpluses of China and Japan almost halved, although the large 
surpluses of some European countries and those of oil exporters persisted. In this 
regard, it is also a notable change that the systemic risks threatening the global 
economy abated significantly. However, two significant risks remained. One of 
them – the “price” of the moderation of external imbalances – is the exacerbation 
of domestic imbalances (increasing unemployment and rising output gap costs). 
The other risk is associated with the fact that while balance of payments (“flow”) 
positions improved, the investment/savings positions of creditors and debtors 
(“stock” imbalances) diverged further.
This is why it is necessary to also analyse the evolution of imbalances on a “stock” 
basis, i.e. based on net external assets calculated from the balance of payments 
statistics. Such an analysis is especially warranted in cases when external money 
market conditions render economies vulnerable; for example, when external 
sources of finance dry up unexpectedly or a credit crunch takes hold (Catao – 
Milesi-Ferretti 2013).
In this analytical dimension, global imbalances continued to grow even in the period 
of 2006–2013, in stark contrast with the result of the “flow” analysis (Figure 3).
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This can be attributed to the following three groups of factors (IMF 2014b)
•  Even after the significant narrowing, global flow imbalances remained positive; 
therefore, stock imbalances continued to widen.
•  Valuation effects can change asset positions. It should be mentioned that 
valuation effects are influenced by the initial international investment position 
of the countries (creditor or debtor) and the composition of their gross assets and 
liabilities. The debtor position of the USA was unique in this regard: after having 
experienced a downward revision of its growth prospects, the value of US assets 
continued to rise even as its international investment positions weakened.
•  Growth effects also supported higher imbalances as a share of GDP: for creditor 
economies, GDP growing ahead of net foreign assets lowered net foreign asset 
ratios, whereas in debtor economies these effects contributed to lower net foreign 
liability ratios.
Figure 3
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Note: Oil exporters = Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bolivia, Brunei, Chad, Republic of Congo, 
Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, 
Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, United Arab 
Emirates, Venezuela, Yemen, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, India, Indonesia, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand. European economies (excluding Germany and 
Norway) are sorted into surplus or deficit each year by the signs (positive or negative, respectively) of 
their current account balances.
Source: IMF staff calculations. IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2014
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The level of foreign exchange reserves – another important indicator of global 
imbalances signalled by the position of current account balances – increased and 
its distribution was disproportionate (Table 3).
Table 3
Global distribution of international reserves
(USD trillions)
1998 2010 2013 Change between 1998 and 2013
World 1.6 9.3 12.1 10.5
Developed economies 1.0 3.1 3.4 2.4
Emerging and developing 
countries 0.6 6.2 8.7 8.1
Source: IMF (2014a)
As indicated by the table, the foreign exchange reserves of the world surged to USD 
12.1 trillion in one and a half decades (representing a USD 10.5 trillion increase), 
accounting for 16.2 per cent of world GDP in 2013. In particular, compared to the 
USD 2.4 trillion growth of developed countries, the growth recorded in emerging 
and developing countries approached USD 8.1 trillion. On the one hand, these 
substantial reserves boosted the countries’ resilience to potential financial shocks; 
on the other hand, they allowed some emerging and developing countries (such as 
China and Saudi Arabia) to record – in addition to the exports of goods and services 
– significant capital outflows to advanced economies, primarily the United States. 
The magnitude of the US dollar reserves also poses a risk to the USA by allowing 
Asian creditor countries to become important actors, which may increase volatility.
Consequently, with regard to global imbalances we can conclude that in the 
review period, this operational deficiency of the IMFS played a prominent role in 
economic growth falling short of its potential in several countries, as the countries 
concerned were unable to reduce their balance of payments deficits and surpluses 
to a noticeable extent. The consequences of this failure are also evident in the 
euro area, where Mediterranean countries accumulated a sustained deficit, while 
surpluses were built up in Northern economies.
Another consequence of the imbalances was the emergence of a global savings 
glut.8 After the initial positive expectations, the surge in cash hoarding led to asset 
bubbles and a contraction in global investment opportunities. It should be borne 
in mind in this regard that balance of payments surpluses and the accumulation 
of foreign exchange reserves were not the only source of the global savings glut in 
several emerging economies in Asia: oil revenues deriving from the sharp rise in 
8  Global savings glut. The term was first used by former Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke (Bernanke 2005).
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international oil prices – and the simultaneous unfolding of the two processes – 
represented an another important contributor.
2.3. Liquidity
Frequent swings in the ebb and flow of global liquidity represented another 
weakness in the operation of the IMFS. For example, the USA’s accommodative 
monetary policy was an important factor in the liquidity tide in the early 2000s, 
which was also buoyed by low interest rates and risk spreads. In this environment, 
investors’ appetite for risk increased; investments in the USA were deemed by the 
rest of the world both liquid and secure.
Before illustrating liquidity developments, we should briefly present the concept 
itself. Initially, the term “international liquidity” denoted the changeability of foreign 
exchange reserves. Later on, with financial globalisation and the interconnectedness 
of money markets the concept and the sources of liquidity expanded (Coene 
2012).
The complex, multifaceted concept of global liquidity is defined by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) and by the IMF through two components: official 
liquidity and market liquidity. Official liquidity is a funding opportunity that is 
unconditionally available to settle needs/claims through monetary authorities 
(central banks). This opportunity is made available through the activity of central 
banks with the assistance of such instruments as the foreign exchange reserves, 
lending, swap lines, IMF programmes and SDR allocations. These instruments 
are aimed at mobilising the available official liquidity the accumulation of which, 
ultimately, is one of the tasks of central banks. Market (private) liquidity is created 
by banks and other financial institutions through their operations. The common 
element of these two liquidity components is “ease of financing” (BIS 2011).
Owing to the extreme complexity of the concept, global liquidity developments can 
only be approximated with proxy indicators. According to the IMF (IMF 2007), the 
official liquidity position can be captured by the short-term real policy rates, the 
evolution of which is largely determined by the monetary policy stance (degree of 
accommodation) of globally important central banks. Another proxy measure is the 
Taylor rate or the Taylor rule, which determines the short-term policy rate based on 
the deviation of actual inflation from the inflation target, the neutral (long-term) 
real interest rate and the cyclical position of the economy. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate 
the key policy rates for the USA and for the euro area and their deviation from the 
Taylor rate.
Since the real interest rates calculated from the policy rates were negative, in the 
period between 1998 and 2005 the monetary policy stance of the USA can be 
described as strongly accommodative before – towards the end of the review period 
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– the applied interest rate approached the level of the equilibrium or neutral rate 
of interest. In 2003–2005, monetary policy was even more accommodative than 
in the early 1990s. Despite the long-term similarity of the monetary adjustment 
path, the European Central Bank (ECB) was characterised by less pronounced 
monetary accommodation in the period 2003–2005 than in the 1970s, when the 
accommodative monetary policy stance peaked at a historical level even in the USA.
Figure 4
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Real short-term interest rate (right-hand scale)
Deviation from Taylor rate (left-hand scale)
Source: IMF staff calculations. World Economic Outlook, October 2007
Figure 5
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Note: Before 1998, purchasing-power-parity-weighted average of euro-area Member States.
Source: IMF staff calculations. World Economic Outlook, October 2007
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According to the third, quantitative measure of global liquidity (Figure 6), monetary 
policy was more accommodative in the first half of the decade between 2000 and 
2010 than either in the 1970s or in the middle of the 1970s, with the adjustment 
peaking in 2005. The increase in international foreign exchange reserves, as seen 
in Section 2.2, largely contributed to the liquidity expansion.
Another group of global liquidity indicators measures the size of cross-border 
global (bank) loans and bond issues. One of the measures is based on a currency 
denomination perspective (dollar, euro, yen, etc.) (Figure 7). We compare the size of 
US dollar-denominated credit extended to the non-financial sector of the USA with 
the size of US dollar credit extended to the non-financial sector outside the USA. The 
figure shows that, in mid-2010, dollar credit to the non-financial sector worldwide 
amounted to 13 per cent of the dollar credit extended to the non-financial sector 
of the USA, compared to 10 per cent in mid-2000. If dollar credit to governments is 
excluded, the share of the international component was even higher (17 per cent) 
in 2010. We also find that US dollar credit to the rest of the world grew faster than 
credit to US residents. The latter grew around 9 per cent on average year on year 
between 2000 and 2007, amounting to USD 23 trillion or 167 per cent of US GDP. 
By contrast, the annual growth of dollar credit to the non-financial sector outside 
the USA was 30 per cent in the same period (BIS 2011).
Figure 6
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Reserves
Note: Change over three years for the United States, euro area and Japan, denominated in US dollars, 
scaled with GDP.
Source: IMF staff calculations. World Economic Outlook, October 2007
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Another two approaches to measuring liquidity are credit analysis – disregarding 
the currency denomination – and the examination of the form of international 
balance sheet positions in which the credit is received by the recipient economy. 
With respect to the former, based on the US dollar books of a sample of European 
banks, before the 2008–2009 crisis many large international banks had built up in 
their countries sizeable US dollar asset positions through FX swaps from short-term 
loans, and encouraged growing exposures to investment risk (BIS 2011). As regards 
the latter, global credit aggregates continued to expand throughout the 2001–2010 
period, while cross-border credit contracted during the years of the crisis (Figure 8). 
The contraction in cross-border credit was even more pronounced in the USA and 
more moderate in the euro area and in European emerging economies, although 
the downward shift had begun earlier – in 2005–2006 – in the latter regions.
Figure 7
Domestic and international US dollar credit
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Trillions of USDTrillions of USD
Debt of US residents*
Debt securities**
Bank loans***
Of which: Debt of US governments
Note: * Non-financial sector debt of residents of the United States. ** Outstanding debt securities issued 
by non-financial residents outside the United States. *** Cross-border and local US dollar loans to non-
bank residents outside the United States.
Source: BIS (2011)
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Based on the experiences of the past period, the cyclical nature of the evolution of 
global liquidity and the resulting shocks to financial stability indicate that liquidity 
exhibited substantial swings and volatility and that, owing to this reason, the sudden 
build-up of liquidity shortages and hence, the deceleration of economic growth, 
could not be prevented from time to time. The latter effect persisted particularly 
long during the period following the 2008–2009 crisis. Mitigating the excessive 
liquidity shortages became imperative in developed economies, and central banks’ 
reciprocal FX swap arrangements served this purpose successfully (Goldberg – 
Kennedy – Miu 2011). Besides FX swap transactions, central banks may contribute 
to the international distribution of liquidity with various additional instruments, 
such as interbank repos or cross-border collateral arrangements (CBCAs). As part 
of the crisis management measures, the asset purchase programmes of central 
banks (Fed, European Central Bank, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, etc.) have also 
played a pivotal role in facilitating the expansion of official liquidity in recent years.
Figure 8
Internationally active European banks’ on-balance sheet USD positions* 
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Note: * Estimates are constructed by aggregating the worldwide on-balance sheet cross-border and 
local positions reported by internationally active banks headquartered in Germany, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. ** International positions vis-à-vis non-banks plus local positions 
vis-à-vis US residents booked by banks’ offices in the United States. *** Interbank transactions: 
estimated net interbank lending to other (unaffiliated) banks.
Source: Bloomberg; JPMorgan Chase; BIS consolidated statistics; BIS locational statistics by nationality
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International financial institutions, in particular the IMF, are also important 
participants in mitigating liquidity shocks. The IMF has expanded the range of 
its lending instruments with the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and the Precautionary 
Credit Line (PCL), both designed to meet the liquidity needs of countries with sound 
macroeconomic fundamentals for crisis-prevention measures. Another important 
instrument in the IMF’s toolkit are Special Drawing Rights (SDR), which are primarily 
intended to mobilise official liquidity in respect of the key reserve currencies while 
they may also be used to boost global liquidity. It should be noted in this regard 
that, under the 14th General Review of Quotas, the overall quota was raised to SDR 
477 billion (around USD 668 billion).
2.4. Stability
Financial stability – perhaps the most comprehensive requirement for the IMFS 
– has not been attained despite the fact that this deficiency jeopardises the 
achievement of central banks’ primary objective. Efforts to strengthen stability 
are demanded by circumstances such as:
•  the vulnerability of emerging and developing countries stemming from the fact 
that, on the one hand, foreign capital is present in these regions on such a large 
scale that the “depth” (Bernanke 2005) – level of development – of the financial 
sector (market) does not support its efficient operation and, on the other hand,
•  that advanced economies have pursued diverging monetary policies in managing 
the arising macroeconomic and funding risks.
It is a complex task to define and set the objective of financial stability due to the 
multi-dimensional interpretation of its concept that ranges from the application 
of inflation targeting through asset prices, political conditions, loan sizes and 
changes in the financial cycle to integrated inflation targeting. The latter (new) 
concept is to be understood as the joint, coordinated application of monetary 
and macroprudential policies which, over the long run, may contribute to the 
sustainability of the financial system and hence, foster economic growth.9 This 
explains why it is so difficult to measure global stability: there is a need to define 
a point of reference (the equilibrium state, target levels or the prevailing trends) 
against which changes are compared in each dimension of stability. Moreover, the 
role of policies aimed directly at strengthening stability should be also determined.
In the course of crisis management, significant progress was made in this regard. 
It is an important achievement of the European asset quality review (AQR) that 
9  Macroprudential policies typically address bank lending and liquidity adequacy. As a result of the crisis 
and the policy pursued by the major central banks, the proportions of financing have changed: in many 
countries, large corporations accessed new funding primarily through bond issuance, while the share 
of bank financing diminished. Macroprudential policy did not – and would not be able to – follow bond 
issuance. Stability can only be approximated, but not fully reached, by macroprudential policy. 
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it dissipated the uncertainties around the quality of bank assets. In addition to 
stress tests, the establishment of the European Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
succeeded in mitigating the risks surrounding banks’ balance sheets and improved 
investors’ confidence in the sector. Another important macroprudential instrument 
of the policies aimed at fostering stability is the countercyclical capital buffer rate, 
which is intended to allocate extra cushions of capital for financial crisis situations 
and, in the case of excessive lending, for the mitigation of financial risks. The 
methodological guidelines of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) assist in the 
country-specific application of the instrument. Moreover, the efforts of the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) in formulating a credit risk measurement system also 
constitute an important part of the range of instruments serving stability policies.
Although short and medium-term policies tend to be in focus in terms of policies 
fostering stability, long-term strategic measures have an equally important role, 
especially with respect to the convergence of emerging and developing countries 
where – based on the indicators calculated from the GDP proportionate data of 
consolidated bank balance sheet reports – the sophistication (depth) of the financial 
sector lags behind the level of development in advanced economies (Table 4).
Based on the indicators, between 1989 and 2009 the depth of the financial sector 
increased sharply in four advanced economies (Switzerland, Belgium, United 
Kingdom and USA), continued to improve in Japan, and in 2009 it reached an 
outstanding level (21.6 per cent) in Ireland within a short period of time. Among the 
emerging economies, such a level of development was only observed in Hong Kong, 
with Singapore ranking second in this regard. The global index stood at 4.2 per cent 
in 1989 and by 2009 it rose to 6.7 per cent. Emerging economies contributed to this 
figure by 0.3 per cent in 1989 and 1.2 per cent in 2009, while advanced economies 
contributed by 3.9 per cent and 5.5 per cent, respectively. The indexes show that 
– despite the progress achieved – further stability-strengthening monetary policy 
measures are needed in the financial sector of emerging countries to thwart the 
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Short and medium-term analyses fostering global financial stability are based 
on a global financial stability map (Figure 9) (IMF 2016). According to the map, 
global stability improved somewhat in 2016. Macroeconomic risks remained 
unchanged. The continued monetary stimulus of central banks eased monetary 
and financial conditions, supporting a recovery in risk appetite. However, as a result 
of the recovery in commodity prices and external financial conditions and owing 
to the pickup in capital flows, market and liquidity risks remained elevated in an 
environment of extended realignment across major asset classes.
Despite lower short-term risks, medium-term risks were rising in 2016 as 
policymakers faced a wide range of vulnerabilities and new challenges. Credit risks, 
for example, were exacerbated by the sharp deterioration of banks’ resilience in 
the low interest rate environment. In a broader sense, the biggest risk is posed 
by the USA’s unbalanced politics and policy, which might lead to tighter-than-
expected financial conditions, greater fluctuations and risk aversion. Another 
Figure 9













Global financial crisis April 2016 GFSR October 2016 GFSR
Note: Away from centre signifies higher risks, easier monetary and financial conditions, or higher risk 
appetite. The region shaded blue shows the global financial crisis as reflected in the stability map of the 
April 2009 Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR).
Source: IMF staff calculations. Global Financial Stability Report, October 2016
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challenge is posed by the worldwide trend of strengthening protectionism and 
hence, the deceleration in trade and economic growth. Consequently, attaining 
stability depends strongly on policymakers’ ability to implement the right “mix” of 
national and global policies (IMF 2017:1).
2.5. International spillovers
This field merits thorough analysis not only because of the amplification of 
international spillover effects, but also because central banks sometimes do not 
appear to pay sufficient attention to harmonising these effects and the country-
specific financial conditions in making monetary policy decisions. The various facets 
of this challenge are aptly illustrated by the shock effects emerging in recent years 
in relation to the global crisis.
A prominent manifestation of these effects is the convergence of interest rates at a 
rate that exceeded the pace of the changes in macroeconomic fundamentals. This is 
evidenced by the panel regression analysis conducted by (Hofmann – Takáts 2015) 
for a sample composed of 30 emerging and smaller advanced economies for the 
period of 2000–2014. The authors found (Table 5) that a 100 basis point change 
in the short-term (3-month) US interbank rate induces a 34 basis point change on 
average in the countries under review (Column 1). Spillovers were even stronger 
(59 basis points) for 10-year bond yields (Column 2). The VIX index – the other 
explanatory variable besides the US interest rates that is designed to capture global 
investment risk aversion – was another important influence on the interest rates 
concerned. A 100 basis point decline in the federal funds rate was associated with a 
43 basis point downward shift in the policy rate of the sample countries compared 
to the level implied by the normative Taylor rule (Column 3). Moreover, when the 
examination of the effect of US policy rate was based not on the normative but 
descriptive Taylor-rule, then the impact was higher, 70 basis points on average, in 
emerging and smaller advanced economies (Column 4). Based on these findings, 
the USA’s federal funds rate had a significant impact on the short and long-term 
interest rates of the 30 countries under review.
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Interest rate  
level4
US rate 0.34*** 0.59*** 0.43*** 0.70***
VIX 0.51*** 0.21** 1.99*** 1.54***
F-stat of US output 
and inflation5 0.24 2.35* 20.80*** 6.80***
F-stat of domestic 
output and 
inflation5
17.18*** 2.09 – 12.60***
R2 0.25 0.26 0.45 0.82
Note: 1 Results from unbalanced fixed effects panel regressions for 30 emerging market and advanced 
economies (Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, 
Turkey and the United Kingdom) for the sample period Q1 2000–Q4 2014. 2 Panel estimation of 
Δrti = β0 +α0i +β1Δrtus +β2Xti + εti  where Δrti  indicates the quarter-on-quarter change in economy i ’s 
3-month money market rate and 10-year bond yield and Δrtus  is the change in the corresponding US rate; 
X includes the change in US real GDP growth and inflation, the log change in the VIX and the change in 
domestic real GDP growth and inflation. 3 Panel estimation of iti −Taylorti = β0 +α0i +β1itus +β1Xti + εti  where 
iti  is the policy rate, Taylorti  is the policy rate implied by a normative Taylor rule (calculated following 
Hofmann and Bogdanova, “Taylor rules and monetary policy: a global ‘Great Deviation’?”, BIS Quarterly 
Review, September 2012, pp 37–49), itus  is the federal funds rate and X includes US real GDP growth, US 
inflation and the (log) VIX. 4 Panel estimation of iti = β0 +α0i +β1itus +β2Xti + εti  where X includes US real GDP 
growth, US inflation and the (log) VIX as well as domestic inflation and the domestic output gap 
(calculated using a standard Hodrick-Prescott filter). 5 F-test of the null hypothesis that coefficients of 
the variables equal zero. ***/**/* denotes results significant at the 1/5/10 per cent level based on 
cluster-robust standard errors.
Source: Hofmann – Takáts (2015); BIS (2015)
Another example demonstrates spillovers from the appreciation of the US dollar 
in emerging and developing countries. This was examined by IMF staff (IMF 
2015a: 12–16) for the periods 1980–1985, 1995–2001 and 2008–2009 when 
emerging economies faced financial crises (Figure 10). In the period 1995–2001, 
US dollar appreciation took place against a background of tighter US monetary 
policy relative to that prevailing in Europe and Japan. During the period, emerging 
countries improved their net international investment positions significantly with 
a parallel increase in foreign exchange reserves, and – also as a result of other 
important development factors – emerging and developing countries in general 
relied increasingly on domestic resources and reduced their dependence on 
foreign currency debt. Emerging economies were also able to increase the share 
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of domestic assets in public debt and to improve their international investment 
position from –40 per cent of GDP in 1995 to –25 per cent of GDP in 2013, with net 
debt improving by 20 percentage points of GDP and FX reserves by 10 percentage 
points of GDP.
Despite these positive effects, appreciation of the US dollar significantly increases 
the vulnerability of some countries. While net external positions improved, gross 
positions made the economy more vulnerable in countries where foreign liabilities 
were especially large (Chile, Hungary, Malaysia, Poland and Thailand). These 
liabilities underpin that, in view of the intensification of financial globalisation 
and, in general, international effects, a more frequent impact assessment of the 
implications of gross positions (“gross flows”) is called for in economic policy 
analysis, in addition to the net external positions monitored regularly by the 
countries and the professional literature.
In addition, the currency composition of the FX debt position also involved 
vulnerabilities: naturally, the appreciation of USD affected those countries the most 
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In many countries, another negative implication of USD appreciation was a sharp 
increase in the outstanding debt of non-financial corporations in recent decades, 
with a parallel rise in foreign currency debt (Figure 11).
As shown in the Figure, an extremely large portion of Chinese corporate debt was 
denominated in the local currency. It should be borne in mind, however, that even 
USD-denominated Chinese debt amounted to over USD 1 trillion based on 2015 
statistics. And while China’s USD reserves exceed this amount, these dynamics are 
concerning especially in light of the fact that the country’s foreign currency reserves 
have fallen by more than USD 1.2 trillion in recent years. Other emerging countries 
(primarily Chile, Malaysia, Thailand, Turkey, Russia, Bulgaria and Hungary) recorded 
high foreign currency debt ratios. In most of these countries, FX debt was largely 
denominated in US dollars, especially in Asia and Latin America but also in Turkey. In 
European emerging economies (Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland), the euro accounted 
for the lion’s share of total FX debt, which made these countries less exposed to 
the spillover effects of USD appreciation.
As shown by these two examples, the monetary policy of the United States exerted 
a significant impact on the rest of the world. Similarly, the monetary policies of 
other globally important countries (euro area, Japan and the United Kingdom) in 
Figure 11
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particular, may induce negative or positive effects (unfortunately mostly the former). 
The intensity and duration of these effects are influenced by three important factors:
•  The openness of the communication cooperation and dialogue between the 
central banks of globally influential countries and the rest of the world. From 
this respect, the former group should assume a more active and initiatory role.
•  The measures taken by individual countries to strengthen monetary policy 
transmission (e.g. in relation to non-performing loans and to the reduction or 
elimination of the output gap).
•  The extent to which the applied policy mix – e.g. fiscal policy – supports 
economic growth and reduces the output gap. For example, in connection with 
the latter Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) pointed out that government expenditure 
on infrastructure development may boost economic growth and employment 
significantly in a low-demand environment. Of course, different policy mixes are 
needed in different countries and situations.
2.6. Institutional framework
The functioning of the IMFS is strongly affected by the operational efficiency of 
the institutional framework vested with international coordination. In the Bretton 
Woods system, the key institution in this framework was the IMF. The second 
amendment to its Articles of Agreement – effective from 1978 – redefined and 
expanded the responsibilities of the IMF in relation to the IMFS: accordingly, the 
IMF is expected to monitor the functioning of the system, to conduct analyses 
and surveys with a view to strengthening the system, and to maintain a forum of 
dialogue with regard to the system.
In addition to the IMF, from the mid-1970s to 1986–1987 the G5 and the G7 
also played a prominent role in international coordination. Rather than making 
specific decisions, their role was mainly focused on formulating joint strategic 
opinions regarding the potential directions of economic development. This role 
was very successful in facilitating the spread of good practices. Some economists 
and policymakers (e.g. Kenen 1988; Tobin 1987) described this policy coordination 
as “regime preservation”, which prevents international economic and financial 
stability from being jeopardised by certain factors. An important achievement in 
this endeavour was the abovementioned Plaza Accord in 1985.
The 1997–1998 regional financial crisis in South East Asia and intensifying anti-
globalist social movements prompted a striking turnaround in international 
coordination. One sign of this was China’s invitation to the 1999 G7/G810 Cologne 
summit. The event was also made memorable by the fact that summit leaders 
10  It was at this summit that China joined the G7, which therefore grew to become the G8.
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voiced concerns about developments in global debt structure for the first time, 
especially in view of the growing significance of derivate transactions.
Another sign of the turnaround was the presentation of the IMF’s 1998 report by 
the managing director, which underscored, as a critical issue in the IMF’s policy, the 
need to strengthen the architecture of the international monetary system (Address 
of the Managing Director 1998). The Managing Directorˊs 1999 Address, in turn, 
outlined the concept and feasibility of a “managed” global financial system where, 
as envisioned by De Larosière, logic and ethics prevail (Address of the Managing 
Director 1999). The report pointed out that while the liberalisation of capital 
movements had sizable benefits, it also created significant risks and emphasised 
that, due to their special traits, this principle should be applied differently in 
transition and emerging economies.
This notwithstanding, the IMF was strongly criticised for the passivity exhibited 
before the South East Asian crisis: the Fund failed to issue an explicit warning 
about the development of a meltdown. Although in line with its 2005 medium-
term strategy, the IMF had launched – in justification of its activity, as it were – 
an experimental, multilateral economic policy consultation to further partnership 
between the participants in an effort to reduce global financial (current account) 
imbalances, due to inadequate support from the key partners (the United States and 
China) the experiment had failed. Indeed, if for no other reason than its professional 
expertise, the IMF would have been rightfully expected to work out alternative 
solutions to mitigate or eliminate the global financial asymmetry.
It was also due to these circumstances that instead of the IMF, the G20 became 
the most important global forum for the coordination of economic policies in the 
past one and a half decades, and that a handful of major emerging economies 
also joined the ranks of the key actors of global economic governance. One of 
the most memorable moments of this change was when the functioning of the 
IMFS became a central item on the G20’s agenda in 2011, and the Palais Royal 
initiative – worked out in an effort to strengthen the IMF’s activity by a group of 
world-renown economists and politicians under the lead of former IMF managing 
director Michel Camdessus – became a subject of extreme interest and heated 
debate (Camdessus – Lamfalussy – Padoa-Schioppa 2011). The authors put forward 
a number of recommendations on how to strengthen the IMF’s activity (how to 
remedy “the lack of teeth” of its procedures) and on how Europe could (would) 
contribute to the needed reform of the international financial system.
The principal objective of the international financial reform programme launched 
by the G20 in 2008 was to increase the resilience of the IMFS while preserving its 
open and integrated structure. The implementation of the regulatory reforms is 
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coordinated by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) established in 2009, with special 
focus on the improvement of four major areas:
•  building resilient financial institutions (implementation of Basel III capital and 
liquidity standards, better risk analysis, etc.);
•  ending the rescue of global systemically important – too-big-to-fail – banks;
•  making derivatives markets safer and
•  transforming shadow banking into resilient market-based finance – regulating 
the shadow banking system.
Another important objective of the reform programme is to intermediate financial 
flows and to facilitate the financial reforms of emerging markets and developing 
economies.
The FSB reports on the progress of the international financial reform programme’s 
implementation in annual reports (FSB 2015; 2016). Based on the reports, the 
institutional framework and programmes developed by the G20 have already 
provided adequate incentives for the countries to comply with the rules and 
requirements of the IMFS.11
3. Summary conclusions
Concurring with Jacques de Larosièreˊs authoritative opinion, since the early 1970s 
the IMFS has been best described as a “non-system” rather than as a “system” (De 
Larosière 2012). Under such circumstances, the build-up of external imbalances 
perpetualised the accumulation of liquidity surpluses and – at least up until the 
outbreak of the 2008–2009 crisis – financial markets developed at a faster pace than 
the real economy. In this new world, everything has become so complex and diverse 
that the established intellectual premises of the IMF are no longer functioning in 
practice. Although on several occasions, the IMF attempted to launch a number of 
major reforms (Kruger 2012; IMF 2015b), due to the unravelling of financial markets 
and the lack of international support, they were never implemented.
Based on the analysis presented above on the operation of the IMFS, we can confirm 
that the functioning of the system is inadequate and inefficient. Below this finding is 
summarised through three relationship circles between the elements of the system.
11  On a European level, the institution of the European Stabilisation Mechanism should also be mentioned, the 
establishment of which in 2012 represented an important step forward in the efforts to avert the spillover 
of a potential crisis within the euro area. It may serve as a “firewall”, as it were, to prevent the insolvency 
of a country from triggering panic reactions in other markets.
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The first circle comprises capital flows, the volatility of exchange rates and the 
evolution of imbalances. Based on the development of the global current account 
imbalances shown in Section 2.2, we can conclude that countries running large 
deficits often lose the confidence of surplus countries, which may set in motion 
an exchange rate crisis between their currencies. An exception to this “rule” is the 
USA, which ran a substantial current account deficit for decades without giving rise 
to a similar crisis. As regards cross-border capital flows – the other important area 
of global disequilibrium – we need to point out that foreign currency debt may 
hurt borrowers significantly if their local currency is devalued and consequently, 
the repayment of their FX-denominated loans becomes far more expensive. This is 
exemplified by the 1997–1998 South East Asian exchange rate crisis. And if debtors 
are unable to repay their loans, the creditors will also suffer as their money will 
only be repaid, if at all, later on or only partially.
Despite these risks, capital flows were almost uniformly perceived as useful for 
the recipient country. Little mention was made about the challenges posed by the 
inflows to macroeconomic governance, the magnitude of the threats to financial 
stability or the impact on reserve accumulation or prudential measures. Also in view 
of the international spillover effects, policymakers failed to identify safer directions 
for capital flows or regulate the process within the framework of the IMFS.
Capital flows also contributed to the extreme volatility of exchange rates. 
Devaluation pressures – which improve the competitiveness of exports – posed a 
risk to indebted countries and to countries with large balance of payments deficits, 
because they may become the focus of policy decisions to such a degree that 
leads to a decline in internal demand. By contrast, the structural realignments in 
countries running balance of payments surpluses fuel even greater imbalances 
in deficit countries. And the often cited idea that the market (floating) exchange 
rate can resolve current account imbalances even in the short run has not been 
confirmed by practical experience. Hectic swings in the exchange rates, for the most 
part, did not even reflect the underlying economic trends and led to particularly 
large distortions in the economic development of small, open economies.
The second circle involves the attainment of the optimal level of international 
liquidity in a period of extreme volatility. From the aspect of the operation of the 
IMFS, too much or too little liquidity is no longer a theoretical but rather a practical, 
measurable (benchmark) issue. During the years preceding the global financial 
crisis, the Fed’s federal funds rate was lower than the level implied by the Taylor 
rule. This deviation suggests that these years were characterised by excess liquidity. 
This lends justification to the opinion (Taylor 2007) that the Fed’s monetary policy 
contributed to the overheatedness of the secondary mortgage market and hence, 
the outbreak of the global financial crisis. As the crisis unfolded, central banks 
attempted to resolve the drastic credit crunch with aggressive liquidity expansion, 
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which was reflected in steep interest rate cuts, i.e. quantitative easing (purchases 
of sovereign and corporate securities directly by the central bank). The resulting 
liquidity situation, however, demanded excessive self insurance, which materialised 
as large and costly capital formation. This process continued in the years following 
the crisis despite the fact that volatility-induced tensions had eased somewhat. 
Strengthening the global financial safety net and extending the scope of cooperation 
between central banks may assist in scaling down this method of self insurance.
The third circle is (economic and monetary policy) cooperation, the relationship 
between spillovers and diverging volatilities. Before the 2008–2009 crisis, this 
relationship, for the most part, was lackadaisical: international cooperation did 
not or only slightly facilitated the development of positive spillover effects and the 
mitigation of volatilities. This led to the build-up of dangerous systemic risks in the 
financial sector, which was also boosted by the widespread application of various 
technical innovations.
In Section 2.5 we presented the correlation between the USA’s federal funds rate 
and the policy rates of a number of significant countries, which indicated that the 
Fed’s low interest rates played an important role in shaping the prices of products, 
services and assets in other countries. The spillover of this monetary effect incited 
banks and investors to take greater risks. This was reflected in the fact that lending 
and investment activities – primarily towards emerging smaller countries – grew 
at a faster pace than banks’ capital. The sharp acceleration in international capital 
flows through the bond markets is especially evident in Latin American countries.
It is an important and progressive institutional change that willingness for 
cooperation between countries and financial institutions noticeably improved after 
the crisis. The Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) initiated by the G20 is a good 
example: under the MAP, with the participation of the IMF, participants analysed 
the countries’ macroeconomic conditions and balance of payments positions in 
order to evaluate key imbalances.12 However, there was no change in respect of 
the fact that the Fed’s strongly influential monetary policy and deliberations on the 
recent interest rate hikes in the USA focused mainly on serving domestic economic 
requirements and interests. Through international spillovers, this continues to shape 
the monetary policy stance of other countries.
The functioning of the IMFS demonstrates that more comprehensive analysis work, 
global discussions and greater international efforts are required for a broad-based 
and complex enhancement of the system. Although numerous experts concluded 
that the system enhancements performed after the crisis had made the operation 
12  Note that in the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure applied by the European Commission external 
balance is analysed with more detailed indicators than those of the MAP process.
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of the IMFS safer, additional radical changes are needed to avoid the imminent 
outbreak of new financial crises.
With that in mind, the following four scenarios should be considered among the 
possible scenarios that may lay the foundations of the reform of the IMFS.
•  Analysing the lessons of the 2008 global crisis in relation to the IMFS and 
aligning the resulting policy responses with the newly arising issues and 
challenges. This requirement may be satisfied by the financial regulatory reform 
of the G20 (ensuring financial stability, promoting traditional bank financing 
and innovative financial sources, preventing systemic risks in the operation of 
financial institutions, strengthening the macroprudential policy framework). The 
implementation of these goals is progressing according to plan, and may serve 
as a starting point for a more comprehensive and thorough reform of the IMFS 
in the near future.
•  Reforming the IMFS with a focus on rule definition. The automatic international 
regulatory mechanisms missing from the existing system would simultaneously 
serve the resolution of global imbalances and balance of payments deficits, the 
mitigation of negative spillover effects and the justified restriction of global capital 
movements.
•  Reforming the IMFS with the IMF in its changed role at the centre of global 
economy and finances. This is in part based on the broad-based quota and 
governance reform adopted in 2010 and taking effect in 2016 which, while 
expanding the funds of the IMF, increases the weight of the G20 and also responds 
to the needs of emerging and developing countries. Another condition is the 
reduction of the USA’s current excessive role.
•  Transforming the existing, USA-led, unipolar global economic system and the IMFS 
into a multipolar system. So far, there have been no attempts – or indeed initiatives 
– in this regard on the part of any of the main power centres (USA, China, euro 
area). With regard to the radical reform of the IMFS, the transformation of the 
existing system into a multipolar system and the presentation of the positions of 
the new power centres in terms of the possible directions of the reform merit 
special attention. The latter is especially intriguing in light of the unprecedented 
clash of opinions between the United States and the European Union and 
the aspects of the already existing, new regional agreements (bilateral SWAP 
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Mónika Kuti – Zsolt Bedő – Dorottya Geiszl
This paper presents the latest results of international research on equity-based 
crowdfunding, and thus – according to the authors’ current knowledge – fills a 
gap in the Hungarian literature. Equity-based crowdfunding offers a fundraising 
opportunity through online platforms for small and medium-sized enterprises 
seeking alternative forms of funding for growth opportunities and innovation in 
this digital age. Investors interested in risk-adjusted financial return have several 
methods available to handle capital market friction and agent costs in the context 
of “crowdfunding”. Information signals on entrepreneurial quality are essential for 
seasoned investors when making capital allocation decisions in a crowdfunding 
campaign. In addition to the national legislative framework, platforms have many 
different rules, techniques and cultural norms that attempt to handle capital market 
imperfections.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: F36, G19, 016
Keywords: equity crowdfunding, financial innovation, start-up financing
1. Introduction
Resources intermediated via information technologies open the door for new types 
of business models and roles. Online exchange, sharing and cooperation between 
Internet users allows entrepreneurs to recognise opportunities, control resources 
and create capacity through crowdsourcing, marketing (social brand and word-of-
mouth) and crowdfunding (Shneor – Flåten 2015).
This paper focuses specifically on equity-based crowdfunding from among the 
many different business models available and presents its complex theoretical 
framework. The appearance of Hungary’s first crowdfunding portal for equity 
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purposes (tokeportal.hu) attests to the topic’s local relevance and its inherent 
business opportunities.
2. Equity-based crowdfunding
The shift in corporate funding towards cyberspace, the paradigm change seen 
in recent years and the shift of collective capital formation towards the digital 
realm is paving new paths. Equity financing offers the opportunity for early-stage 
fundraising and for bridging the funding gap for young, innovative startups. These 
financial innovations open the door for startups to obtain funding even if capital 
markets are not functioning. In the wake of the global economic crisis, business 
angels and venture capitalists have increased their investment activity and their 
preference has shifted to later-stage investments (Block – Sandner 2009). This 
trend has highlighted the timeliness and opportunities offered by equity-based 
funding, opening up new directions for research in the international literature. 
Equity-based crowdfunding (hereinafter: ECF) is likely to create great challenges 
for business angels and venture capitalists in the near future (Vulkan et al. 2015). 
Equity-based crowdfunding consists of entrepreneurs publishing open calls online 
for the sale of their equity shares in the hopes of attracting a large number of 
investors. The calls and investments take place through online platforms which 
provides tools such as the legal background, pre-screening and the handling of 
financial transactions. Equity-based crowdfunding is a model where investors 
acquire a stake in the company in the form of a share or share-like agreement (such 
as profit-sharing). Equity-based crowdfunding involves the sale of securities and 
is therefore significantly influenced by the legal environment of the host country 
(Bradford 2012).
In terms of the choice between traditional bank financing and crowdfunding, the 
latter offers financial benefits such as market feedback, product validation and 
community impacts. Imperfect information and moral hazard also affect companies’ 
choice between the available business models of crowdfunding. In case of equity-
based crowdfunding versus donation-based crowdfunding, financial return is 
important for investors alongside companies’ future capacity to generate cash flow. 
In reward-based crowdfunding, backers tend to look at whether the idea’s pitcher 
will be able to create and deliver the prepurchased product. For large-scale projects, 
the campaign-starting companies prefer equity crowdfunding and investors also 
factor in long-term profit; by contrast, the minimum threshold may be difficult to 
achieve with rewards-based crowdfunding in campaigns that require a high amount, 
so this format is generally preferred for smaller value, high-quality projects. If a 
product can reach a large customer base, reward-based crowdfunding enabling 
pre-purchases is preferred, while profit-sharing-based models are preferred for 
special niche products (Miglo 2016).
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3. Capital market imperfections
The problem of information asymmetry is a central issue in equity-based 
crowdfunding. Researchers are actively investigating the correlations between 
the disclosure of information and successful fundraising. Startups send different 
signals to angel investors and venture capitalists than to small investors. Small 
investors are less sophisticated in terms of their financial knowledge and experience 
compared to venture capitalists, who have extensive knowledge on startups and the 
founding teams’ valuation (Freear et al. 1994). Not every signal on startup quality 
is able to effectively handle information asymmetry. The effectiveness of signals 
depends on how perceivable they are and their cost, in other words how much 
investors take notice of them and understand the messages, and also depends on 
the costs of producing the signals not exceeding their benefits, in other words, 
they must be structured in such a way that dishonest signals do not pay (Connelly 
et al. 2011). Ahlers et al. (2015) investigate what project signals and entrepreneur 
quality attributes most spurred investors to pledge their financial resources in the 
context of equity-based crowdfunding. They found that projects that signal higher 
entrepreneurial quality and have perceptible characteristics are more likely to 
attract funding; the less detailed the information on the link between the offered 
business share and financial forecasts, i.e. the higher the uncertainty, the more 
careful potential investors will be when evaluating the startup; social capital and 
intellectual capital barely have an impact on campaign success. The hard signals 
issued by entrepreneur are discounted by investors while the hard information from 
investors significantly shapes campaign success; meanwhile, soft information from 
both entrepreneurs and investors reinforce network impacts (Estrin – Khavul 2016).
The fraction of equity retained by the entrepreneur or overcapitalisation is typically 
interpreted as a sign of entrepreneurial intent and a greater fundraising opportunity 
(Leland – Pyle 1977). If the long-term objective of fundraising is growth in the 
context of equity crowdfunding, the startup must strive to retain control in the 
course of issuance. The proposed proportion of equity is generally disclosed on the 
platforms. Retaining equity can essentially be interpreted as a perceivable signal 
(Ahlers et al. 2015). On the one hand, entrepreneurs who offer a larger portion 
of their startup through the platform are less likely to attract potential investors; 
on the other hand, the success rate is higher for entrepreneurs with larger social 
networks, as this decreases uncertainty and increases visibility (Vismara 2015b).
Researchers are also investigating information asymmetry and the question of 
location. Seed-stage equity-based and platform-based interregional trading creates 
opportunities for startups, investors and legislators, contributing to more effective 
capital allocation. Angel investments are geographically localised; early-stage 
investors focus on local transactions. Although there is home bias in equity-based 
crowdfunding that characterises investors who are similar to business angels, there 
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is no such behaviour among sufficiently diversified investors (Hornuf – Schmidt 
2016). A common explanation for the absence of remote angel investments 
is information asymmetry. Although the Internet breaks down certain types of 
information constraints, it is incapable of transmitting face-to-face interactions 
such as the founding team’s grit, determination, interpersonal dynamics, and 
trustworthiness (Agrawal et al. 2015). The face-to-face personal communication 
characteristic of angel investors and venture capitalists (Moritz et al. 2014) is 
replaced on these platforms by pseudo-personal communication.
Equity-based crowdfunding syndicates made up of leading investors are able to 
tackle the issue of information asymmetry. These business formations present the 
transactions to masses of potential backers (Agrawal et al. 2015) and link the face-
to-face due diligence and monitoring that is characteristic of the off-line realm with 
online global access. The introduction of syndicates in equity crowdfunding is a 
relatively new phenomenon, available on AngelList since 2013. This platform allows 
individuals, angel groups and private equity funds to form syndicates and boasts a 
far higher rate of successful syndicated transactions compared to non-syndicated 
transactions. Venture capitalists therefore tend to prefer the syndicate strategy 
to increase the number of incoming transactions, improve brand reputation and 
provide sound arguments to their key partners with a view to concluding effective 
agreements (Coppey 2016). A syndicate is essentially a pre-screening mechanism 
prior to the subsequent non-syndicated investment stages. Syndicate leaders are 
generally well-connected through investment channels and business opportunities, 
which creates conflict of interest with unsophisticated small investors seeking to 
invest in startups. There is thus a trade-off in syndicated equity crowdfunding 
between access to deals and conflict of interest (Itenberg – Smith 2017). The authors 
demonstrated that syndicated investment offer rounds are riskier, yield slower 
return, and startups in which a syndicate leader invested earlier perform worse.
In the case of equity-based crowdfunding, a kind of counterselection resulting in a 
sub-optimal balance can be observed, i.e. a process in which the price and quantity 
of products and services change within a given market because one counterparty 
possesses information that the other party cannot obtain even at a reasonable cost. 
According to Agrawal et al. (2015), neither ordinary investors nor startup founders 
are able to correct information asymmetry at a reasonable cost in the context of 
crowdfunding. Ordinary investors typically lack the time, money and expertise to 
be involved in the daily management and supervision of the startups they fund. 
On the other hand, startup founders have a better understanding of what they are 
doing and their market prospects, but have limited resources to communicate with 
the investors, to widely disseminate information and to prepare detailed financial 
reports. Moral hazard is when the party which incurs the costs has to assume 
disproportionate risk. Once a crowdfunding campaign ends, backers do not have 
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effective means to force startup founders to perform in line with the promised 
conditions. At this point, the acquired equity belongs to the startup, the bargaining 
position has shifted between opportunistic startups and investors, while ordinary 
investors assume the risk of loss.
The examination of campaign updates introduced a dynamic approach into research 
following the static analysis of information asymmetry. Startups can increase the 
probability of their equity-based crowdfunding campaign succeeding by disclosing 
up-to-date information. It is thus useful to know which types of updates are 
effective. Updates related to the number of investments made by the crowd and 
the amount of investments collected by startups have a positive impact on campaign 
success with a few days’ delay (Block et al. 2016). According to the authors, this 
impact increases with the number of words featured in the updates, but decreases 
in parallel with the number of updates. They pointed out that updates related to 
the startup team (qualifications, age and personal interests), the business model 
(expected market, business idea, future business orientation and expansion 
expectations), co-creation projects and product development no longer have a 
major impact on the level of success. By contrast, updates on new funds (e.g. from 
angel investors, venture capitalists or tenders), the development of the business 
related to increases in sales revenues and favourable customer feedback as well 
as the promotional campaigns led by the startup, with networking taking place on 
social media, have a positive impact. Businesses release significantly more updates 
during the funding campaign than afterwards and publish more information if the 
campaign did not reach the funding objective or if the remaining funding period is 
short (Dorfleitner et al. 2017). According to Dorfleitner et al., businesses use some 
linguistic tools in their updates that strengthen group identity and group cohesion, 
and the probability of updates is higher when there is strong competition among 
the crowdfunding campaigns running in parallel.
The success rate is higher for those businesses that are also supported by 
professional investors (business angels and venture capitalists) and which obtained 
some grant money, or have protected their intellectual capital in the form of patents, 
trademarks or copyrights – pointed out Ralcheva and Roosenboom (2016), who also 
emphasised that if the business hired a consulting body, appointed nonexecutive 
directors or involved consultancy firms, or if the owner intends to keep a larger 
share of the business after the funding, a successful campaign is more probable. 
According to some other studies, the campaign’s success is determined by the 
pre-filtered campaign characteristics and the private and public networks, i.e. the 
investment decision criteria applied by traditional venture capitalists and angel 
investors are less relevant (Lukkarinen et al. 2016).
Early supporters play a key role in the success of crowdfunding campaigns on 
donation-based platforms (Burtch et al. 2013), reward-based platforms (Colombo 
192 Essay
Mónika Kuti – Zsolt Bedő – Dorottya Geiszl 
et al. 2015) and debt-based platforms (Zhang – Liu 2012). Empirical evidence to 
support this in the case of equity-based crowdfunding has been missing for a long 
time. On equity-based crowdfunding platforms, the names of individual investors 
are public and immediately accessible for every single offering which, in turn, affects 
the behaviour of future investors. Creating momentum in an early stage is a success 
factor, as the information can be evaluated based on the list of previous investments 
of early supporters which may convince future investors. Those investors who made 
their profile public often have higher qualifications, more project specific industry 
experience and a longer list of investments made through the platform. Additionally, 
their offering share compared to other investors is larger during the initial days 
of the campaign and then declines over time (Vismara 2015a). According to the 
author, information cascades are being formed as the presence of investors with a 
public profile attracts additional investors as the result of the “success brings more 
success” process. The psychological concept of observation-based social learning 
(Bandura 1977) appears in the financial literature as information cascades (Welch 
1992). Two conditions must exist for the information cascade to occur: uncertainty 
and sequentiality (Bikhchandani et al. 1992). Uncertainty appears more on the 
demand side of equity-based crowdfunding, where investors are less capable of 
overcoming information asymmetry. In this case, the signals sent by additional 
investors, i.e. the mass impact, becomes significant. In the course of crowdfunding, 
subsequent investors learn from observing the behaviour of previous supporters.
The dynamics of crowdinvesting is L-shaped on the platforms operating on “first 
come first served” basis, while it is U-shaped on the platforms operating on “sealed 
offer and secondary price auction” basis. (Hornuf – Armin 2015). Therefore, we 
have evidence supporting the idea that investors make their decisions based on the 
information updates provided by the entrepreneur and based on the investment 
behaviour and comments of other crowd investors. Campaign attributes, the level 
of investor sophistication, the process of granting funds, herd behaviour and stock 
exchange volatility determine the extent to which investors are willing to pay for the 
cash flow rights of startup businesses (Hornuf – Neuenkirch 2015). It is difficult to 
tell to what extent crowdinvestors become small business angels: sometimes they 
invest together with professional investors, but sometimes they are the competitors 
of business angels (Hornuf – Schwienbacher 2014).
In terms of their composition, crowd investors cannot be considered as a 
homogeneous community. Wallmeroth (2016) revealed that strategic investors 
investing a larger part of their own assets are less likely to become investors who 
later return to the platform and are more likely to invest in businesses that will not 
go bankrupt after the campaign. In his opinion, it is likely that investors offering 
large amounts are sophisticated, professional investors as opposed to the crowd 
of less sophisticated investors sporadically investing small amounts. According to 
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Brown and Davis (2017), equity crowdfunding is characterised in general by the 
“all or nothing” funding style, the scarcity of investor profit and the crowd of non-
cooperating investors.
In the case of equity crowdfunding, nonfinancial motivations are not typical, and 
investors are more likely to redeem after the campaign their intention to make 
a financial commitment expressed during the campaign than in the case of the 
reward-based model (Cholakova – Clarysse 2014). As for crowdfunding providing 
financial return, crowdinvestors are typically young men with degrees motivated 
by the acquisition of business share and by excitement (Daskalakis – Yue 2017). On 
the markets of equity crowdfunding, 93 per cent of investors are men, which can 
be explained more by the gender difference related to risk avoidance than by the 
differences in terms of excessive self-confidence (Hervé et al. 2016). One interesting 
observation is that the balanced presence of genders is the highest for equity-based 
crowdfunding compared with all other forms of business funding, and furthermore, 
that gender determines the nature of the relationship between demand and offer of 
capital: According to Vismara et al. (2016), projects of woman-led businesses have 
twice as many female investors than those helmed by men. The authors showed 
that although the great majority of investors are men, women invest 34 per cent 
more in general.
The literature also addresses the performance indicators after the campaign. One 
year after a successful campaign, the businesses’ revenues and the growth rate of 
their sales increased, which shows a positive link with the large number of investors 
during the campaign, while the profit dropped in general. According to Décarre and 
Wetterhag (2014), these trends resemble the one seen when business ventures are 
investing in companies. They also emphasise that a PR effect can be felt, resulting 
from the fact that these businesses also use the campaigns for marketing and 
promotional purposes. Based on their research of equity crowdfunding platforms 
in the UK between 2011 and 2015, Signori and Vismara (2016) found that only 
10 per cent of the businesses failed, and 30 per cent of them were able to involve 
additional funding with one or more seasonal share issuances, while investors’ 
average expected return was 8.8 per cent.
4. Equity-based crowdfunding platforms
Social networks and online platforms create new opportunities to raise funds for 
businesses and enable nonprofessional investors to place their funds without 
the use of financial intermediary systems. The acceleration and scaling of early 
funding opportunities within business funding schemes via Internet platforms can 
be exploited, taking account of the given regulatory system, which creates a balance 
between capital formation and investor protection. The platform is an architecture 
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which enables the exploitation of the signals and network effects in a reduced 
transactional cost environment (Estrin – Khavul 2016). The transactional interface 
for ECF must provide the legal background and the pre-screening of businesses, 
and allow financial transactions to be made (Ahlers et al. 2015). Intragroup and 
intergroup moderation is possible on the platform acting as an intermediary 
interface (Belleflamme et al. 2015; Viotto 2015). ECF is a multiple-phase process 
where targeted communication is needed for business ideas to be convincing on 
the platform and for investors.
According to Löher (2016), the three important areas of the intermediary role 
include a) project pre-screening, where the platform relies on its own networks 
thanks to access to deal offers, which has the objective of reducing the cost of deal-
seeking; b) the use of standardised contracts that comply with the legal background; 
and c) communication to reduce information asymmetry and promote a uniform 
campaign strategy. These platforms essentially search, assess and structure 
investment opportunities.
Brown et al. (2016) formulated the following correlations in terms of crowdfunding 
and platform efficiency:
1.  The equity-based crowdfunding platform must simultaneously ensure that 
entrepreneurs can lawfully raise capital, and that investors can lawfully access 
investment opportunities.
2.  It is more naïve investors narrow-mindedly following signals and basing their 
decisions on mass wisdom and not sophisticated investors who are needed for 
the equity-based crowdfunding platform to be efficient.
Lower quality businesses with a smaller social network are forced to turn to the 
crowd if they are unable to obtain funds from friends, family members, business 
angels or from venture capitalists through traditional early-stage funding. To reduce 
counter selection and moral hazard, in addition to legislation, various platform 
rules, self-regulation forms, technical features and cultural norms were born, which 
influence what quality and what types of startups are attracted by the platform. 
Investment ceilings, fundraising ceilings, limited disclosure obligations, platform 
investments, crowd audits, additional disclosures and performance transparency, 
and milestone-based financing are the rules and methods that minimise the chance 
of market failure (Catalini et al. 2016). The differentiating characteristics of high 
quality startup businesses and the renowned portals functioning as intermediaries 
may represent the way out of the Lemons Problem (Ibrahim 2015).
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The platforms channel the flow of investments with standardised contracting 
practice. The platforms make various business offers for the rights to shareholder’s 
equity, profit sharing and future share capital. The offering of non-equity securities 
is aimed at short-term profit sharing not including shareholder rights. In parallel, 
the platform also discloses a timing for the future investment rounds and strives 
to prevent that businesses maintain a costly, long-term relationship with a great 
number of small investors. The rights to future equity securities offered on the 
platform last until the occurrence of some future investment event. Future equity 
capital offers postpone the acquisition of shareholder’s rights until the point when 
the high-growth startup becomes the target of acquisition, IPO or risk capital 
financing when crowd investors receive their ownership share. In the meantime, 
crowd investors do not have shareholder’s rights, which would entail a number of 
costly, time-consuming risks and obligations. The link between the features of the 
early stage startup financing and the transparent investor agreement comes from 
the Simple Agreement for Future Equity, SAFE, as a deferred equity instrument. 
Another solution for the same issue is the KISS or Keep It Simple Security, which is 
essentially a convertible bond according to which the startup business promises 
the investor to repay the capital with some interest. KISS turns into a property 
right once the startup reaches certain milestones, such as acquisition, IPO or the 
involvement of risk capital. Therefore, the difference between KISS and SAFE is 
that if the investment is not converted into a property right, then in case of SAFE, 
the investors lose their capital while in the case of KISS, they gain it back through 
debt service. According to Wroldsen (2017), there are great opportunities in these 
two simplified contracting forms, but interestingly investors benefit more from the 
collective protection provided by social media than from the formalised contractual 
rights.
On the German crowdfunding market, the subordinated loan providing profit 
sharing became dominant as an investment form. According to Klöhn et al. (2016), 
the most recent trends include that the minimum maturity time went from 4 years 
to 6-8 years, lately offering fixed interest payment, and investors are also entitled to 
profit sharing. The number of contracts granting the right to share in exit revenues 
increased recently, while veto rights have been discontinued, and dilution is now 
possible for next round investments. On German equity crowdfunding platforms, 
crowd investors greatly depend on venture capital funds because they do not hold 
any share capital in the businesses. Such venture capital funds have a vested interest 
in crowding out small investors through their mezzanine financing contracts; in 
response to this trend, the platforms created contracts that promote the coexistence 
of these two groups (Hornuf – Schmitt 2016).
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5. Conclusions
In recent years, equity-based crowdfunding platforms started to emerge once 
the legislative and regulatory environment had been created. Compared to 
other crowdfunding business models, investors are driven by financial return and 
entrepreneurs come up with larger investment projects compared to the average 
project size of reward-based crowdfunding. A number of success factors have been 
identified, including signs of strong entrepreneurial skills, the internal proportions 
of business share offering, the retention of ownership, the availability of hard 
information on investors, the size of the entrepreneurs’ social networks and updates 
identifying future growth opportunities. When creating equity-based crowdfunding 
platforms, attention must be paid to the concordance of pre-screening, deal 
offering and the processes defined by the standardised contracts, compliance with 
the regulatory environment and the consideration of switching effects between 
network effects strengthening platform reputation. Off-line investment agents 
have a beneficial effect on the platforms operating in the given region. Striving to 
establish best practices requires constant innovation which can be observed in the 
case of experiments with syndicate strategies and also in the case of the evolution 
of the various securities and rights serving the reduction of conflict of interest 
between crowd investors and sophisticated investors.
The ever increasing development of digital technologies, blockchain and bitcoins 
with the so-called Initial Coin Offering deals propose new directions in the world 
of business investments through platforms the analysis of which goes far beyond 
the framework of this study.
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1. Introduction
Upon hearing the name ‘Magyar Nemzeti Bank’, most people unwittingly think of 
the main building near Szabadság tér in Budapest. This comes as no surprise, since 
it is a distinctive, one-of-a-kind building, and its architectural style, the groups of 
statues on its façade, and the windows adorning the interior are all astonishing 
works of leading architects, sculptors and applied artists. The building has housed 
the Bank’s professional activities for many decades and has symbolic significance in 
Hungarian and international financial and economic policy. Despite the fact that the 
Bank’s main building has been presented in many books through the painstakingly 
meticulous work of various authors, the professionals playing a part in the Bank’s 
past, their community and engagement as well as the Bank’s publications, i.e. the 
journals circulated internally or externally that provided a publishing opportunity 
for everyday information and experts’ serious professional works, are hardly 
mentioned. The various publications are interesting and valuable not only because 
of their visual appearance, but also because they represent a real rarity as regards 
to their content. If we go beyond the surface, we can take a peek behind the curtain 
and get to know, understand and in a sense relive all of the events in the Bank’s 
distant past (e.g. personal recollections from during and after the Second World 
War, the 1956 Revolution and its aftermath within the Bank). The accounts as well as 
the illustrations, caricatures and drawings found here are of exceptional quality and 
poke fun at the everyday events at an organisation and a discipline (economics) as 
a whole. Furthermore, sometimes we can also see the artists’ honest self-reflection 
about the social and political structure and atmosphere between 1945 and 1990. 
This short description, which is far from comprehensive, was compiled on the one 
hand to pique readers’ interest in visual communication, a topic rarely in the focus in 
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economics, and on the other hand to pay tribute to the Bankszemle (Bank Review), 
and commemorate it on the 60th anniversary of its first publication.
2. Bankszemle
The Bankszemle,1 first published in June 1957 (Figure 1) was the scientific journal of 
the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, first prepared for internal use and circulation only. The 
publication was intended for professionals and published in 350 copies, which was 
gradually increased to 1,000. On account of its private circulation, it was written 
and read mainly by the Bank’s staff. Later, in parallel with rebranding and page-
setting innovations, circulation of the journal was widened, thereby reaching several 
financial institutions, organisations and companies, and professionals from outside 
1  The Bankszemle was published until 2001, when it was replaced by the Financial and Economic Review as 
a major Hungarian scientific journal in the fields of economics and finance.
Figure 1
Rebranding of the Bankszemle
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the Bank were also allowed to publish in it. As a result, the number of subscriptions 
to the journal jumped from around 1,000 to over 3,000, which had made it a major 
journal in the country. We can see that on the outside, the publication changed 
somewhat over the decades, but its topics remained the same. The periodical’s 
new look and especially the page-setting of the publication’s inside pages were 
intended to enhance the quality and prestige of the professional content published.2 
It appeared as an 80-page publication for a long time, and then the number of 
pages was reduced to 64, thereby making the whole work leaner. Thanks to new 
page-setting technologies, it was possible to increase the length of the contents, 
and the readability of the texts was aided by modification of the page layout (e.g. 
two-column pages).
3. The Forint magazine
The Forint, the journal of the staff of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, was first published 
on 15 August 1950.3 Its forerunner was called Bankújság (Bank Journal),4 and its 
sister papers were the Fillér5 and the Bankó (Bank Note) (Figure 2–3).6 Due to paper 
shortages, the Forint’s publication was interrupted in the autumn of 1951, and it 
only became available again in 1957.7 This internal-circulation magazine was one of 
the main platforms for the Bank’s active and retired employees for social interaction 
and voicing their opinion. The paper entitled Magyar Nemzeti Bank Dolgozóinak 
Lapja (Journal of the Staff of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank), which was occasionally 
called Üzemi Híradó (Operational News), is one of the most authentic sources for 
obtaining profound insight into everyday life at the Bank in the past.
2  The editor-in-chief, Dr János Zádori, said the following about the necessity of rebranding in the January 
1986 edition of the Forint magazine (Page 11): “The Bankszemle had become obsolete, it was the only 
small-circulation periodical in Hungary. In such a journal with second-rate typography and bland cover, even 
top-quality works could not make an impact.”
3  In its heyday, around 1975, approximately 3,600 copies of the journal were published, which was later slowly 
and gradually reduced. As a result, the initially subscription-based system was replaced by a free-or-charge 
model at the turn of the 1990s, which was to stop the plummeting circulation of the journal.
4  The paper existed between 21 December 1949 and the end of July 1950 (Botos – Botos, 2004).
5  It was published by the Hungarian Communist Youth Association (KISZ), and its contents and quality were 
a far cry from those of the Forint.
6  This was the official publication of the Hungarian Banknote Printing Company and was first published in 
April 1958.
7  After June 1953, the social information provision function of the Forint was taken over by the Híradó, which 




Transformation of the covers of the Bankújság between 1949 and 1950, and the 
Forint between 1950 and 1989
(Part 1)
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The journal was produced by an external printing house (Kossuth Nyomda) from 
1969, which was replaced by printing within the Magyar Nemzeti Bank in 1979. This 
transition shortened printing times and brought about technological innovations in 
connection with production. New page-setting opportunities arose, which enabled 
the expansion and renewal of the contents of the journal on the one hand, and 
facilitated and enhanced the readability and structuring of the content on the 
other hand. These innovations had a positive impact, not only on the text but 
also on the visual content. One of the most striking examples for this was the 
change in the content and visual appearance of the journal’s cover and header, 
which was fine-tuned over time, and became increasingly varied and exciting. Text-
based and monochrome covers were replaced by ones with a colour background, 
and they were illustrated initially with drawings and then with black-and-white 
photographs, and after the 1990s with colour photographs. Thanks to page-setting 
Figure 3




technology, a balance was struck between the text and the images in the journal, as 
the illustrations within the text gained increasing prominence, thereby supporting 
and complementing the message of the written content. Moreover, caricatures 
shaping readers’ opinion also appeared as independent, unique visual means of 
communication.
These focused on economics and general topics related to economics and finance 
(e.g. the “Közgazdasági kislexikon” (Concise Encyclopaedia of Economics) series or 
the “Értelmező bankszótár” (Dictionary of Banking Terms) series) on the one hand, 
and were representations of the various problems and situations in the everyday 
life of the Bank (e.g. lack of space in the Bank, the crowded rooms, the elevator 
that was perpetually out of order) on the other hand. Completely independent 
from these, we can of course find drawings addressing general social issues (e.g. 
the “Fintor” (Grimace) series). One of the special features of the journal was the 
illustrations on half a page or an entire page that were published quite frequently 
and that may bring to mind the currently popular, storytelling images.
Of course, the Forint also contained political statements, notices and reports 
characteristic of the age, mainly in the first half of the paper. The journal’s 
special columns stood out from this (e.g. “Bankokos Manci”, “Fintor”, “Fullánk”, 
“Bankenciklopédia”, “Értelmező bankszótár” (Know-All Mary in the Bank, Grimace, 
Sting, Banking Encyclopaedia, Dictionary of Banking Terms)) and humorous writings 
in verse (e.g. “Tűnődő Bankos Sebestyén” (George, the Pondering Banker)). The 
one-off or serial publication of these made the paper distinctive, unique and also 
more personal and casual for the readers. In addition to the traditional pieces, 
reports and portrayals depicting the everyday life and the various events in the 
Bank as well as the institution’s sporting and cultural life, which were later enriched 
by photographs, articles with a more critical and scathing tone were also included 
(e.g. cutting red tape, comprehensible communication, bland and expensive food 
in the canteen, overcrowding, wasting working time).
The circulation and print run of the journal was strongly influenced by the active 
headcount in the Bank, which started slowly diminishing in 1972, and then from 
1986 this decline continued at an increasing pace. Despite the continuous attempts 
to renew the journal, the downward trend could not be halted, which was a 
recurring problem until publication was terminated.
3.1. The secret graphic artist of the Forint magazine
The overwhelming majority of the illustrations and drawings between 1945 and 
1978 were prepared by Dr Herbert Enyvvári, a lawyer at the Magyar Nemzeti 
Bank. However, his life was much more adventurous than just this. Born in 1916, 
drawing and graduating from the Academy of Fine Arts were his passions from 
his childhood. After his school leaving exam in 1934, he enrolled to the Legal and 
Political Science faculty of the Pázmány Péter Catholic University at his father’s 
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insistence. He continued to draw all throughout his years at the university, getting 
orders from several publishers (e.g. Athenaeum, Dante, Cserépfalvi, Révai), and 
collaborating with Zsigmond Móricz, Frigyes Karinthy among others, and he also 
worked together with folk authors Géza Fejes and József Darvas. The books he 
illustrated (e.g. the tales of Gusztáv Bernáth or Háry János legújabb kalandjai 
(The Latest Adventures of János Háry) by István Tamás) made him popular not 
only in Hungary but also at the international level. He received his degree in 1939 
and then enlisted in the army. He only returned home in 1943, due to a shrapnel 
wound sustained on the front. At his father’s insistence, he started looking for a 
respectable job and began working at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. That same year, 
he commenced work on the illustration to Cervantes’ Don Quijote published in the 
translation of Miklós Radnóti. A deep and close friendship developed between the 
poet and the illustrator. In the summer of 1944, he asked for permission to return 
to the front, where he was wounded again and then captured during the Soviet 
advance. He only returned to the Bank in 1945 as an expert in labour law, where 
he was later also in charge of preparing the internal rules of procedure. That was 
when he started drawing fervently in the Forint. He married his wife, Éva Rákóczy,8 
whom he met in the Bank, in 1948. Let us see the perhaps most telling recollection 
about the personality of Herbert Enyvvári: “During his life, he always resisted the 
oppressive regimes’ apparatus with all available means, even in peacetime after the 
war. During communism, he stood with two bags of potatoes in his hands during 
the compulsory official assemblies in the bank (!) so that he did not have to clap” 
(Miklauzič, 2013b: 37). Herbert Enyvvári’s caricatures and illustrations were the 
cornerstones of the Forint’s character.9 Although many people10 followed him in 
this position, his subtle drawings, unique graphic style, humour and exceptional 
attitude would have been impossible to imitate.
8  Éva Rákóczy, a descendant of the aristocratic Rákóczy family, also joined the Bank in 1945. She was first 
employed in the Tax Division and then in the Legal Department. One of her ancestors was János Rákóczy, 
“the secretary and closest confidante of Lajos Kossuth, János Damjanich’s brother in arms, a fervent 
supporter of Sándor Petőfi, the lifelong friend to Imre Madách and Mór Jókai, the intellectual partner of 
Hungarian patriots, a commanding figure of the army’s leaders, supporting the 1848–1849 freedom struggle 
with an independent cavalry troop” (Miklauzič, 2013a: 5).
9  Digitized publications can be viewed in the Library of Magyar Nemzeti Bank.
10  The first to take over the illustration work was András Káspári, another staff member at the central bank 
(occasionally in 1978–1979, then mostly between 1984 and 1990), and there was a short interim period 
(1982–1983) when the illustrations in the journal were mainly prepared by Dr Ferenc Kesztyűs. From the 
1990s, the Forint started publishing the works (or reproductions) of professional caricaturists, mostly László 




The Referáló Lapok (Reports) series published between 1965 and 1980 (Figure 4) 
included summaries of articles that appeared in the general economics and financial 
papers of the socialist countries, covering different topics in each issue. The 
Tanulmányok (Studies) series had the same image in 1960 when it was launched, 
but it was “rebranded” around 1964 (Figure 5).
Figure 4
Covers of the Referáló Lapok series in 1977
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The covers in both series use different colours, but are still characterised by a 
recurring look at certain intervals. On account of the variety of covers and the 
typographical solutions, to the eyes of the modern reader these were perhaps the 
two series of the Bank with the most interesting content and the most uniform 
visual image.11
The Közgazdasági Irodalmi Szemle (Economic Literature Review) (Figure 6) was 
launched by the Economic Department. The series was published between 
September 1940 and June 1944 (Botos, 1999: 256–257), with the aim of supporting 
and facilitating the professional awareness of the Bank’s staff through reviews of 
11  There are remarkable similarities between the style of the covers and the character of the currently very 
popular handbook series of the Harvard Business Review (HBR) Press. Both use a sleek design and simple 
colours and typography for the covers of their publications. The “only” difference is that the HBR series 
also includes demonstrative illustrations.
Figure 6
Rebranding of the covers of the Könyvismertetések, the Folyóiratszemle and the 
Közgazdasági Irodalmi Szemle
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foreign literature. After processing the articles published in Hungarian journals12 
with an explicit focus on banking, the reviews were divided into seven topics13 for 
the readers. By contrast, the Folyóiratszemle (Journal Review) (Figure 6) provided 
detailed information on the monetary and credit management methods of socialist 
countries and the theoretical articles published in official journals. As suggested by 
the title, the Könyvismertetések (Book Reviews) (Figure 6) sought to present books 
aimed at a professional audience.
The Közgazdasági Főosztály Közleményei (Publications of the Economics 
Department) series (Figure 7) was published between July 1969 and August 1989, 
with various longer professional and scientific studies, treatises and summaries 
by the Bank’s staff. It was very close, or, we could say, a forerunner in style to the 
12  In the Bankszemle (Bank Review), the Gazdaság (Economy), the Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review), 
the Külkereskedelem (Foreign Trade), the Pénzügyi Szemle (Financial Review) and the Társadalmi Szemle 
(Social Review).
13  The issues of general finance, income regulation, budget, lending, payments, FX management, foreign 
trade and investment finance.
Figure 7
Covers of the Közgazdasági Főosztály Közleményei in 1969 (Issue 1) and in 1983 
(Issue 107)
  
 Note: The reason why Issue 107 from 1983 is shown here is that from then on, later issues were available 
only in black and white in the digital archive of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Nainuwa). However, except 
for the colours, everything appeared as in the previous issues. Nevertheless, in order to illustrate the 
visual continuity, the last colour-cover issue available in the archive is included here.
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MNB Füzetek launched at the turn of 1995 and 1996,14 the idea of which originated 
from György Szapáry,15 and to the MNB Occasional Papers launched in the autumn 
of 2005.16 During the 30 years of this series, a total of 117 issues appeared, the 
special feature of which was not the cover of the series, which was unusually unique 
and incongruous with the world of banking, just like its typography, but the fact 
that it was able to appear with the same look and structure all throughout its 
existence.
We must also mention another publication, the series published by the Education 
Department,17 established in 1952 (Figure 8). The department was tasked with the 
uniform supervision of the internal and partly external professional trainings of the 
Bank at that time (Botos – Botos, 2004: 138). The publications for mostly internal 
circulation, produced in various print runs, providing comprehensive and concise 
professional advice and task descriptions to the staff in a topic or position, were 
probably published because of this from 1953. The publications were published by 
Pénzügyi Kiadó, and the covers were using soft colours (grey, white, dark brown).
5. Summary
Nowadays, the importance of the visual image and especially visual communication 
is undeniable. The method, channel, structure and “external look” of communication 
are critical, despite seeming insignificant and non-essential, and they should form 
an integral part of professional and scientific life. This is because by nature, visual 
images and visual communication raise awareness and guide us, which may facilitate 
the processing of the content geared towards professionals. In a world where the 
available information multiplies day by day, it is much harder, but not impossible, 
to stand out from the “crowd” of professional communication. Well-structured 
organisations, journals and series with a uniform visual image can communicate 
continuity, stability and reliability towards the outside world. Over the longer 
term, accessing, structuring and categorising the visual image of an organisation’s 
professional materials paves the way for using the visual foundations as a platform 
in order to make the organisation’s content geared towards professionals stand 
out even more from the crowd, thereby drawing attention to the organisation. 
14  The MNB Füzetek was first published only in Hungarian, and then – in line with similar international 
publications – only in English, and, accordingly, it was renamed MNB Working Papers and is still published 
today. 
15  Deputy Governor of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank between 1993 and 1999, and 2001 and 2007, and currently 
chief advisor to the Governor of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank.
16  The MNB Occasional Papers combined the MNB Háttértanulmányok (MNB Background Studies) series and 
the MNB Műhelytanulmányok (MNB Workshop Studies) series published before the autumn of 2005 and 
is still published by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank.
17  The Education Department, which was in charge of the publication, was created in November 1952. It 
sought to provide assistance in the professional training of the colleagues in the national network of regional 
offices, county branches and branch offices established between 1950 and 1956. The department operated 
for three years and was then merged into the HR Department in 1955.
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I believe that the present description may be of interest not only because of its 
special nature, but also because it may point out aspects for the future that can help 
the further development of the Bank’s and its publications’ external and internal 
communication.
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Tamás Bánfi:
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“Banks lent more of the deposits held with them to residential customers than usual. 
The increasing demand for consumption had some serious consequences: the price 
level increased and the level of savings dropped, which made funding investments 
impossible. Owing to the drop in investments, unemployment rose and tax revenues 
shrank, which increased the government deficit and placed government debt on 
a growth path. The funding of pensions was also jeopardised. The central bank, 
which is independent of the government, tried to control this harmful process by 
raising the interest rate.”
The above – imaginary – quotation could be included in the case studies of any 
mainstream textbook on macroeconomics, although it is full of entrenched concepts 
and relationships that we use and teach without any serious review. And we are 
wrong. The book by Tamás Bánfi entitled A pénz forradalma – A pénzteremtés 
elmélete és gyakorlata (The Revolution of Money – The Theory and Practice of 
Money Creation), explores, considers and reconsiders the relationships between 
money creation, measurement of value, government finances (deficit, debt, pension 
financing), and the relationships between investments and savings, unemployment, 
fiscal and monetary policy. Each chapter can be considered a study in its own right, 
yet each is related to money and the creation of money.
Banks create money by accounting transactions, lending and crediting the amount 
of money on the account of the customer. To understand and bring others to 
understand this statement is not an easy task, even in academic and professional 
financial circles. People who are constantly faced with arguments denying or 
countering money creation or neglecting its importance should not be surprised 
that a scientific collection on money begins with a chapter introducing the creation 
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of money (The theory and practice of money creation). One should begin reading 
the book with this, and we should be impressed at how simple this operation is.
Chapter two (The measurement unit of the numéraire is the currency standard) 
introduces us to the theoretical and sometimes practical (e.g. 27 July 1946 in 
Hungary) zero point of money creation, the time of the introduction of a new 
currency. In hyperinflation, money loses its functions one by one: it is no longer 
a store of value, a medium of exchange, and it can also no longer be used to 
measure prices. Therefore, upon introduction of the new currency, the fiat money, 
the monetary standard should be determined. The monetary standard can be 
determined fully arbitrarily, but it is practical to choose a standard that minimises 
the money circulation, information and other transaction costs.
Chapter three (A theoretical history debate of money creation) explores money 
creation from a historical aspect. The long period when monetary functions 
were fulfilled by substitutes for money besides and instead of commodity money 
connects the eras of commodity money and fiat money. Classical paper money and 
classical banknotes basically substituted precious metals in their functions of means 
of exchange and means of payment, but after some time their increasing amount 
started to determine prices as well, while the price-determining role of gold became 
questionable. And if this is so, then – having fulfilled all the functions of money – 
they are not merely substitutes for money, but rather are the monies themselves.
Chapter four (Savings and investment equality does not prevail according to 
Keynesian definitions) is a debate partly on definitions and partly on the history 
of theory, while at the same time it also has important practical, economic policy 
messages. The mistaken belief found in professional circles that investments require 
the preliminary (or at best, simultaneous) accumulation of savings, can only be 
verified if money creation is denied. It is possible to finance deficits in government 
finances or business current deficits by new, fiat money without these funds 
having been collected by someone previously, and without having price increases 
as a result of such financing. The investment-savings equation may still apply: fiat 
money finances investments, and thus it will still be received by someone as income. 
Unspent amounts will remain savings, by definition, until the income has been 
spent on consumption. But even if it does get spent, it will become (as yet unspent) 
income – and simultaneously – savings somewhere else.
Chapter five (The blind spot (or badge of shame?) of economics: the uninterpretable 
and unmeasurable price level) should be started (almost) from the end, so we 
can see how many authors use the concept of “price level” in so many places, 
without going deeper into its exact interpretation. This interpretation is not only a 
theoretical challenge. The measurement, forecasting, reduction and/or maintenance 
of inflation is a practical, defining element in monetary policy, and these activities 
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cannot be adapted to a falsely created, inconsistent benchmark. Several alternative 
options are possible: on the one hand, we could select a good, whose price changes 
allow us to follow nominal changes of price values; on the other hand, we could use 
wage level instead of price level, since it measures a homogeneous type of good 
(or at least much more homogeneous than the world of goods), and its changes 
are closely related to changes of the rest of the prices.
Human communities have had an increasingly hard time controlling those harmful 
dynamics – increasing inequalities in income and wealth, destruction of nature, 
economic, social and political crises – that are generated by selfishness and the 
pursuit of self-interests channelled into market demand and supply. It makes the 
struggle for survival as a community even more difficult when we use inaccurate 
concepts and unclear relations to describe and model the economy, and importantly, 
because incorrect conclusions are drawn from the models, there is no harmony 
between fiscal and monetary policies (Chapter six: Relationship between fiscal and 
monetary policy in the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st century). It 
is worth following the historical road that begins with the bank that finances the 
state and ends with a central bank independent of government finances, with the 
function of targeting inflation, dragging and pulling interest rates – and thereby 
international capital movements. And we should also consider – in light of the 
harmful processes mentioned above – what could function as the new basis for 
this relationship.
In order to reach a fiscal and monetary relationship that is more workable than at 
present, it is necessary to understand government deficit and government debt from 
a theoretical and historical (!) aspect (Chapter 7: Government deficit–government 
debt). It is widely believed that controlling government deficit and government debt 
is one of the important – if not the most important – keys to economic and financial 
stability. The endeavour to reduce the deficit and decrease the debt follows from 
this concept. Yet, what we can see from economic and social developments tends 
to imply that there is a growing need for the presence of the state, while its funding 
is jeopardised from several sides (demographics, migrations). In other words, the 
budget deficit and the resulting indebtedness are exactly the conditions for social 
stability and sustainability. On the other hand, the government deficit played an 
important role at the time of the appearance of fiat monies, and the market of 
government debt is still the most important benchmark of money markets.
In the 20th century, not only was the relationship between the state, and between 
the central bank and the economy transformed, the structure of society and 
the family also underwent a transformation which was not independent of the 
establishment of the system of state institutions (e.g. the pension system). Families 
became smaller, and women appeared in the labour market. One thing that has 
not changed, however, is the interpretation of “unemployment” in theoretical 
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macroeconomics. Chapter eight of the book (The necessity of revise of employment 
and unemployment in macroeconomics) argues that – with the spread of the 
dual-income family model and single-adult households – it is no longer possible 
to classify persons of working age as active and inactive, as was possible at the 
time of the single-income family model. From that it follows that unemployment 
and inactivity cannot be interpreted and measured separately, instead of these, 
employment should be placed in the focus of macroeconomic thinking and aims 
of economic policy.
Pensions are the “invention” of the last two centuries, and presumably this 
invention has significantly contributed to the transformation of Western society; 
the established social and family structure makes it necessary to retain the pension 
systems, since neither self-care nor family care can be ensured. However, the 
current pension system cannot be sustained and requires major transformations. 
The acceptance of the proposals for change includes reconsidering the relationship 
between the central bank and the state, because according to the contents of 
Chapter nine (A paradigm shift in the pension system), as a temporary arrangement 
in a new, state-funded old age pension system the basis for later entitlements 
of the beneficiaries would be financed by money created by the central bank. 
Of all the proposals perhaps, this one is the strongest, and it would be instantly 
denied by economists trained to believe in the indisputable independence of the 
central bank. By comparison, the proposal on the termination of state support for 
voluntary pension funds or the statement that the old age pension system should 
be independent of employment are insignificant.
Each chapter of the book The Revolution of Money has some exciting contents: 
for economists, financial professionals, bankers, practitioners or theoretical 
connoisseurs of monetary and fiscal policy. I believe some readers will be not only 
surprised and even rather astonished by the statements and proposals set forth in 
this book. This is because they have learned different things using other methods: 
they use and read the concept of “price level” every day and they are convinced 
that the bank lends the deposits it holds. In fact, it is probably not easy to review 
these entrenched relationships and abandon them. But it is certainly worth a try: 
reading the book of Tamás Bánfi offers a good starting point for that.
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Rise and Fall of the American Growth
Princeton University Press, 2016, 784 pp.
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Economic productivity and 20th century economic history can be viewed from 
a techno-pessimist and a techno-optimist perspective. According to techno-
optimists, such as Klaus Schwab, founder of the World Economic Forum, the “Fourth 
Industrial Revolution” based on digitalisation will have unprecedented economic 
consequences. Robert J. Gordon is a pessimistic economist, who believes that 
techno-optimists exaggerate the impact of digitalisation. He maintains that this is 
confirmed by the decades after the American Civil War, during which the US was 
completely transformed due to the discovery of electricity, the invention of the 
internal combustion engine and the spread of motor vehicles. Gordon argues that 
the Golden Age of American economic growth is over.
The 1870s were the dawn of the United States. Over the next six decades, 
innovations and discoveries transformed all walks of everyday life. By 1929, all urban 
homes had electricity, gas pipes, telephone, sewer systems and clean running water. 
By 1929, horses had disappeared almost completely from the streets, replaced 
by motorised vehicles. In 1929, the opportunities for the public’s entertainment 
included the radio, listening to music on a phonograph and motion pictures. By 
1929, maternal mortality had dropped to almost zero, and medicine had almost 
reached its current standard. The number of hours spent working decreased, and 
electric appliances made household chores considerably easier. This transformation 
progressed slowly, and then after 1900 it gained traction due to electrification and 
the spread of motorised vehicles. The 1870s laid the foundations of our modern 
age. Electric lighting, the first reliable internal combustion engine and wireless 
telecommunication were all invented in 1879, within a three-month period, and they 
were followed by the appearance of the telephone and the phonograph within a 
decade. The quality of food consumption, i.e. varied diets, developed at a slow pace, 
but the quantitative change was significant. Average calories consumed in 1870 
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exceeded those in the 1920s. Clothing did not change much from a qualitative and 
quantitative perspective between 1870 and 1930, but the situation of housewives 
improved considerably. Thanks to the increasing efficiency of textile manufacturing 
and the spread of mail-order catalogues, the price of clothes plunged, which, 
coupled with the increasing income of households, enabled women to buy clothes, 
thereby saving them much work. The slow growth in food and clothing consumption 
is not a paradox because households spent the money they saved on those items 
on purchasing the latest discoveries. Nonetheless, it is highly likely that the growth 
in food and clothing consumption was underestimated due to the distortion of 
the price index. The price index does not take into account that as chain stores 
appeared, consumers were able to buy food significantly cheaper than earlier. 
According to the author’s calculations, in 1911 chain stores were cheaper than 
traditional stores by 22 per cent on average. We can see a similar distorting effect 
in clothing prices, and in this case mail-order, catalogue-based merchants were 
the cheaper alternative to tailors. In addition to the distorting effect of the price 
index affecting food and clothing, the considerable improvement in living conditions 
shows that a change in real consumption does not necessarily reflect the public’s 
living standards. Can we assign economic value to the transition to fully equipped 
homes? The answer lies in the connection between prices and rents of homes and 
the various levels of amenities. Homes equipped with a bathroom were 82 per cent 
more expensive in the period under review than those without one, and homes with 
central heating cost 28 per cent more on average than unheated flats. No studies 
have been prepared concerning the price of homes furnished with electricity, but 
Gordon believes that they must have had a premium of at least 28 per cent on the 
market. The revolutionary change in the living standards provided by US residential 
buildings is one of the main topics of this book. These were innovations that can 
only arise once in humanity’s history. Although it took over 50 years for the above-
mentioned solutions providing all the necessary amenities to spread throughout the 
entire population, the process was completed by the mid-20th century. Sustained 
economic growth required a steady flow of innovation; most electric household 
appliances targeting consumers were invented before 1940, and it was only a matter 
of time for them to reach all households. The author argues that with the exception 
of air conditioning, no invention after 1940 was able to radically transform people’s 
daily lives. Homes with full amenities and vehicles using internal combustion engines 
boosted the living standards of the American population so tremendously that the 
author believes that this cannot be repeated. The dramatic change in transportation 
is portrayed by Gordon through three major channels. The first channel is the 
development of the uncoordinated, low-quality railway system before 1870. By 
1940, train speeds had increased from 20–25 miles per hour to 70–75 miles per 
hour, and due to infrastructure developments, trains were now able to cover large 
distances. The introduction of air-conditioned trains in 1940 contributed to the 
improvement of travel comfort. The second channel is linked to the development 
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of transportation within city limits. Until 1870, urban transportation was provided 
by horse-drawn carriages, at a speed of 3–6 miles per hour. By 1902, horse-drawn 
vehicles of public transportation had been replaced almost completely by trams 
and trolleys. On account of the frequent traffic jams in large cities, underground and 
elevated rapid transit railways were built shortly after the introduction of trams, and 
they were first used within the city limits, then they became suitable for travelling 
between cities. The third and most important channel was the appearance of cars, 
which transformed both urban and rural life between 1910 and 1930. Henry Ford’s 
Model T could be purchased for a quarter or half of the average annual income in 
the 1920s, as a result of which this car was available to the entire public. By 1926, 
93 per cent of farmers from Iowa and other northern states had a car. Between 1870 
and 1940, the US population rose from the period of isolation thanks to innovations 
in communication and the entertainment industry. In 1938, one-third of the total 
US population, i.e. over 40 million people, listened to the broadcast about the 
competition between Sea Biscuit and War Admiral, at one of the most famous horse 
races of all time. Between 1870 and 1940, a drop in infant mortality and contagious 
diseases can be observed. The increase in life expectancy was twice as high in the 
first half of the 20th century as in the second. The favourable health developments 
can be mainly attributed to the establishment of urban sewerage systems and 
clean running water. According to estimates, 75 per cent of the decrease in infant 
mortality was due to the provision of clean running water. Furthermore, growing 
hygiene awareness also has to be mentioned, just like the preservation of food and 
the introduction of regulations pertaining to the contamination of food, as these 
all contributed to the reduction of contagious diseases. Between 1890 and 1930, 
the environment and conditions of work experienced an unprecedented change. 
The number of hours worked per week and occupational accidents dropped, a 
much larger portion of the young generation could take part in education as child 
labour was abolished, and the innovations used in households made the life of 
housewives easier. The Great Depression and the Second World War interrupted 
these developments, but 25 years after the war, the impact of improving working 
conditions could be felt throughout the population. The reduction in the marginal 
disutility of work occurred in three dimensions, one of which was the decline in 
working hours per week from 60 to 40.1 The second dimension was a shift in the 
distribution of labour from demanding and dangerous blue-collar work towards 
white-collar work. The third and most important dimension was the invention of 
household appliances that eased the burden on housewives.
Economic growth started decelerating in 1940 and especially in 1970. This claim 
can be considered evident if we examine the changes in the quality of consumer 
goods and services providing basic necessities, i.e. food, clothing and shelter. 
1  In the steel industry, the average number of hours worked per week fell from 72 to 40.
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The better part of the development in food and clothing occurred between 
1870 and 1940. The spread of frozen food after 1940 merely provided another 
alternative to canned food that had been eaten for decades. As households’ 
income increased, the share of spending on food declined from 45 per cent to 
13 per cent between 1870 and 2012. The number of cars increased rapidly until 
1970, and then this rise decelerated between 1970 and 1990 and halted completely 
after 1990. Miles travelled by car increased until 2000 at a diminishing pace, and 
then shrank continuously between 2000 and 2014, which, according to Gordon, 
can be probably attributed to the drop in the share of the population holding a 
driving licence. In contrast to the areas examined earlier, no slowdown could be 
observed in entertainment after 1970. Among the components of the US living 
standards, entertainment opportunities increased the most between 1940 and 
2014. Today, households can access services linked to entertainment that did not 
even exist in 1940. As a result of the development in information technology, ideas 
were born that fundamentally reformed human communication and data storage 
habits. Gordon Moore, the co-founder of Intel, gave a very accurate estimate in 
1965. He believed that the memory of computer chips would double every two 
years. Between 1990 and 2006, computing capacities doubled every 16 months, 
however, the pace of development declined after 2006, and currently the memory 
of IT devices doubles every 4–6 years. According to the author, this is because 
there is no demand for the engineering expense to reduce the size of chips, since 
their current size and capacity are perfectly suitable for completing the tasks on 
desktop and laptop computers. The emergence of the Internet has transformed 
users’ communication and shopping habits. Information has become free, and new 
communication channels, such as Facebook, Twitter and Skype, have appeared. 
Despite the rising costs of healthcare, the positive impact of the development of 
the technologies used in medicine falls short of the effects seen between 1940 
and 1970. Large-scale healthcare spending on medical research and treatment 
will undoubtedly continue to raise the life expectancy of the US population at a 
slow pace, but it is unlikely to cause radical changes in the living standards of 
Americans. Since 1940, working and living conditions have improved considerably, 
but at a significantly slower pace than before 1940. Between 1940 and 1970, the 
trend that started in the early 20th century continued: tough physical labour was 
replaced by safer and less demanding activities. By 1970, household appliances 
had become almost universal among the population, which lifted the burden of 
household chores from women. Although between 1940 and 1970 modern working 
conditions became established, the transformation of women’s role in society and 
the labour market started only in the mid-1960s. Rising educational attainment was 
the main reason behind the spread of white-collar work. Child labour was abolished 
in the US before the Second World War, and by 1970 three-quarters of the total 
population had a secondary school diploma. As a result of the passing of the social 
security legislation in the 1930s, most workers retired at 62, which, coupled with 
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the rising life expectancy, placed extreme pressure on the US pension system. In 
order to maintain the financial sustainability of the social security system, most 
employers started using defined-contribution 401(k) plans instead of the annuity-
based plans in the 1980s. The author identifies two factors that have contributed 
in an unparalleled manner to US economic growth since the 1940s. The emergence 
of women on the labour market and decreasing discrimination against the African 
American population paved the way for the efficient allocation of investments in 
human capital. One study found that this labour market transformation contributed 
15–20 per cent to the economic growth between 1960 and 1990. The unique nature 
of the transition can be seen in the fact that the female labour market participation 
rate has been on the decline since the 2000s, and the difference between the 
average wages of whites and African Americans has been stagnating since 1990. 
The other reason behind the decelerating economic expansion is the slower growth 
of the population’s educational attainment. The share of those with a secondary 
school diploma has been stagnant since the 1970s, and even though the number 
of graduates increases steadily, many young graduates are unable to find work on 
the labour market.
Gordon argues that the Great Depression of 1929 and the Second World War 
contributed directly to the largest economic growth in US history. Without the 
Great Depression, the New Deal would not have been born, just like the NIRA or 
Wagner Act, which facilitated the establishment of trade unions. Partly due to 
unionisation, real wages started rising, and the average hours worked per week 
decreased from 60 to 40. As a result of higher wages and shorter working hours, 
economic productivity soared in the early 1930s, before the US entered the Second 
World War. Owing to the surge in real wages, private sector investments increased, 
which launched the process of substituting labour with capital. The other positive 
effect of the Great Depression was the reform of business models. The cost-cutting 
measures entailing mass layoffs were inevitable due to diminishing production 
and profitability. The new and more efficient business models contributed to the 
productivity growth observed after the Great Depression. The pressure exerted by 
the Second World War on the economy had a less speculative effect on productivity. 
Several economists analysed at length the speed and efficiency of building the 
Liberty freighter ships. Much to the surprise of the economists, the remarkable 
labour productivity growth persisted after the war. The drop in military expenditure 
did not reduce labour productivity in the military industry for a few years after the 
end of the war. War fostered innovation, and the productivity-boosting effect of 
new technologies took hold even in peacetime.
According to experts forecasting the impact of innovations, economic output will be 
increasingly produced by robots. Techno-optimists believe that as a result of future 
innovations, labour productivity will substantially increase, which will offset the 
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persistent mass unemployment caused by the machines. Techno-pessimists forecast 
that the emergence of technologies will not bring about radical productivity growth, 
and – similar to the past decades – it will only entail slow economic growth and 
a gradual decrease in unemployment. Statistics confirm techno-pessimists’ view. 
Unemployment in the US has dropped from 10 per cent to below 5 per cent since 
October 2009, and annual labour productivity growth is 0.5 per cent, which is well 
short of the 2.3 per cent productivity growth seen in the dot-com era between 1994 
and 2004. Gordon predicts that labour productivity will increase by 1.2 per cent 
on average annually between 2015 and 2040, which is far below the standards of 
1920–1970 and 1994–2004, but exceeds the average annual percentage growth in 
the past 11 years, and the 0.5 per cent increase observed in the last five years. The 
author estimates that in the coming 25 years, the median disposable income of the 
US population will grow by 0.3 per cent on average each year, which is significantly 
lower than the 2.25 per cent average between 1920 and 1970, and the 1.46 per 
cent between 1970 and 2014.
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Impact of the Financial Crisis on the European 
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Dániel Papp  
Kaarlo Tuori – Klaus Tuori:
The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis
Cambridge University Press, 2014
ISBN: 978-1107056558
The authors would like to make the reader see the crisis as more than just a financial 
calamity affecting government debt and the banking sector. They place the issue 
in a broader context and urge us to view the crisis from a broader public order 
and constitutional perspective, encompassing European integration as a whole. 
This is because the euro-area crisis had a massive effect on the entire European 
constitutional system. The authors thus argue that the problem can only be analysed 
taking into account the common European values guaranteed by the Treaties. In 
line with this, the authors undertake not only to paint a comprehensive picture 
of the economic reasons behind the crisis and the crisis-management solutions 
employed, but also to present a historical and conceptual analysis of the EU Treaties 
in the light of the crisis.
The book lists the economic causes of the crisis, such as the collapse of the US 
mortgage market, which suddenly turned the highly interconnected nature of 
the financial market, which had been regarded as beneficial in the EU, into a 
predicament, creating a multitude of contagion channels that enabled the rapid 
spread of the crisis. In addition to these, the book also pays special attention to 
abstract causes such as the fact that financial risk-taking and responsibility for 
those risks have not always been in direct proportion. The authors believe that 
in many cases, this could occur because governments intervened in the system 
by providing state guarantees, which is in large part attributable to the fact that 
household debt management remained within the purview of the Member States. 
The other shortcoming of the EU presented in the book is that the Member States 
disregarded the changing conditions on the global market when drafting the current 
Treaty, especially the rapidly growing clout of Asian countries.
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The most striking example of the lack of consistency between the Treaties and the 
rescue packages created in response to the crisis can be seen in the “no-bailout” 
clause of the EU Treaties. According to the clause, the EU does not bear the 
responsibility for the obligations of the Member States in any form. However, this 
is in stark contrast to the EU’s behaviour during the crisis. The authors believe that 
this was possible only because the rescue packages were obtained by the recipients 
under the auspices of the European Stability Mechanism, which is a legal person in 
international law, separate from the Member States, therefore from a formal law 
perspective it is uncertain whether it is covered by the “no-bailout” clause enshrined 
in the Treaty. This cunning legal argument was implicitly accepted by the subjects 
of EU law, since in a teleological approach, the aim of the “no-bailout” clause and 
the rescue packages was the same: maintaining the stability of the euro area. Based 
on this, we cannot say that in a teleological sense the rescue packages would be in 
conflict with Article 125(1) of the EU Treaty. The authors argue that the fact that this 
is not admitted explicitly by major EU institutions is because it would entail serious 
moral hazard, as in that case Member States could spend without limitation, secure 
in the knowledge that the EU would come to their rescue if needs be. The other 
important consequence of the crisis with respect to the EU’s constitutional order is 
that the issue of Member State sovereignty has become relativised and conditional 
on the financial assistance provided by the EU or the EU Member States. This 
relativisation could be best observed in connection with the Greek rescue package 
where the Member States providing the assistance set out strict conditions for the 
disbursement of the funds, and these conditions radically affected Greek society.
The authors believe that a straightforward solution to the above-mentioned 
problems would be to considerably strengthen the direct democratic legitimacy of 
the EU institutions, which is also part of the recent reform plans of French President 
Emmanuel Macron. Traditionally, the main institution in this thought experiment 
is the European Parliament. In order to provide a genuine solution and avoid a 
situation where Member States would feel that the EU’s economic decisions are 
imposed upon them, the decision-making mechanism should be reformed as well, 
since currently the European Parliament plays no role in most major economic 
decisions and rescue packages. The fact that the European Parliament is so weak 
is a deeply rooted problem. It is perhaps also attributable to the fact that the 
development of the European demos, just like the European identity, is in an 
embryonic stage.
The main crisis management measures were implemented without the substantial 
engagement of the European Parliament and the EU institutional system subject 
to the Treaties, within a new framework based on individual intergovernmental 
agreements. The crisis generated a multitude of official, semi-official and unofficial 
bodies which do not have formal powers, yet exert significant influence. All of 
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the bailout packages were developed by organisations such as the Eurogroup, 
the dedicated working group alongside the president of the European Council, 
or the Euro Summit. However, in some sense these institutions are not subject 
to the system of checks and balances in the EU. One good example for this is the 
transparency guaranteed in the Treaties and the right to access documents, which 
are generally implemented in the EU institutional system, however, they take hold 
much less in the case of the mechanisms that are outside of this system, for example 
in the European Stability Mechanism. One serious problem arising from this is that 
– due to the fact that the responses to the crisis had no solid legal foundations – 
the cornerstones of the EU are called into question. One such issue is the question 
of the rule of law. This is because the rule of law requires that all the elements 
it comprises be implemented. If an important element such as the right to legal 
remedy is violated, there is no real rule of law. In the case of the financial rescue 
packages, judicial control is very much illusory and could not be enforced at all due 
to the pressure on the Member States.
According to the authors, the deepening of the crisis was halted in 2012, and by 
that time there was light at the end of the tunnel. The European institutions used 
the relative tranquillity to analyse whether they were able to provide appropriate 
responses in the most pressing times and to examine the lessons learnt from the 
measures taken, and they tried to ascertain how to avoid another crisis in the future. 
In light of this, a committee was established, headed by Herman Van Rompuy, with 
the participation of the European Council, the Commission, the Eurogroup and the 
ECB, to prepare a comprehensive reform plan for the EU’s future.
The committee basically had three goals: to deepen economic cooperation, to 
remedy the democratic deficit caused by the crisis, and to coordinate the two-
speed EU. Deepening economic cooperation was mainly to be achieved through 
harmonisation of the financial intermediary system, and thus they devised the basic 
idea behind the banking union that has since become clearer and has provided 
some practical experiences. Two of the originally planned four phases of the banking 
union plan have already been realised. In addition to the Capital Requirements 
Regulation (CRR) and the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) pertaining to the 
operation of the banking system and also containing substantive law norms, the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) overseeing the finances of euro-area countries 
was also launched in 2014. With regard to the future, the authors believe that 
everything points towards the other two pillars being fully realised, thereby creating 
a full-blown common European resolution framework and deposit insurance system.
The special relevance of the work is the authors’ conclusion concerning the two-
speed integration of the EU, where they assert that this phenomenon has been 
more pronounced than ever since the crisis. Nevertheless, this is not regarded to 
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be clearly negative but rather an opportunity in some sense, because they believe 
that if the goal is to deepen integration, this can be achieved much faster and 
more efficiently by agreements between the Member States than by amending the 
EU Treaties covering all countries, since the latter are used, due to the unanimity 
requirement, by certain Member States for promoting their own interests, thereby 
obstructing the process. All in all, the authors are pessimistic about the deepening 
of the EU’s integration.
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Workshops of the Hungarian Economic 
Association’s 2017 Itinerant Conference
Péter Domokos – Róbert Hausmann – Gábor Szarka   
The Hungarian Economic Association (MKT) hosted its 55th Itinerant Conference, the 
largest annual conference of Hungarian economists with deep-rooted traditions, 
between 7 and 9 September 2017 in Eger. The Conference included 17 workshops 
in addition to the opening and plenary meetings. The conference’s keynote speaker 
was New York University professor Thomas J. Sargent, winner of the Nobel Prize 
for Economics. In this paper, we summarise the workshops of the Competitiveness 
section and Responsible corporate governance section. 
The MKT’s competitiveness section held its workshop at the Itinerant Conference 
for the second time this year, with the priority objective of drawing attention 
to structural policy. The competitiveness section examined the topic from both 
theoretical and practical perspectives, providing a meaningful contribution to the 
development of economic thinking on sustained convergence in Hungary.
At this year’s workshop, the competitiveness section hosted three foreign and three 
Hungarian speakers who spoke about the definition of competitiveness and the 
associated methodological questions, and also investigated the competitiveness of 
the CEE region and Asia from various aspects. The presentations on the different 
dimensions and the diverse findings confirm that competitiveness cannot be given 
a single definition and that there is no single recipe for successful economic and 
social convergence, even if certain international experiences can often be adapted. 
However, there was consensus among the speakers on the fact that knowledge and 
innovation-based development is the best way to increase competitiveness in a 
sustained manner. Hungary’s macroeconomic figures provide an adequate basis for 
achieving a competitiveness turnaround and thus achieving sustained convergence.
Tan Khee Giap, Co-Director of the Asia Competitiveness Institute and professor 
based in Singapore, spoke about the central role of the state in avoiding the middle 
income trap, primarily through its economic stimulating, social balancing and 
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political stabilising functions. An efficient state is also essential according to the 
IMD’s chief economist, Christos Cabolis. He also drew attention to factors such as 
infrastructure, economic openness, the availability of skilled labour and an ideal 
labour market environment. Polish professor Arkadiusz M. Kowalski identified 
the development of independent technologies, in addition to stable economic 
fundamentals, as the key to maintaining and improving competitiveness. This, 
however, calls for a technological turning-point in Hungary according to professor 
László Monostori. The National Competitiveness Council established this year 
may contribute greatly to a competitiveness turnaround in Hungary according to 
Deputy State Secretary of the Ministry for National Economy, László Turóczy. MNB 
experts Gergely Baksay and Gábor Horváth gave a presentation on the relationship 
between the banking system and competitiveness, presenting the central bank’s 
newly developed international banking system competitiveness index. University 
professor Zoltán Sipos identified the quality and measurement of education and 
close cooperation between universities with a new generation of students and 
the corporate sector as the cornerstone for improving Hungary’s competitiveness. 
Tan Khee Giap, Co-Director of the Asia Competitiveness Institute spoke about 
the successful economic model of Asia and Singapore, the competitiveness of 
far Eastern countries and the research organisation’s methodology for measuring 
competitiveness. Giap, who holds a PhD from the United Kingdom, is a professor at 
the National University of Singapore and also Chairman of the Singapore National 
Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation. He has also served as a consultant 
to international agencies such as the ASEAN and the United Nations, is the lead 
author of 20 books and is a member of the editorial advisory committee of the 
British Competitiveness Review. His research interests include the Cost of Living 
Index and the Global Liveable Cities Index and competitiveness analysis on China, 
India and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) economies.
According to Giap, East Asia’s economic development model is based on overcoming 
(1) production, (2) infrastructure and (3) financial challenges which helps overcome 
the middle income trap and may be the right path for Eastern European countries. 
He deems that successfully achieving these three criteria and thereby achieving 
economic convergence calls for a strong and responsible role for the state. 
According to his presentation, the role of the state must focus primarily on its 
economic stimulating, social balancing and political stabilising functions. The 
professor emphasised the importance of SMEs in improving competitiveness, mainly 
through their capacity to create jobs, flexibility, cost-effectiveness and innovative 
capacity. Tan Khee Giap presented the Asia Competitiveness Institute’s current 
efforts to develop a productivity and efficiency assessment index for SMEs that will 
be capable of measuring their competitiveness. He specifically emphasised that 
SMEs must be given state support in making digital progress, as failure to do so 
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will give an advantage to multinational corporations. On this note, he mentioned 
Hungary’s Funding for Growth Scheme as an exemplary initiative, emphasising the 
significance of the MNB’s measures to support SMEs. In the context of an economic 
history overview, he noted that Singapore’s economic structural transformation was 
mainly built on its people, progressing upwards within the production chain and 
the reinforcement of high-tech industries. Education and innovation have become 
the foundations of competitiveness.
The main advantage of the competitiveness index created by the Asia 
Competitiveness Institute is that it uses a regionally interpretable objective 
weighting method that enables the comparison of countries in space and time. 
The ranking, which includes 100 basic indicators, classifies the dimensions of 
competitiveness into four categories and 12 pillars in which the four areas have 
identical weights.
Christos Cabolis, chief economist at the IMD World Competitiveness Center, gave 
a presentation on the methodology for measuring competitiveness and Hungary’s 
competitiveness. Cabolis has held numerous academic positions at various 
universities, including Yale, and has published on the topic of competitiveness in 
numerous publications. His current research areas include the evaluation of credit 
rating agencies, the interaction between competition and specialisation of venture 
capital companies, and optimal bank size.
Cabolis stressed that the state plays an important role in creating an environment 
in which companies are able to produce high value added products. He added 
that participating in the high value added phases of the value chain and efficiency 
are one of the cornerstones of corporate profitability that contribute to both job 
creation and sustained convergence. He gave a particularly positive assessment of 
Hungary’s experiences in terms of job creation. Successful corporate governance 
also plays a pivotal role in company growth, but regular renewal and innovation 
along with identifying talent are also important factors.
According to Cabolis, economic openness plays a major role in national 
competitiveness and correlates with competitiveness. The more open an economy, 
the better it places in competitiveness rankings. A 2017 analysis by the IMD World 
Competitiveness Center identified Hong Kong, Switzerland and Singapore as the 
three most competitive states in the world. According to the IMD survey, the factors 
that contribute the most to Hungary’s competitiveness are skilled labour, the labour 
environment and commercial relations. On the other hand, opportunities for 
development were identified in areas such as governmental and business efficiency. 
The IMD digital competitiveness ranking was also showcased at the end of the 
presentation, with its main pillars consisting of knowledge, technology and future 
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readiness. Improving flexibility and the capacity to adapt and further developing 
education may play a pivotal role in addressing digital challenges.
Arkadiusz M. Kowalski, professor of the World Economy Research Institute at the 
Warsaw School of Economics, investigated the competitiveness of the Visegrad 
Group using a multiple dimension econometric model. Kowalski has previously 
worked at Poland’s Ministry of Economy in the domain of innovation policy and 
business clusters, has written numerous papers on competitiveness and international 
economics and also contributed to compiling the Polish competitiveness report. 
His presentation focused on the past economic performance of the Visegrad Group 
over the past nearly 30 years, identifying GDP per capita as the main indicator of 
this performance. In post-communist countries, Poland has achieved the greatest 
convergence since 1989, seeing its per capita GDP (based on PPP) go from 38% 
to 65% of the EU15 average. Kowalski identifies the components of economic 
convergence as (1) economic growth, (2) price stability, (3) full employment and 
(4) fiscal and (5) external balance, which he sums up as the “Pentagon of economic 
performance”. The economist made a distinction between macro-level and micro-
level competitiveness: the former is based on national attributes and is defined 
by economic policy, while the latter can be interpreted through the quality of the 
business environment and the competitiveness of firms.
According to the speaker, the influx of foreign direct investment contributed to 
the economic convergence of the V4 economies, the dynamic multiplier effects 
of which also had a positive impact on economic and social dimensions. Although 
FDI-based investments contributed to the region’s technological convergence, the 
development of own technologies is necessary to maintain competitiveness and a 
knowledge and innovation-driven economic model needs to be created. Defining 
research and development directions (by identifying beneficiary sectors) is the 
state’s central (top-down) function, but is also based on bottom-up initiatives. 
Regional clusters are the practical embodiment of innovative (R&D based) sectoral 
collaboration, and their spread will form the foundations of a competitive economy 
in the future. Kowalski argues that Hungary is in a particularly good position in terms 
of innovation within the Visegrad Group.
László Monostori, president of the Industry 4.0 National Technology Platform and 
Director of the Hungarian Academy of Sciencesˊ Institute for Computer Science 
and Control (SZTAKI), held a presentation on the significant technological turning-
point necessary to achieve a turnaround in competitiveness. Monostori is a full 
member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and university professor of the 
Faculty of Mechanical Engineering of the Budapest University of Technology and 
Economics. Winner of the Széchenyi Award and recipient of the Knight of Cross 
from the Order of Merit of the Hungarian Republic, László Monostoriˊs research 
areas include intelligent production processes and systems, real time cooperative 
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corporations and change and disruption management within the manufacturing 
structure.
Industry 4.0, or the fourth industrial revolution includes the creation and spread 
of cyberphysical systems. As part of this process, the integration of reality and 
virtual reality, unattainable in the past, will be used to implement a new level of 
organisation and regulation of the entire value chain within product lifecycles. The 
cycle is based on the real-time availability of information. New business models 
emerge as a result, which strive to serve increasingly individualised customer needs. 
Monostori argued that Hungary has much to do in order to take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by Industry 4.0, mainly in the realm of education to develop 
digital competencies, renewing companies’ equipment and providing direct and 
indirect support to SMEs.
To foster the national adaptation of the fourth industrial revolution, every 
industrially developed country is devising strategies. These include Germany’s 
Industrie 4.0 strategy, China’s Made in China 2025 programme and Japan’s 
Industry 4.0, Society 5.0, as well as the Robot Revolution Initiatives. In Hungary, 
the Industry 4.0 National Technology Platform is aimed at fostering the spread 
of the fourth industrial revolution mainly by providing a framework for the 2016 
Irinyi Plan and the objectives defined in the Industry 4.0 strategy. Monostori said 
that in the context of the discussed process, poles of excellence in production 
information technology and production management will be created with the task 
of accelerating the innovation process, creating digital industrial solutions, training 
a new generation of qualified experts and fostering the emergence of a sustainable 
and competitive production ecosystem.
Representing the Hungarian government, László Turóczy, Deputy State Secretary 
for economic planning and competitiveness of the Ministry for National Economy 
(NGM), gave a presentation on the Hungarian aspects of competitiveness and the 
activities of the National Competitiveness Council which was established this year. 
In his introduction, Deputy State Secretary Turóczy stressed that competitiveness 
can be identified over the long run based on the level of productivity, which 
defines the economy’s growth rate. While the traditional economic policy tools 
for stimulating growth seem to have run out, the emphasis is increasingly shifting to 
competitiveness-based economic policy. The NGMˊs Deputy State Secretary stressed 
that low wages in Hungary no longer give it a competitive edge and sustained 
convergence calls for the creation and spread of higher value added activities.
In order to achieve convergence objectives, the Hungarian government established 
the National Competitiveness Council in March 2017 to deepen professional 
dialogue and professionally prepare political decision-making in the affected 
area. Deputy State Secretary Turóczy stressed that the National Competitiveness 
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Council is a consultative body based on the professional apparatus of the NGM 
(and of its members) and the professional authority of its members that formulates 
non-binding recommendations for improving competitiveness in Hungary. 
The body has so far assessed and crafted recommendations on the business 
regulatory environment, the supply of competitive labour and economic and 
social digitalisation. Going forward, after fine-tuning the economy, the National 
Competitiveness Council will also address structural matters (such as education 
and productivity) in the course of which it will involve external experts in the 
professional forum.
Gergely Baksay and Gábor Horváth gave a presentation on the measurability 
of banking system competitiveness and reported on the new banking system 
competitiveness index created by the central bank. In the first half of the 
presentation, Gergely Baksay, the MNBˊs director in charge of competitiveness 
explained how the banking system affects competitiveness and the perspectives 
for investigating this. Banks can contribute to the sustained convergence of the 
national economy through the efficient and sustainable allocation of funds in the 
long term. For this, customer needs must be met on the one hand, while remaining 
attractive to investors (banking system shareholders) on the other hand. Banking 
system competitiveness can thus be interpreted in two distinct segments: the 
user side and the investor side. In some cases however, there may be a conflict of 
interest between these two sides. The customer wants low interest rate spreads, 
numerous branch offices and as much competition as possible, while profit-oriented 
shareholders want less competition, higher interest rate spreads and cheaper 
operation (for instance, fewer branch offices). The MNB’s experts deemed that 
this conflict is resolved over time and the two approaches can become mutually 
reinforcing in the long term, and a competitive banking system serves the interests 
of both groups. For instance, the user base may grow in response to a banking 
system that is more focused on customer interests, which increases return and 
enables more investments. Although the role of financial intermediation is covered 
by international competitiveness surveys, it is only assessed partially based on 
specific criteria. However, a broader international comparison is important for the 
MNB, and so it developed a banking system competitiveness index for the entire 
European Union based on objective fundamentals and factoring in both user and 
investor aspects using the available statistical data and surveys.
Chief economic expert Gábor Horváth explained that the index factors in availability, 
quality and pricing from the user side, and the aims to measure the banking 
systemˊs capacity to attract capital from the investor side through profitability, 
growth opportunities, the operating environment, stability and the availability of 
new technologies. If we look at Hungary’s position compared to other banking 
systems within the EU, the main shortcomings on the financing side can be identified 
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in the realm of household loan prices, digitalisation and product penetration. In 
terms of its capacity to attract capital, improvements are mainly necessary in the 
banking systemˊs technological and cost efficiency ratios. Improvements in efficiency 
and a change in mentality would be the strongest drivers of competitiveness gains 
in the Hungarian banking system. In addition, unexpected innovation can disrupt 
the status quo at any time, so every sector must shape its services flexibly, looking 
ahead and factoring in the needs of younger generations.
In the final presentation including the competitiveness section workshop, Zoltán 
Sipos, professor and head of department at Zsigmond Király University, presented 
the results of a study investigating the competitiveness of private higher educational 
institutions that he co-authored with the rector of Zsigmond Király University, 
Péter Szatmári. Siposˊ main research areas are international marketing strategies, 
postmodern marketing in tourism and the development of international business 
methods. His key publications address the international business relationship 
network.
In his presentation, he criticised the current measurement practices of higher 
education competitiveness in Hungary, which have a flawed approach to the group 
of higher education institutions in Hungary and fail to sufficiently factor in outcome 
indicators. He also added that in his opinion, the Hungarian methodology does 
not allow for international comparison and because only the leading Hungarian 
universities appear in international rankings, we have no realistic picture of the 
other Hungarian institutions. Hungarian practice primarily looks at input indicators 
(such as the number of applicants and admission score thresholds) while only 
factoring in research results (such as publications and impact factor) among output 
criteria, while ignoring graduates’ knowledge, competencies and employment 
opportunities.
The author formulated recommendations for improving the standard of Hungarian 
higher education based on his experiences drawn from private higher education. In 
his opinion, institutions must react flexibly and quickly to challenges, particularly 
those associated with generation Z, remain open to new opportunities and 
innovation and maintain continuous operative ties with market players, which 
can be achieved through dual training. These require a stable higher education 
development strategy ensuring, through a reform of the accreditation system and 
through performance measurement based on learning outcomes, that graduates 
have competencies tailored to the needs of the market.
The Responsible corporate governance section held an independent workshop 
for the first time this year. The workshop’s topic was presenting the challenges 
to corporate growth through the example of generational changes in family 
businesses and corporate governance practices associated with presence on 
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the stock exchange. Bianka Parragh, member of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s 
Monetary Council, chaired the workshop and explained the importance of the 
values represented by the renewed section in her keynote address: the spread of 
corporate governance practices contributes significantly to improving the country’s 
competitiveness, as transparent corporate governance conducted according to high 
standard principles improves efficiency and boosts company value.
During the first part of the workshop, the speakers addressed the issues associated 
with the generational change in family businesses which are not traded on the 
stock market. Tamás Madlena, deputy CEO of the Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE) in 
charge of business development, presented the BSE’s market development efforts 
in the SME segment. While a large number of family-owned businesses are present 
on the stock market in Western Europe, this ratio is negligible in Hungary. The BSE 
has hosted almost 100 bilateral company meetings based on which it has focused 
on education (the ELITE programme in partnership with the London Stock Exchange) 
and preparations for the stock market in the medium term. The capital market 
ecosystem can be established in the long run and with a systematic approach, in 
which the MNB, as the owner, is a supporting partner.
After Tamás Madlenaˊs presentation, Dávid Boross, co-president of the Family 
Business Network Hungary (FBN-H) and also the second generation owner and 
manager of the horticultural company Oázis Kertészet, spoke about the importance 
of generational changes for family businesses. The topic is particularly important 
because many of the founders of family-owned businesses accounting for 
approximately half of Hungarian GDP will reach the age of 60-70 during this decade. 
Only a third of businesses will survive the first generational change. FBN-H provides 
assistance for conscious planning and a successful generational change.
Kálmán Nagy, partner at Concorde MB, gave a presentation about the weight of 
medium and large corporations within the Hungarian economy (approximately 
2,000 companies with EBITDA of over HUF 250 million) and the significance of 
the wealth to be legated (approx. HUF 2 trillion), which may be properly managed 
by the trustee. This market is currently underdeveloped and inactive in Hungary. 
If confidence, predictability and experience are improved adequately, trusts may 
spread in Hungary.
During the panel discussion that followed the presentations, Márton Michaletzky, 
Head of Issuers Acquisitions Division of the BSE, and András Szabó, founding owner 
of iData, joined the speakers to discuss the elements of successful generational 
change with the audience’s active participation. Dávid Boross stressed the 
importance of the family Constitution in which family and business rules are 
separated and the conditions of operation are defined.
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During the second part of the conference, the financial director of MasterPlast, 
Róbert Nádasi presented the company’s history to highlight the conscious 
development that has always been aimed at bringing the company to the stock 
market. He particularly emphasised the significance of an external professional 
board of directors separate from the owners and the role of publicity associated 
with being present on the stock exchange in helping the company’s owners shape 
its long-term strategy and future prospects and understanding of their company 
with the help of regular disclosures and investor questions and feedback.
Levente Zsembery, chairman of the Hungarian Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association (HVCA), spoke about the objectives and expectations of venture 
capitalists. Venture capitalists are looking for a credible story (adequate market, 
product, management, motivational structure) for which they provide smart money: 
capital, a relationship network, support, feedback and financial literacy training. 
The presentation’s concluding thought was to highlight the corporate governance 
shortfalls of Hungarian companies.
During the panel discussion that followed the presentations, the Marketing Director 
of the BSE, Balázs Bozsik and OTP Bank’s Head of Legal Services, Zsolt Wieland, 
joined the speakers. The participants analysed the development opportunities for 
the Hungarian capital market which urgently calls for government support, the 
establishment of trust and the selection of the right companies, along with the 
right owner mentality.
The Itinerant Conference addressed relevant topics, hosted interesting and credible 
professional speakers and actively involved the audience. The topic that elicited the 
greatest response from the audience was generational change for family businesses. 
The section introduced itself successfully and plans to present new programmes 
in the near future, in the wake of which the section’s members and activities are 
expected to increase.
The concepts addressed at the workshop can be summarised in the following points 
and recommendations:
•  Fostering the spread of the best Hungarian corporate governance practices 
which can improve competitiveness within the national economy: this can be 
achieved by formulating recommendations, defining rating systems or spreading 
international best practices to serve as examples.
•  A successful change in generations by Hungarian small and medium-sized 
enterprises is a national economic interest that can be a defining factor of 
competitiveness even in the short and medium run. The matter’s economic impact 
should be better evaluated and an action plan created (drawing attention to the 
importance of the matter, creating government programmes, communication).
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•  It is essential to handle certain sectors simultaneously involved in capital 
and knowledge-intensive activities on a priority basis. Support in the form of 
monitoring and targeted programmes in relation to the need for R&D&I and 
the involvement of the available resources would be called for. This group of 
corporations is most closely affected by technological progress and easing 
the conservative capital structure would open the door for faster growth and 
incentivise innovation.
•  The importance of developing the capital market. Venture capital financing and 
the creation of the necessary ecosystem requires development and contributes 
to dynamic economic growth, achieving a more balanced capital structure and 
successful generational change for SMEs, which requires the targeted transfer of 
capital market knowledge to a targeted group of companies.
•  The BSE plays an essential role in education and creating the ecosystem.
•  The BSE’s role as advisor and partner and more conscious communication on 
this subject.
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Report on the Digital Currencies International 
Conference
Gábor Horváth
On 6 November 2017, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) Department of the Corvinus 
University of Budapest hosted an international conference on digital currencies at 
the Bálna event hall in Budapest. The eventˊs keynote speaker was Michael Kumhof, 
Senior Research Advisor at the Bank of England, well-known expert on the topic 
and a member of the editorial team of Ledger, the first proofread academic journal 
specialising on virtual money and blockchain technology. Ken Lo, owner and CEO of 
the ANX Hong Kong Bitcoin exchange, arrived from the private sector and made the 
event unique with his presentation. There was substantial interest in the conference 
and the topic, as was clearly reflected by the nearly 450 participants. The first 
section of the conference focused on central bank digital currency (CBDC), while 
the second section was centred on Bitcoin and other altcoins as well as blockchain 
technology.
Dániel Palotai, executive director at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB), opened the 
conference; in his welcome speech, he highlighted that innovations and fintech 
companies may restructure the current financial system in many aspects. Bitcoin 
and the Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) serving it enable direct settlement 
between the participants without a central or intermediary party. Despite the 
increasing popularity of virtual money, experts disagree: some of them believe 
that Bitcoin and other alternative, encrypted digital currencies may not play the role 
of money over the long run since they are too volatile, risky and energy intensive. 
However, the global trend – according to which the market capitalisation of Bitcoin 
and other altcoins has substantially increased over the past period – cannot be 
disregarded. The question is: Will more mature versions of these alternatives, 
which have outgrown their childhood diseases, represent a challenge later on to 
fiat money and ultimately also a challenge to central banks? This is the key question 
not only for central banks and governments, but also for every credit institution.
In his opening address, Kristóf Lehmann, head of the MNB Department, expressed 
his joy at seeing the diverse range of participants which was partly due to the 
current interest in the topic, and partly to the appeal of the internationally 
recognised names among the speakers. Making reference to a recently published 
paper of BIS, Lehmann pointed out that it is not likely that the Bitcoin and other 
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digital currencies will be able to take over the role of the currencies issued by 
states, but he underlined that the distributed ledger technology behind virtual 
money could be deployed in other areas. Most recently, a few large central banks 
(BoE, Fed, Riksbank) announced that they are analysing and testing the application 
opportunities of the technology and even the possible introduction of virtual central 
bank currencies. In order to clearly see what this is all about, it would be worthwhile 
to analyse and group digital currencies based on various attributes within the 
dimensions also discussed by Kristóf Lehmann. For example, based on who the 
issuer is (central bank or private), the form of the currency (electronic or physical), 
the participants who have access to it (every participant or only a limited circle of 
participants), and the type of settlement mechanism (centralised or decentralised).
Based on this classification, if we assume that the central bank is the issuer and 
the form of the currency is electronic, then we can still differentiate four different 
central bank currencies available in digital form: (1) currently existing reserves of 
commercial banks kept with the central bank, (2) the currently non-existing deposit 
accounts of households and firms kept with the central bank, (3) the settlement 
operating on distributed ledger basis exclusively available for commercial banks, and 
(4) digital currency available for the public, registered on distributed ledger basis, 
but issued by the central bank (this latter one would be, for example, the Swedish 
e-krona or FedCoin according to current plans).
Michael Kumhof previously worked for the IMF, where he was responsible for the 
development of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, and was 
one of the authors of a study entitled “Chicago Plan Revisited”. With his co-author 
John Barrdear, Kumhof analysed the introduction of central bank digital currencies 
available for households and companies in their paper titled “Macroeconomics 
of Central Bank issued Digital Currency”. We might say that there is no other 
researcher in the world who is better prepared than Michael Kumhof when it comes 
to presenting the economic effects of central bank digital currencies.
In his address, Kumhof presented the economic effects of the introduction of central 
bank digital currency under the circumstances as detailed in the abovementioned 
study.1 In the presented model, a stock of central bank digital currency equivalent to 
30 per cent of the GDP is introduced in such a way that the central bank purchases 
a stock of government bonds from households, equivalent to the quantity of the 
issued digital currency. This reduces real interest rates and thereby boosts aggregate 
demand in parallel with decreasing tax burdens, thanks to which the potential 
issuing finally increases by 3 per cent in the model. In addition, the inflation target 
and the counterpointing of business cycles become more achievable through the 
countercyclical pricing of the central bank digital currency. The presenter pointed 
1  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/workingpapers/2016/swp605.pdf
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out that under the conditions they had calibrated, the introduction of the central 
bank digital currency does not modify the banks’ money creating capacity, so the 
financial system will not be significantly restructured merely by the introduction of 
the digital currency. The nature of the introduction, a controlled transition and the 
analysis of novel financial stability risks call for further detailed research.
In connection, Lajos Bartha, Director of Financial Infrastructures at the MNB, noted 
in his presentation that currently everyone is curious to see what kind of challenge 
FinTech will represent for banks. However, considering the fact that an increasing 
number of central banks globally raise the idea of central bank digital currency – it 
is possible that in the end not the innovative FinTech companies, but rather the 
FinTech central banks will represent the biggest challenge for the traditional banking 
system. Bartha started off with a money theory and money history summary: he 
presented the various roles money should take, and the development path through 
history of legal tender as a result of various innovations. He highlighted that until 
now central bank currencies in digital form were only accessible by the banking 
system, i.e. they were not available to households and companies. One of the 
possible paths of development is that central bank currencies available in digital 
form will become accessible for the public, i.e. central bank digital currencies will be 
introduced. Bartha pointed out that a central bank digital currency available to the 
public can be implemented in several ways; by expanding the traditional account 
management systems and by the same token, anonymity should also be ensured 
along with digitalisation, which introduces a further aspect into our taxonomy based 
on BIS. The presentation listed different motivation factors driving the introduction 
of a central bank digital currency: placing innovation at the forefront; the availability 
of risk free digital money; increased financial awareness entailed by the even 
broader use of electronic payment methods; the support of more efficient monetary 
policy. All of these factors explain why a number of central banks are contemplating 
the possibility of introducing a central bank digital currency.
According to Bartha, however, we should also see that this possible introduction 
raises a number of questions and risks from the perspective of financial 
infrastructure as well, such as how could a central bank provide the related services, 
how could the cyber security resilience of the central infrastructure be ensured, 
how could the central bank meet those legal requirements (for example client 
due diligence) that the central bank itself requires from commercial banks. Bartha 
pointed out that the introduction could be implemented in at least three different 
manners: on a traditional account basis, on a “value basis”, with solutions similar to 
prepaid cards, where not only the digital form but also anonymity can be ensured, 
or based on the distributed ledger technology also applied for Bitcoin, among 
others. According to the presentation, the pioneer Bitcoin has limitations in terms 
of money functions: the intermediary function is substantially restricted by the low 
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penetration in the acceptance network, the high exchange rate volatility limits the 
settlement unit function, while the value retention function is constrained not only 
by the previous factor, but also by the lack of an institutional background. Some 
factors limiting the role of the central bank digital currency in payment turnover 
also arise, which are partly specific Hungarian issues: although the technology is 
already generally available, cash turnover is still overwhelming in Hungary especially 
in the countryside; and if the market of payment services becomes one-tiered, who 
or what shall motivate further innovation or development?
In relation to the final proposal of Lajos Bartha, in the last presentation of the 
first section, Gergely Szabó, economic research expert at the MNB, talked about 
the potential impact of central bank digital currencies on money creation and the 
financial system. He demonstrated that a change in format, i.e. a central bank 
currency available to the public in digital form may potentially bring about some 
changes in content. After a short endogenous money theory introduction, Szabó 
said that over the past years a number of reputable researchers, including Michael 
Kumhof and several of his co-authors, demonstrated money creation in the banking 
system through lending. He also pointed out that the banksˊ money creating 
capacity is attributable for the most part to the fact that only the money created by 
banks is available in digital form to households and companies. Because the central 
bank currency is not competitive in terms of form, the money created by the banks 
is converted less and less to central bank money (to cash). Not necessarily, but all 
of this may change if a central bank currency became competitive also in terms of 
form, similarly to the money issued by commercial banks. This is because in this 
case part of the deposits created in the course of lending could leave the banking 
system and migrate into central bank money.2 But this may place the banking 
system in a position – especially if commercial banks have no or only limited central 
bank resource availability – whereby it can only land money if it has preliminary 
savings, term deposits and investments. Therefore in an extreme case – should sight 
deposits kept by the banks completely migrate into central bank digital money and 
there would be no central bank availability – the introduction of central bank digital 
currency may lead to a system similar to a sovereign money system, where the 
money is created by the central bank while the banking system is the intermediary 
of the existing savings. Szabó emphasised that the impact of central bank digital 
currency on money creation, lending and the financial system and the inherent 
challenges have already been evaluated by several central banks. Szabó also called 
attention to the fact that a change in money creation is not a necessary component 
2  The speakers’ opinions are not uniform in that respect. In his model, Kumhof assumed that bank account 
money will first be fixed in the form of government bonds at the State Treasury and can reach the central 
bank from there to be sold against digital money. But it is important to see that in Kumhof’s model, money 
continues to be created by commercial banks in the course of lending, and the central bank is available 
for the population as an option through the above mentioned transaction, i.e. the central bank does not 
create new purchasing power (in the “pecuniary” sense), it merely provides special liquidity for society.
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of the introduction of central bank digital currency; the central bank may decide on 
the conditions of the central bank digital currency and the central bankˊs availability 
and may shape these in such a way that their impact on money creation is limited. 
Finally – as observed by previous speakers – Szabó emphasised that exploring 
the effects of the introduction of central bank digital currency requires extremely 
complex research work; some central banks, for example the Bank of England and 
Riksbank had made significant progress, but for the time being the critical part of 
research work is yet to come.
The second section focused on Bitcoin and other altcoins. The first speaker of this 
section was Antal Kuthy, a recognised expert in the field of cryptography, founder of 
E-Group, a supplier to China Union Pay among others, who presented in detail the 
technology behind Bitcoin. He demonstrated that one of the strengths of Bitcoin is 
that it combines in a single applicable use many, already partially existing novelties 
available in different areas. The technology combines the building of consensus, 
distributed registration and encrypted procedures. Kuthy emphasised that the 
technology is not identical with cryptocurrencies but goes far beyond them. The 
registration of money is only a narrow field among the possible fields of utilisation. 
Blockchains may store not only numbers representing money, but also any other 
information such as contracts acting as programs. Kuthy stressed the Ethereum 
Project which has the objective of broadening the areas of application, i.e. providing 
a framework that can be applied by any utilisation working on distributed ledger 
basis.
Kuthy’s presentation was followed by Ken Lo, the CEO and shareholder of the 
Hong Kong-based ANX Bitcoin exchange, with over 1 million members from more 
than 50 countries. Ken Lo emphasised that there is currently a significant “hype” 
surrounding not only Bitcoin but all other altcoins (Ethert, Ripplet and the other 
1,200 cryptocurrencies). The exchange rate is extremely volatile, and huge price 
fluctuations are possible within a few days or possibly even within just a few hours. 
A few years ago cryptocurrencies were considered as a toy of some IT geeks, but 
this has changed by now. The fact that the capitalisation of cryptocurrencies 
already exceeds USD 200 billion makes it impossible not to consider them. There 
is substantial media coverage which supports the popularity of cryptocurrencies, 
but the fact that the CME (Chicago Mercantile Exchange), the US options and 
futures exchange, will list Bitcoin among its tradable instruments is maybe the 
most significant piece of news. Currently, the majority of large investors do not have 
access to Bitcoin, but through CME practically every major investor in the world will 
have access to this market which may result in substantial additional buying power. 
In addition to cryptocurrencies, Ken Lo also presented a new application area of the 
technology in the financing of innovative investments. While in the past the main 
financers of innovative and risky investments were venture capital firms, now the 
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ICO (initial coin offering) may offer a new way in this field and in crowdfunding. 
The owner of an idea may be able to raise funds simply and globally by issuing its 
own currency (coin) and use such currency to finance its business. The advantage 
of this solution is that it can be resolved in a simple manner without any agents, 
the coin is easily accessible and can be easily sold later on the secondary market. 
However, this new form of fundraising does not relieve the investors from having 
to evaluate the actual project, as it may still carry high risks irrespective of the form 
of financing. And without market makers, completely unrealistic base prices and 
broad exchange rate movements may occur.
The second section was closed by Michal Vodrážka, Director at the Czech National 
Bank in charge of financial infrastructure. In his presentation, he described the 
official standpoint of the Czech regulation on Bitcoin and other altcoins. Vodrážka 
mentioned that for the time being this regulation treats cryptocurrencies as a 
rather insignificant matter, but that they are closely monitoring their evolution. 
The Czech National Bank does not consider virtual currencies as actual money, 
credit institutions are not allowed to trade in such instruments and their banking 
license do not extend to them. The regulation, governing the prevention of money 
laundering and terrorist financing analyses the related activities in detail. However, 
the speaker remained sceptical regarding the necessity of a major regulation on 
virtual currencies on top of the mentioned money-laundering issues, in addition 
to having drawn the attention to the serious risks related to virtual currencies. 
Although a small community is extremely committed to virtual currencies, they 
play a marginal role in transactions for the time being: in the Czech Republic only 
160 stores accept these instruments.
The conference proved to be extremely successful based on the feedback of both 
the participants and the speakers. The presented topics were discussed from 
several aspects, thus generating substantial added value and new knowledge. 
The complexity of the topic and its increasing popularity suggest that this event – 
together with the research – may well have a continuation going forward.
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The Future of Old-Age Provision – 
Demographic Change, Financial Services and 
Residential Property. International Expert 
Meeting Summary
Erzsébet Czinger
On 23 June, 2017 an international expert meeting entitled “The future of old age 
provision – demographic change, financial services and residential property” was 
held at the Andrássy University Budapest. The aim of this stakeholder meeting 
was to discuss Equity Release Schemes (ERS) and their future possibilities, with a 
special focus on Hungary.
At the meeting, the perspectives of providers, customers, regulatory and supervisory 
bodies and the academic sector were presented, and thus the topic was discussed 
from the point of view of nearly all stakeholders involved. Despite the efforts of 
the organizers, representatives of the life insurance sector, which – according to 
the current Hungarian legislation – may be the future potential providers of ERS 
products in the Hungarian market, were absent.
The meeting started with the opening address of Martina Eckardt from the Andrassy 
University Budapest (AUB), who welcomed the guests and stressed that the pension 
system in Europe is an important challenge which must be solved. The same point 
was emphasised by Dietmar Meyer, Rector of the AUB, who in his welcome address 
underlined that new approaches and new solutions are essential for Europe to be 
able to support the elderly.
The next presenter, Jörg Dötsch from the AUB, provided a short overview of the 
project “Integrating Residential Property with Private Pensions in the EU”1 and 
presented its partnership, research objectives, initial outcomes and some findings 
on the Hungarian market. Following this, John Maher from the Waterford Institute 
of Technology, Ireland focused in his presentation on the retirement income pillars, 
the potential capital and income generation/ release from residential property 
and different proposals that have been examined in the project (e.g. unitised, 
leveraged, collective acquisition of residence rights with encashment of those 
rights post retirement, or, mortgage acquisition of residence with pension released 
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from house, post retirement). Moreover, he outlined some overall parameters and 
proposals to be discussed, such as desirability and feasibility, obstacles and enablers, 
beneficiaries/ population cohorts, prerequisites for viability of the proposed 
solutions, scale of intervention and the relative priority of interventions. He also 
emphasised that if we want a good model, the scale is very important.
The next speaker, József Hegedűs, CEO of the Metropolitan Research Institute, 
Budapest, gave an overview of the topic from the point of view of a sociologist. 
He referred to the integrating mechanism concept as articulated by Karl Polanyi 
(Polanyi’s work suggests that the market cannot be sustained without state 
regulation and a particular type of developed, ingrained social culture). Hegedűs 
also noted the impact that Airbnb is having on the rental market in Hungary (shifting 
supply from conventional residential renting to short-term tourism-type renting). 
Hegedűs envisaged choices regarding three sources of solutions to housing and 
income/ living standards in retirement: state, market, family. Family solutions 
include a life support contract in exchange for tenancy or occupancy rights. 
Hegedűs characterised housing as a special commodity, which thus merits particular 
consideration and treatment in a societal context. He also stated that privatising 
housing had the propensity for reinforcing or accelerating social inequality – look 
east for example to Russia. Moreover, he contrasted active earners (asset poor 
& cash rich) with retirees (asset rich & cash poor). Hegedűs gave some insights 
on a 1998 study performed in Hungary with respect to housing equity, which 
found that a housing equity release product was not feasible. He also referred to 
a DEMHOW study,2 which concluded that releasing housing equity was competing 
with family care solutions. Lastly, he mentioned a deepening gap between social 
classes emerging in Hungarian society and highlighted the distribution of income, 
housing wealth and arrears over different quintiles.
Following this, Imre Hild, co-founder of Hild Life Annuity and founder and managing 
CEO of OTP Life Annuity presented the experiences of equity release programmes in 
Hungary from the providers’ perspective. In his presentation, The Story of the Life 
Annuity for Real Estate Model 2004–2009 in Hungary, he gave an overview of the 
main features of life annuity for real estate programmes in Hungary and highlighted 
why such programmes could be viable and attractive in the country. He categorised 
the reasons into three main groups: structural reasons (e.g. in 2004 there were 
170,000 pensioners without children and 40–50 per cent of pensions was spent 
on maintenance and upkeep), financial reasons (e.g. for most of the target market 
the apartment was acquired at EUR 1,000 and the average pension was EUR 300 
in 2004) and social reasons (e.g. Life Annuity for Real Estate has been known as a 
private contract since 1950s and it could change the lifestyle of the elderly without 
2  For more information on the results of the DEMHOW project, see http://cordis.europa.eu/project/
rcn/88908_en.html.
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admitting hardship to neighbours). Summarising the experiences of the 2.5–3 years 
of operation, he explained that the average age of the contracting parties had been 
71 years old; the average real estate value had been HUF 12.4 million; among the 
contracted properties 60 per cent had been apartments, 30 per cent had been 
houses and 10 per cent had been weekend houses; the upfront payment had been 
25 per cent of the value of the property at the beginning, which had risen to 40 per 
cent due to increasing competition between different providers; and the average 
monthly annuity indexed by inflation had been HUF 30,000. As for the overall results 
of the 2.5–3 years of operation, Hild indicated that approximately 5,000 clients / 
4,000 properties had been involved, HUF 13–14 billion in upfront payment had been 
made and HUF 50 billion in real estate value had been involved (this latest was a 
total by all three providers that were present in the Hungarian market from 2004 
until 2008, when the ERS programmes came to a halt in Hungary due to a real estate 
crisis triggered by the global financial crisis). Lastly, among the lessons learnt, Hild 
mentioned that the key had been to speak with the customer voice; the contract 
had had to be a simple, no catch contract; security meant more than cash and that 
life annuity programmes had saved lives and overall, it had proved to be more than 
a simple financial programme, since it had turned into a social programme at least 
from the customers’ point of view. However, only part of the social problems raised 
by their clients could be fixed by a financial product like ERS, Hild stated.
The last presenter, László Kalmár, CEO of Europ Assistance Hungary (a company 
active in the field of providing care and insurance services for life annuity 
programme participants), presented the topic from the customers’ perspective. 
Apart from the presentation of his company’s activities, he gave an overview of the 
number of open cases since January 2014 and he also emphasised the importance 
of being able to speak with a customer voice and also taking care of some needs 
of the customers which were not covered by the contract.
Finally, the stakeholder event was concluded with an open discussion, where 
participants also considered the future of ERS programmes in Hungary. It was 
mentioned that since 2015 only insurance companies were allowed to offer ERS 
products in the country, due to a change in the statutory requirements for operating 
such a business. However, there has not been much interest from the insurance 
companies so far, according to Ferenc Szebelédi, head of the Insurance Supervision 
Department at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, representing the point of view of the 
regulatory and supervisory authorities. All in all, participating stakeholders agreed 
that despite the present situation, the ERS market could evolve over time.
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